# EXISTENTIAL AND ONTOLOGICAL

# DIMENSIONS OF TIME IN HEIDEGGER AND DŌGEN

by

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# PREFACE

My aim in this dissertation is to establish a basis and framework for philosophical dialogue between Heidegger and Dōgen through an examination of their analysis of the true nature, structure and meaning of time in terms of a convergence of existential and ontological dimensions. Heidegger and Dōgen each seem uniquely suited for critical comparative and cross-cultural study for two interrelated reasons: They both attempt an overcoming of their respective philosophical traditions which, they feel, express unacknowledged and deficient presuppositions concerning time; and they re-orient our understanding of all phases of existence and experience in terms of time and temporality, death and dying, finitude and impermanence, issues of universal meaning which influence and determine but are not necessarily restricted by any particular historical or cultural context.

The present study has a three-fold significance. First, it focuses attention on the matter of time as the central clue to the question of Being in Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* and throughout the various phases of his philosophical enterprise, that is frequently overlooked or relegated

to secondary status. Second, it seeks to advance the Western scholarship, still in its formative stage, of Dōgen's philosophy of Zen, which clearly has a monumental importance in the history of both Japanese thought and Buddhist thought as a whole, and remains singularly contemporary in its exploration of the dynamic nature of temporal reality. Third, the dissertation attempts to ground comparative philosophy and religion in a specific yet universal issue, underscoring the differences between Heidegger's theoretical approach to ontological disclosure and Dōgen's insistence that philosophy can and must only spring from direct religious experience.

I express my deepest and heartfelt gratitude to my mentor and dissertation advisor, Dr. Charles Wei-hsun Fu, for his constructive and ever-challenging guidance, support and encouragement in both my academic and personal development. Professor Fu has been the pivotal force in shaping the outlook, direction, structure and substance of my academic career from my first semester graduate course with him through the preliminary stages and drafts of this dissertation to its completion. His insightful and penetrating method of analysis and his devotion to understanding and debate expressed in our many stimulating and critical discussions have prepared me for and illuminated the demanding task of interpreting Heidegger and Dōgen. Professor Fu's work, particularly his papers on Heidegger and Taoism

and on Heidegger and Zen, provides the meaningful and inspirational background and model for my undertaking.

I am also grateful for the advice and guidance of the other members of my dissertation committee. Dr. Gerhard Spiegler, in challenging me with his careful and thought-provoking approach to Heidegger, has greatly helped direct and refine the focus of this study. Dr. Bibhuti S. Yadav has presented an enlightening and inspiring approach to Buddhist thought both in class and in frequent dialogues. Dr. Thomas Dean's meticulous reading and stimulating suggestions have helped me clarify many points of analysis and critical evaluation. I also thank Dr. Kenneth Inada (currently at the University of Hawaii) for his intriguing advice concerning the method and content of comparative philosophy and religious thought. It was my great fortune to study in Professor Inada's seminar in Fall, 1976 and to benefit from his continued interest and assistance since that time. Dr. Thomas Kasulis (University of Hawaii) has also kindly read and made recommendations on this work. Finally, I thank the faculty of the Department of Religion at Temple University for the academic training, financial support, and stimulating atmosphere necessary for the accomplishment of the dissertation.

## ABBREVIATIONS

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| SZ (BT) | Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1953. Trans. Being and Time by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York, Harper and Row, 1972. |
| SBGZ (Terada) | Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō, 2 vols., ed. Terada To-oru and Mizuno Yaoko, Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, 1970 and 1972. |
| SBGZ "Uji" | Trans. Steven Heine, Appendix to Dissertation, pp. 279-306. |
| SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) | Trans. Norman Waddell and Abe Masao, The Eastern Buddhist, part 1, vol. 8, no. 2 (Oct., 1975), pp. 95-112; part 2, vol. 9, no. 1 (May, 1976), pp. 87-105; part 3, vol. 9, no. 2 (Oct., 1976), pp. 71-87. |
| SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) | Ibid., vol. 7, no. 1 (May, 1974), pp. 129-140. |
| SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) | Ibid., vol. 4, no. 1 (May, 1971), pp. 125-157. |

# CHAPTER I

# THE QUESTION OF TIME

## Introduction

Both Heidegger in Sein und Zeit and Dōgen in Shōbōgenzō (particularly "Uji," "Busshō," and related chapters) maintain that the problematics of existence and the limitations of metaphysics are fundamentally and directly related to basic misconceptions concerning time. Human understanding and activity tend to be fixated with the apparent stability and constancy of phenomena which are conceived in terms of serially-connected instantaneous time-units forever and irreversibly "passing us by," as if independent of existence. Time is viewed as a static substratum "in which" events transpire from the standpoint of a substantive and actual, yet fleeting, current moment linked in an endless series to past moments which have gone away and future moments which are yet to come. This static, linear conception of time, so deeply ingrained as to be considered self-evident and beyond question or doubt, is manifested in man's preoccupation with the chronology and calculation of time in terms of hourly and seasonal sequences. It also haunts

supposedly more sophisticated philosophical claims of permanence or of an eternal time conceived as an abstract, changeless realm outside of the limitations of contingent time.

In the seemingly innocuous phrase rife with misconceptions that "time flies,"[1] for example, which both thinkers cite as illustrative of the conventional view of time, there is expressed a particular ontology derived from the entanglements of existence which, in turn, further debilitates that existence, impeding genuine self-realization and self-understanding. It reveals man attached to a supposedly actual 'now,' fragmenting time into three isolated and independent tenses. The past and future, in contrast to a particular time-point in the present and revolving around it, are not actual and therefore are not considered real. The past comes before the present and has been fully exhausted when the present takes place; and the future which has not yet arrived is equally empty of actuality. Man constantly refers back to the past and ahead to the future in the expressions 'old and new,' 'beginning and end,' 'before and after,' but only relative to the supposed stability of the present. In divorcing himself from time, man thereby disperses time into separate slots or entities which are mutually exclusive: one point (t2) cannot begin until the first (t1) is finished;

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[1]See SZ 330 (BT 379) and 425 (BT 478); SBGZ "Uji" 293 (Terada vol. I, p. 258).

once completed, (t2) has no bearing on the next point (t3).

Dōgen illustrates the conventional view of time by citing the example of someone who lives in a valley, crosses a river and climbs a mountain to reach a palace at the summit. When the goal is sought and attained, the tendency is to relegate the mountain and river to things of the past which have no relation to living in the present. "Although the mountain and river are indeed here right-now, I seem to think that I have left them far behind and I act as if I occupy a palace made of rubies, thereby believing that there is a separation between myself and the mountain and river [as great] as that between heaven and earth."[2] Where is time to be found in the movement from the valley (t1) to the river (t2) to the mountain (t3) and finally to the summit (t4)? Although man is fixated on the present at any particular time, he feels that all the while now-points proceed incessantly and in rapid succession; the nows are connected in a linear series which moves on its own like a conveyor belt, sweeping man away as it rushes by him. Human events occur in time and are controlled by it. Time cannot be stopped, although it can be calculated with increasing accuracy.

"Time flies" just barely expresses, but cannot fully articulate the sense of subjugation and conflict which man

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[2]SBGZ "Uji" 290-291 (Terada vol. I, p. 257).

experiences with regard to time. Time appears to have an inevitability and unstoppable movement which is free from man and yet which continuously victimizes him. It is as if time were in pursuit of man and capable of overtaking him should he relinquish his hold on the present -- so he attempts to seize it all the more firmly without realizing its fabricated nature. Despite man's fixations, he always seems to be losing time or he can never get enough of time as he watches it speed by him. The movement of time seems to be remote and unreachable; no matter how diligently he chases after it or how accurately he measures it, man cannot prevent or dissuade, subdue or forestall the irreversible sequential tide. In fact, it is just these attempts which further remove man from a genuine experience of what Heidegger calls "primordial time" (ursprüngliche Zeit) or what Dōgen calls the "truth of [being-]time" (uji no dōri).[3]

The ordinary view is self-limiting or lacking of a

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[3]I shall use Heidegger's term "primordial time" (ursprüngliche Zeit) to refer to both philosophers' conceptions of genuinely realized time prior to, underlying, and the disguised basis of the conventional view, keeping in mind that despite the common elements in their philosophies, there are also major and significant differences which will subsequently be explored. Primordial time, to be discussed in detail in Chapter 4, is the eminently active, dynamic, non-substantial and unified foundation of the multiple dimensions of existence, including authenticity and inauthenticity, language, space, history, etc. I shall also use Heidegger's term "derivative time" (abkünftige Zeit) to refer to the conventional view, which is not a logical error or mistake, but is inauthentically derived from primordial time.

primordial basis, according to Heidegger and Dōgen, because although it holds that at any given time-point the present is unrelated to past and future, the present instants themselves are connected in a linear series of coming along and going away, arising and desisting. The present is vainly grasped as something stable, but the continuity of time is conceived as a ceaseless and relentless marching forward on its own. The fact that man is constantly measuring time and trying to refine his sense of calculation, and then lets himself be controlled by this reckoning, as if it were absolutely real, indicates how he feels victimized by time, taking it for granted as something given and not subject to inquiry without ever really understanding it or trying to become aware of the source of his bondage to it. Caught in an entanglement of seeking more time while losing his grasp on what he has, and of taking one particular moment to be appropriate or not for reasons dictated by external circumstances, man conceals from himself primordial time in insidious yet all-pervasive ways.

Both thinkers agree that the conventional view of time is not to be considered 'false' in that it does have a certain justification and can even be useful in an everyday context. But, they argue that calculative time is derivative of primordial time, springing from and yet concealing it. They insist that we constantly re-examine, re-evaluate and revise our viewpoints concerning time in accord with its

truly dynamic and unified existential and ontological nature. They consider unnecessary any recourse to Augustine's famous dictum that while everything seems to be known about time, once one is questioned, nothing is really known.[4] The matter of time is too basic and essential to be lightly dismissed, and its true nature can be penetrated and appropriated through proper analysis and understanding.

Although critical of misconceptions about time, Heidegger and Dōgen certainly do not negate time itself, but investigate the meaning and structure of contingent lived-time. They do not deny the reality of the present now, of the three tenses, of change and movement, or of continuity and duration, but re-orient our understanding of these dimensions of experience by pointing to the basic, pervasive and inviolable relation between time and the existence of self and world. Heidegger and Dōgen differ significantly in their respective views of the nature and constitution of primordial time, yet they do concur that it must be conceived as a dynamic and unified process inseparable from human activity. Primordial time does not mean that there are fixed things in an ever-changing realm called time; nor that time is merely

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[4]In The Confessions of Saint Augustine (Book XI), trans. Edward Pusey (New York: Collier, 1975), p. 194: "For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? . . . If no one asks me, I know: If I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not. . . ."

the various transformations of an essentially constant entity. It is not the meeting of one changeless substance with something changing so that the first is thereby altered. An understanding of the primordiality of temporal existence demands the overcoming of traditional notions of substantiality, actuality or constancy.

The conventional view of time is problematic precisely because it is so familiar and taken for granted as self-evident. Not only are the predicaments of existence inherently connected with time, but they are intensified because they are generally analyzed either without regard for the issue of time or in terms of the conveniently accepted sequential view. Human activity is misdirected so long as the question of time remains unexplored, and fundamental presuppositions are continually overlooked and not overcome.

Heidegger and Dōgen challenge and attempt to expose the limitations of the conventional conception in two interrelated ways: ontologically, by surpassing deficient or misleading doctrines in their respective philosophical traditions which are based on sequential time; and existentially,[5]

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[5]I shall use the term "existential" to refer to the dimension of concrete human encounters with and decisions concerning time which, in turn, reflects and determines the dimension of ontological understanding of the meaning and structure of existence. "Existential" is to be distinguished from Heidegger's terms <u>existenzial</u> (the ontological structure of Dasein) and <u>existenziell</u> (Dasein's ontical affairs

by analyzing the possibilities of human freedom in terms of genuine encounter with time in existence. First, in Sein und Zeit Heidegger charges that the Western metaphysical tradition has been forgetful of the meaning of Being because it has always accepted and built itself upon the most naive and opaque definition of "now-time" (Jetzt-zeit). Being is represented as a present-at-hand (vorhanden) being and conceptualized as the highest and/or first entity. That is, the disclosive presence of Being (Anwesenheit) is mistaken for one aspect of time -- the most obvious one, the present (Gegenwart). Being, the primordial ground and structure of existence, is thus rendered indistinguishable from a substantive being which Dasein manipulates that is present-at-hand or that bears a "constancy of presence" (ousia), because

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and factical decisions), which will always be cited in the German, even in translations of passages (since Macquarrie and Robinson translate "existenzial" as "existential," misleading from our point of view). My suggestion is that the "existential" dimension of time, perhaps as an implication in Heidegger's thought although he tends to deny it, must represent an inseparability of experience and understanding, decision and disclosure, practice and insight; in other words, "existential" is a unity of Heidegger's existenzial and existenziell from the higher point of view. The question of the relationship between the two levels of Heidegger's inquiry, the existenzial-ontological and the factical-existenziell, and of whether it is appropriate or fair to refer to Heidegger's thinking as "existential" will receive attention in later chapters in light of Dōgen's philosophy of genjōkōan (spontaneous here-and-now realization) which does not presuppose, but rather seems to consistently overcome any distinction between "theory" (existenzial) and "practice" (existenziell) from the standpoint of the ultimate identity of existential awakening and ontological seeing.

entities are grasped in their Being exclusively with regard to the present tense. This everyday, derivative view is systematized and rigidified in Aristotle's definition of time as the substantive duration of the now in relation to the receding no-longer-now and the approaching not-yet-now ("For this is time: that which is counted in the movement which we encounter within the horizon of the earlier and later").[6] Aristotle's definition can never fully disguise its derivative basis, but it has tragically been taken over unchallenged by subsequent thinkers, including the great modern philosophers.[7] It is not sufficient, however, for a thinker to merely emphasize the significance of time in order to escape the stranglehold of the conventional view. Even Kant,

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[6]Cited in SZ 421 (BT 473) from Aristotle, Physica, Book Delta II, 219b, 1 ff.

[7]Heidegger's critique is mainly directed at those modern thinkers whom he feels have both fulfilled the greatness and revealed the poverty of the traditional metaphysical conception of time -- Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. He does not generally deal with other modern philosophers who challenge the conventional view of linear and sequential calculative time, such as Bergson and Whitehead, who attempt to formulate a comprehensive and creatively dynamic temporal unity of reality. Heidegger does briefly mention in SZ 432 ftn. xxx (BT 500-501) that Bergson's philosophical project is derivative of the Aristotelian conception, and limited in that it has not first disclosed the primordial existenzial origins of temporality. His interpretation of Whitehead would probably run along similar lines. Yet, Whiteheadean process philosophy of the harmonious and dynamic universe of prehensive events and developing organisms perhaps poses a significant challenge to Heidegger's Dasein-oriented approach to the question of time.

who alone analyzes the transcendentally idealistic origin of time in terms of its synthesizing and creative epistemological function, accepts the traditional conception and leaves veiled the decisive connection between the Cartesian *cogito* and time.

Heidegger asserts that Being always has a "temporal determinateness" (*temporale Bestimmtheit*). Being is not an abstract, independent realm in contrast to or transcendent of time, but is dynamically and illuminatively revealed by the horizon of time in the most profound, basic and pervasive respects. The temporal nature of Being is continually ignored in metaphysics because Being is conceived either in terms of sequential time or as outside of time or as some entangled combination of these views. Three categories are presupposed which use time to naively discriminate various realms of entities: the temporal (natural processes and historical events), frequently contrasted with Being; the non-temporal (spatial and numerical relationships), which supposedly has little to do with Being; and the supra-temporal (that which has no bridge to the temporal), which is generally identified with Being. Heidegger maintains that the latter two categories are misleading and that the temporal category has been poorly conceived largely because it has been separated from the others. He insists that claims of eternity made from Plato to Hegel and Nietzsche are based on the untenable notion of an "endless" series of now-points

without beginning or end, and thus do not go beyond the conventional understanding. Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence of the same, for example, represents the will to power's futile attempt to perpetuate the now forever. By reducing eternity to the world of becoming, Nietzsche presupposes the fundamental bifurcation of Being and now-time and thereby reverses -- without overcoming -- traditional metaphysics.

Dōgen is critical of particular ways time has been ontologically portrayed in the history of Buddhist philosophy. Time is a fundamental issue in Buddhist thinking because the Buddha's analysis of existence, which Dōgen feels is frequently overlooked or misinterpreted, states that all factors of experience (dharmas; hō) are non-substantive (anātman; muga) and non-permanent (anitya; mujō) events which do not move in time, but are thoroughly temporal in nature. The elements of experience comprise a perpetual, mutually conditioning flux of arising-desistence, appearance-disappearance, life-death (pratitya-samutpada; engi) each and every moment which, if staticized by desire and ignorance, generates suffering (dukkha; ku) resulting in karmic bondage to cyclic death and rebirth. Despite the merits of the basic Buddhist view, the genuine significance of impermanence is somewhat neglected in subsequent historical developments of philosophy. The Abhidharma scholastic controversy concerning the essence and duration of the momentariness of dharmas, for example,

seems to reduce impermanence to a speculative issue. The Mādhyamika refutation of time as a conceptual fabrication (prapañca), an important corrective to the Abhidharma view, does not account for the deeply existential nature of mujō. Even the Hua-yen (Kegon) notion of the simultaneous interpenetration of 10 phases of time, a doctrine which Dōgen largely incorporates into his thinking, is overly speculative and somewhat removed from existential considerations. It is idle to discuss time, Dōgen strongly feels, as a philosophical topic divorced from one's own immediate and continuing temporal activity and response to impermanence. Dōgen seeks to explain the truth (dōri) of time only on the basis of the utmost exertion of the "skin, flesh, bones and marrow"[8] of the True Man (shinjin) who has fully penetrated and realized the meaning of impermanence.

Dōgen most vigorously protests the betrayal of the meaning of impermanence in the tendency to seek awakening in a non-temporal or supra-temporal realm. In the Abhidharma categorization, time is considered problematic and associated with the conditioned (saṃskṛta) realm, whereas nirvāṇa is

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[8]The phrase "skin, flesh, bones, marrow," repeatedly used by Dōgen, refers to the traditional Zen story of Bodhidharma (the first Zen patriarch to transmit the Dharma from India to China) who tells four disciples in response to their various Zen expressions that they "possess," respectively and metaphorically, his skin, flesh, bones and marrow (the last is reserved for the one who communicates by silence). In SBGZ "Kattō," Dōgen refutes any gap between external/internal, speech/silence, superficiality/profundity which may be implied in traditional interpretations of the legend; he maintains that all are spontaneous manifestations (genjō) of being-time.

non-temporal and associated and with pure space (*ākāśa*) as the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*). The Mahāyāna refutation of conceptual polarities and identification ot conditioned and unconditioned, *nirvāṇa* and *saṃsāra*, however, does not fully overcome this tendency because the sequential view of time is frequently unchallenged. The central Mahāyāna ontological doctrine of Buddha-nature (*busshō*) is represented in much of the sūtra and śāstra literature and accepted by the orthodox Japanese Tendai teachings of Dōgen's age as a permanent absolute, undefiled by change and conditions, which paradoxically manifests itself in-and-through the relative world at the point of complete enlightenment.[9] While Buddha-nature is considered to be originally *beyond* time, the process of actualizing enlightenment is depicted in terms of the linear sequential development of now-points leading to a future goal *in* time, compared to the seeds of plants which when nourished by rain issue forth branches, leaves, flowers and fruits with new seeds. Dōgen attempts to overcome this sort of static eternalism which he terms the "Senika heresy"

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[9]The Mahāyāna literature, particularly in the *Tathāgata-garbha* (matrix or potentiality for "Thus-come" attainment) tradition, includes the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*; the *Mahāyānaśraddotpāda Śāstra* (*The Awakening of Faith*, trans. Yoshito Hakeda, New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); *Śrī-mālā-sūtra* (*The Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā*, trans. Alex and Hideko Wayman, Columbia University Press, 1974); and the *Ratnagotravibhāga-Mahāyānottaratantra-śāstra*. See the Waymans' "Introduction" for a review of the history and doctrines of this literature in light of related Mahāyāna philosophical developments.

(sennigedō), the view that busshō is untouched by time in that the "house is changing but the masters are still the same."[10] Senika refers specifically to the Ātman doctrine of the Upanishads of an eternal Self which sits like a passive and impartial witness in the chariot comprised of mind, body and senses. It also designates the tendency toward a subtle, often disguised staticization of Buddha-nature which haunts Mahāyāna thought, including Zen. For example, Dōgen applauds the dictum attributed to Hui-neng that "impermanence is the Buddha-nature," but also criticizes the sixth patriarch's doctrine of "seeing into one's own nature" (kenshō) which may be interpreted as an eternal substance or substratum.[11] Dōgen also refutes the "naturalistic heresy" (jinen-gedō) which presumes that Buddha-nature will arrive on its own independent of the sustained effort of dedicated discipline.

Heidegger and Dōgen also show that ontology based on calculative time derives from existentially deficient encounters with time in one's own life. Man is so intimately

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[10] SBGZ "Sokushinzebutsu" (Terada vol. I, p. 83). Dōgen also critiques the Senika heresy in SBGZ "Busshō" and "Bendōwa."

[11] Dōgen's critique of Hui-neng is in SBGZ "Shizen-biku," in which he postulates that the doctrine of kenshō attributed to the sixth patriarch may not have actually been formulated by him since it seems to represent, from the standpoint of being-time, an heretical tendency.

related to and determined by time in terms of death, contingency and vicissitude that he tends to deny or fearfully flee from his awareness of temporal limitations, which only heightens his bondage to them. In a sense, the expression "time flies" is justified; it is actually closer to the truth than the one who utters it realizes in that the certainty of death does suggest the irreversibility of and man's dependence upon time. In Heidegger's notion of finitude (Endlichkeit) and Dōgen's interpretation of impermanence (mujō), however, contingency is stressed more deeply and radically than in the conventional view, and from a willingness to accept, confront and find freedom in terms of it rather than by fleeing it. Without such existential resolve, ontology remains misguided. So long as death is seen as an actual end to life that will arrive in the not-yet-now of endless time, primordial time is concealed. Profound awareness of and perpetual confrontation with death within existence as the extreme possibility of one's impossibility is the most convincing and significant evidence of the interconnectedness of man and time. Although seemingly nowhere to be found and the least tangible of elements, time is the most basic and undeniable aspect of experience; whether acknowledged and genuinely realized or not, it can never be escaped. Death is disclosed by Heidegger and Dōgen as the urgent, immediate and unavoidable signpost of time which disavows any attempt to divorce time from existence, and

betrays claims of permanence which bypass this relation.

In highlighting the existential significance of death in terms of disclosing the ontological meaning of finitude and impermanence, Heidegger and Dōgen do not propose that man submit to fate or be overwhelmed by the flow of time, which is precisely the attitude expressed by the conventional view that "time flies." Nor do they attempt to stop time, but to uncover and analyze the source of -- and thereby resolve -- the sense of conflict between man and time which generally causes him to fear or to wish to escape time. Awareness of death is not a cause for nihilism or dismay, but a unique affirmation. The human predicament is not generated by death, but by an unwillingness to authentically accept and confront it. By calling for continual encounter with death within one's existence, Heidegger and Dōgen insist that time can neither be denied, the conventional attitude, nor transcended, the more philosophical yet equally misguided view. Rather, they accentuate and illuminate the singular significance of time in its inseparability with human existence as the basis of freedom.

Thus, an understanding of the nature and structure of primordial time is the aim of ontological disclosure, which liberates fixation with the substantive and actual now-points by revealing the elements of existence to be dynamically interrelated through the temporal process. Concrete, active realization of true time rather than the

attainment of a goal either 'in' or 'out' of time is the basis of authentic existence or enlightenment. Although Heidegger and Dōgen agree that primordial time is the starting point of philosophical reflection, the ground of existential freedom, and the basis for the convergence between these dimensions, they approach the issue with different aims, methods and perspectives. The reasons which lead to their strikingly similar philosophies of time have quite different foundations, and it is necessary to clarify the divergent approaches and central goals before critically comparing their doctrines.

Dōgen's concern is primarily soteriological. He seeks personal emancipation from the existential anguish of suffering through insight into the truth of impermanence. The ontological question about the true nature of time is raised by Dōgen only in light of his religious quest, which motivates him to comprehend reality from the ever-flexible middle way perspective without presupposition or one-sidedness. In turn, the question of time is fully resolved only on the basis of complete existential fulfillment through sustained practice of his soteriological aims. To understand and express the inexhaustible meanings of the Way is necessarily to live and to continually renew and enhance one's authentic experience of time through the concrete here-and-now activities of True Manhood. Therefore, the three dimensions -- soteriological (the quest for

enlightenment), existential (dedicated exertion in pursuit of the Way), ontological (clarification of the truth of being-time) -- are inseparably and simultaneously realized by Dōgen as ultimately one and the same reflection of "the immediate and complete manifestation of Zen kōan" (genjōkōan): "Of whoever expresses the Way, Buddha-nature must be nothing other than the attainment of Buddhahood (jōbutsu). Buddha-nature is the majesty of attaining Buddhahood. Furthermore, the attainment of Buddhahood and Buddha-nature must be simultaneously realized as the same life and the same practice."[12]

Dōgen insists on bringing Buddhist philosophy in accord with his intensely and dramatically personal experiences of all-pervasive impermanence, and he is dissatisfied with those views which overlook or discount the full significance of existentially realized transiency. In the opening paragraph of "Genjōkōan" (which is in most editions the introductory chapter of Shōbōgenzō), Dōgen notes that although the Buddhist Way is originally beyond the bifurcations of life/death, delusion/enlightenment, sentient beings/Buddha, fullness/lack, still there is the continual unfolding of generation and extinction, arising and desistence. "In spite of this [ultimate non-differentiation]," he writes, "flowers fall amid our grudging, and weeds flourish in our chagrin."[13]

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[12] SBGZ "Hakujushi" (Terada vol. I, p. 451).

[13] SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 133 (Terada vol. I, p. 35).

The existentially experienced ontological reality of mujō generates the two-fold sense of dejection and despair or of longing and aspiration in the pursuit of soteriological deliverance, attitudes which themselves must be either uprooted or cultivated even while they cannot alter the course or resist the incessancy of change. Any attempt to negate or transcend impermanence is ontologically untenable, existentially misleading and soteriologically unsatisfactory. Dōgen does not propose a final "solution" to impermanence, but demands genuine realization which penetrates to the true existential and ontological meanings of mujō prior to man's obsession with "time flies." It is the tendency to deny mujō in the thought that there are no blooming flowers or falling leaves in the world of "the true nature of dharmas" (hosshō) that must be abated, and not the temporal vicissitudes themselves.

Heidegger's ultimate concern is ontological as he attempts to solve the ever-puzzling Western metaphysical question of Being, which he maintains is "the question of all authentic questions, i.e. of all self-questioning questions, and whether consciously or not it is necessarily implicit in every question."[14] He turns to an analysis of Dasein's finitude and the possibilities of its temporal

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[14] Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, trans. An Introduction to Metaphysics by Ralph Mannheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 5.

existence in order to prepare a fundamental ontology and not, he maintains, to offer an existential imperative or moral pronouncement. It is essential for his task to undertake an investigation of the finite transcendence of Dasein's way to be as the best access to the meaning of Being, but not to propose definite ontical modes of behavior. Heidegger asserts that while existenzial analysis is not possible without existenziell decision, fundamental ontology cannot in turn provide guidelines for action. "Existenzial Interpretation will never seek to take over any authoritarian pronouncement as to those things which, from an existenziell point of view, are possible or binding."[15] Although in his later works Heidegger does speak of "saving"[16] the modern post-metaphysical epoch from the apparent global dominance of technology, which is a consequence of the withdrawal of Being, he generally shies away from discussing any soteriological import in his thinking, and he maintains that the existential question is subsidiary to the Seinsfrage. Nevertheless, it seems that in Sein und Zeit especially, there is an existential emphasis on Dasein as thrown-projection, and a

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[15] SZ 312 (BT 360).

[16] Heidegger refers, for example, to the danger wherein grows the "saving power" for man, as the shepherd of Being, to attend the arrival of the truth of Being, in the essay, "The Turning" in The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 42.

soteriological implication in the notion of anticipatory resoluteness that are beyond Heidegger's stated or explicit intentions. This tension in the structure and execution of Sein und Zeit raises the question of whether there is a deep-rooted and problematic ambivalence in Heidegger's thinking.[17]

Dōgen philosophizes on the basis of his liberation experiences. He writes in "Uji" that without clearly perceiving and expressing the truth of time, it is impossible to "reach the moment of breaking through the barrier [to realization],"[18] for bodhi and nirvāṇa would be seen as the mere coming and going of sequential time and nothing else. Understanding true time is not only a matter of good metaphysics, but of personal awakening, transformation and deliverance. To misconceive time is to be unenlightened and to mistake oneself and/or phenomena for constant substantiality, as one who rides in a boat either thinks that he is still and that the riverbank is moving or vice-versa, but

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[17]The "ambivalence" in Heidegger's approach, which leads him to vacillate between his emphasis on Dasein's concrete decisions and affairs and his refraining from any experiential concern or espousing a practical proposal, will continually be explored in subsequent chapters as to its roots in and consequences for his disclosure of the primordial unity of temporality. It seems that Heidegger's reluctance to speak of practice may still presuppose in a subtle way the traditional distinction between theory and practice which he seeks to overcome.

[18]SBGZ "Uji" 297 (Terada vol. I, p. 258).

fails to experience the continuing dynamic and harmonious interplay of boat, water and bank.[19] Although Heidegger discloses the unified ground of care (*Sorge*) as prior to bifurcations of *theoria* and *praxis*, his *Denken* is by his own claim primarily "theoretical" (in the sense of emphasizing *existenzial* disclosure) and not "practical" (by not advocating any specific *existenziell* mode of behavior). Heidegger philosophizes, according to the claim of fundamental ontology, to the exclusion of his or any particular person's experiences. The *existenzial* structures of Dasein are not necessarily derived from or applicable to anyone's practical life, and yet are meant to constitute a theory which is universally significant for the very basis and meaning of existence itself. Heidegger asserts that "time must be brought to light -- and genuinely conceived -- as the horizon for an understanding of Being and for any way of interpreting it . . . in terms of the temporality of the being of Dasein which understands Being."[20] Yet, his aim is the liberation of Being from its objectified status, and not of himself or even of the universally conceived Dasein.

## Formative Elements in Dōgen's Philosophy of Time

Dōgen's understanding of time is shaped by several

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[19]SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 135 (Terada vol. I, p. 36).

[20]SZ 18 (BT 39).

important personal realizations of the permeation and meaning of mujō, which he later interprets as unique existential "occasions" (jisetsu) for the spontaneous manifestation (genjō) of the Dharma in lived time. Dōgen is deeply aware of impermanence not only because of the basic Buddhist doctrine of the 3 signs of existence (ku, suffering; muga, non-self; mujō, impermanence), but also because of the Japanese cultural context as well as dramatic experiences in his own life. Medieval Japan was keenly attuned to the sadness and poignancy of fleeting existence. There also developed a widely held belief which considered Japan inextricably bound by the Age of Degenerate Law (mappō) that arose due to the corruption and hypocrisy of the rapidly changing and troubled world and man's apparent failure to elevate himself above the sense of decay, hopelessness and dismay. Although greatly influenced by the Japanese ethos, Dōgen understands mujō even more fundamentally and radically than as an unfortunate historical epoch, due in large part to the early death of his parents. It is recorded that as Dōgen at age 7 observed the smoke ascending from the incense at his dear mother's funeral,[21] he was profoundly stirred by the incessant mutability of the life-death process which consumes all phenomena, the conditioned nature of existence

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[21]For biographical material on Dōgen, see Hee-jin Kim, Dōgen Kigen -- Mystical Realist (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1975), pp. 1-69.

underlying any particular experience of sorrow, loss or lamentation. "When I was quite young," Dōgen says in reference to this incident, "the realization of the transiency of this world stirred my mind toward seeking the way."[22] He was both grieved and inspired by mujō as Śākyamuni was once moved by the sight of old age, illness and death to renounce the idle luxury of the palace and seek refuge from dukkha through the cultivation of insight and meditation.

The suddenness and tragedy of death created a sense of urgency about the need to seek the Way which continued to motivate Dōgen throughout his life. In his exhortative/autobiographical works such as Zuimonki and "Gakudō-yōjinshū," he constantly reiterates the themes that life is as ephemeral as a dewdrop, that death claims the king and pauper alike, and that there is no time to waste on superfluous matters which obstruct realization. "The thorough clarification of the meaning of birth and death -- this is the most important problem of all for Buddhists."[23] Dōgen does not see impermanence as a cause for fatalism or as a reason to seek enlightenment outside of the life-and-death process. In fact, he strongly rejected such efforts to deny the flux

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[22]Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, trans. Reihō Masunaga in A Primer of Sōtō Zen (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1975), p. 66.

[23]Dōgen, "Shushō-gi" trans. Yūhō Yokoi in Zen Master Dōgen (New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1976), p. 58.

both as un-Buddhistic and, more basically, not true to the nature of his own quest and longing to find release from suffering within -- rather than in contrast to -- the unstoppable transiency of lived time. Rather, impermanence impelled Dōgen to become an avid, persistent seeker who refused to let anything interfere with his resolve to penetrate to the true nature of time. He used the ever-changing flux to enhance enlightenment by transmuting his raw sense of mujō into lucid insight into primordial time -- uji (being-time) or mujō-as-mujō -- which led him to revise or overcome many commonly accepted Buddhist doctrines. "Our body is not really ours," he later writes. "Our life is easily changed by time and circumstance and never remains static. Countless things pass and we will never see them again. Our mind is continually changing. Some people wonder, 'If this is true on what can we rely?' But others, who have the resolve to seek enlightenment, use this constant flux to deepen their enlightenment."[24]

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[24]SBGZ "Immo" trans. Kōsen Nishiyama and John Stevens in A Complete English Translation of Dōgen Zenji's Shōbōgenzō, vol. I of 2 (Sendai, Japan: Daihokkaikai, 1975), p. 58 (Terada vol. I, p. 223). Because of scholarly limitations in this translation, which does not attempt a direct and literal rendering of Dōgen into English, I will only use it when it seems to convey the full meaning of the original text. For a critique of this and other translations of Dōgen as well as recent secondary literature, see Thomas Kasulis, "The Zen philosopher: A review article on Dōgen scholarship in English," Philosophy East and West, vol. 28, no. 3 (July, 1978), pp. 353-373; see also the introductory comments to the "Appendix" (A Translation of Dōgen's "Uji") of this dissertation.

Haunted by the tragic death of his mother, Dōgen rejected his family's refined, aristocratic life-style to enter the monkhood at age 12, and eventually he went to the Tendai monastery at Mt. Hiei. His path to awakening was impeded largely because the orthodox monastic teaching of Buddha-nature was problematic with regard to time. As a diligent and studious young monk, Dōgen's experiential understanding of mujō immediately came in conflict with the Tendai interpretation of busshō as everywhere present though generally yet-to-be-realized. Awakening depicted as a metaphysical process of the self-realization of an unchanging absolute Buddha-nature, distinguished in terms of its innate and acquired, complete and partial dimensions seemed to Dōgen to negate the importance of practice and of his own existential appropriation of the Way. Dōgen was also disturbed by sectarian controversies at Mt. Hiei and other Buddhist centers over the preeminence of kōan or zazen practice, self- or other-completed enlightenment, and mind- or body-actualized enlightenment.

The problem was that enlightenment was said to be unitary and all-pervasive, and yet was continually divided and sub-divided into its various aspects. Sorrowful about the transiency of the world and seeking release though disdainful of the romanticized fatalism of the aristocracy, Dōgen found the doctrine of busshō contradictory and self-defeating, reduced to facile solutions or pat formulas that

left untouched his profound personal longing. He was told that the Way is, was and always will be right here, a view which can lead to a naive affirmation of the phenomenal world before it is authenticated by sustained practice. Why then, he asked, have all Buddhas been committed to spiritual exercise and physical discipline? On what basis was he -- Dōgen -- compelled to cultivate a meditative discipline? Buddha-nature was also said to be originally beyond time, and yet it could be approached as a goal to be attained in time. Neither of these points successfully accounted for the significance of mujō. Was there a barrier between an eternal busshō and the world of impermanence and sentience? Dōgen suspected not, but he was as yet unable to surmount this impasse. He did not recognize that his heightened sense of urgency in the quest for enlightnment due to the swift passing of time was itself a partial barrier to the realization of primordial time. The orthodox doctrines did not help him fully uproot his misconceptions; rather, they tended to reinforce them and obstruct awakening.

"The Way is basically perfect and all-pervading. How could it be contingent upon practice and realization?"[25] This was the fundamental question plaguing Dōgen, his Great

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[25]Dōgen, "Fukanzazengi," trans. Abe Masao and Norman Waddell in The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 6, no. 1 (Oct., 1973), p. 121.

Doubt Block,[26] which he forced himself and all Buddhists he met to ask in their study and training; but he did not find it answered on Mt. Hiei. Dōgen challenged the conception of Buddha-nature as a potentiality possessed by all beings somehow separable from the everyday self, or as an unactualized possibility awaiting the appropriate time for fulfillment. He was wary of any misleading objectification of busshō either as something static and eternal that did not require self-effort or as an attainable goal fulfilled only at the completion of practice. The profound and troubling soteriological dilemma which Dōgen faced, aggravated by the apparent gap between his existential experience of mujō and the Tendai ontology of an eternal Buddha-nature, is succinctly illustrated in the following mondō (Zen dialogue between masters) related in "Genjōkōan:" A monk approaches Zen master Hotetsu, who is fanning himself, and asks, "The nature of the wind is constancy. There is no place it does not reach. Why do you still use a fan?" The master replies, "You only know the nature of the wind is constancy. You do not know yet the meaning of its reaching every place";[27] and

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[26]I use the Zen term "Great Doubt Block" to refer to Dōgen's soteriological impasse caused by the apparent gap between the theory of eternal Buddha-nature and his own painful experience of transiency as well as his inability, at that point, to liberate himself from attachments to a fixated concept of self.

[27]SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 139 (Terada vol. I, pp. 38-39).

he continues fanning himself. That is, the permeation of wind, symbolic of busshō, seems to render superfluous any human action, such as waving a fan. But if the fan, symbolic of sustained practice, is not used, the coolness and freshness of the wind will never be felt.

Dōgen journeyed to China with a sense of shame and disillusionment about the weakness and inadequacy of the Buddhist Dharma as taught in Japan.[28] He soon found himself on the receiving end of such a conversation as cited in the mondō above. While living on board a docked ship, he was visited by an old monk who quickly terminated his visit despite Dōgen's insistent request that he stay the night. The monk retorted that he must return to his job of cook at the monastery, but Dōgen protested that someone of his position could easily escape this obligation. The cook made the point, however, that his monastic duty was indeed the practice of the Way (bendō), something to be eagerly pursued and by no means to be avoided.[29] This encounter shocked Dōgen into a new perspective of time and its relationship to Buddha-nature. He realized that enlightenment is not a matter of waiting, anticipation or expectation, but is to be

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[28]Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, p. 67: "I regarded the great teachers of my country as so much dirt and broken tile," Dōgen writes of the time after he read the biographies of the authentically dedicated Buddhist priests of China.

[29]Dōgen, "Tenzokyōkun" trans. Jiyu Kennett in Selling Water by the River (New York: Vintage, 1972).

actualized right here-and-now through continuing practice. The Way is everywhere, but it must be affirmed and renewed through the cultivation of sustained exertion (gyōji) which completes and fulfills it. "This Dharma is amply present in every person, but unless one practices, it is not manifested, unless there is realization, it is not attained. It is not a question of one or many; let loose of it and it fills your hands. It is not bounded vertically or horizontally; speak it and it fills your mouth."[30] The encounter with the elderly monk stunned Dōgen into a self-imposed injunctive to exert himself fully to bring forth the Way. No time could be wasted so long as it continually developed and prolonged the practice of awakening. Dōgen no longer saw time in terms of sorrow, unchanneled urgency, boredom or longing; he found that each and every and any moment could be an existential occasion to realize busshō.

Dōgen underwent one more significant experience before his breakthrough of the Great Doubt concerning the relationship between impermanence and Buddha-nature -- the occasion of his satori achieved under the guidance of master Ju-ching. It is noteworthy that Dōgen did not formulate his own philosophical understanding of the Dharma until after his enlightenment. One of his major contributions was to stress without question or compromise the absolute

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[30] SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) 129 (Terada vol. I, p. 11).

simultaneity of Buddha-nature and self-realization, which involves the identity of theory and practice, ontology and existence, philosophy and religion, original and acquired enlightenment. Philosophical reflection must derive from personal, practical experience and cannot precede it. "The Buddha-nature is not incorporated prior to attaining Buddhahood; it is incorporated upon the attainment of Buddhahood. The Buddha-nature is always manifested simultaneously with the attainment of Buddhahood."[31]

Continuing his quest in China, Dōgen was eager to be the disciple of Ju-ching, who was widely respected for his tireless, deeply sincere and uncompromising approach to Zen meditation. Only a true and inspiring master, Dōgen felt at this point, could convey the meaning of the Way through the authentic face-to-face encounter between men. The decisive moment for Dōgen came during a session of intensive meditation when Ju-ching thunderously reprimanded another monk for falling asleep after countless hours of zazen: "In zazen it is imperative to cast off body and mind! How could you indulge in sleeping at such a critical point?" Dōgen was suddenly awakened upon hearing this remark. He told Ju-ching that his body and mind had indeed been cast off (shinjin-datsuraku), and the master confirmed the authenticity

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[31]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 2, p. 88 (Terada vol. I, p. 53).

of his satori.[32] Dōgen had fully rid himself of bondage to passions and delusions -- self-imposed volitional and conceptual fixations -- and had spontaneously manifested the liberation of True Manhood.[33]

The impact of the incident was that Dōgen had crossed the fabricated boundary which heretofore separated two kinds of time -- the eternal and instantaneous, awakened and mundane, nirvāṇic and transitory, purposeless and directional. It was the point where his urgency, striving, longing and despair met and were reconciled to ultimate meaninglessness, goallessness and non-attainability, no longer in terms of futility, but as the constant renewal of the Way through continually renewed self-exertion. Instead of trying to make mujō go away or regretting it, Dōgen saw that it offered the genuine risk which perpetually enhances enlightenment.
Dōgen does not dissolve the polarities of time into a metaphysical synthesis of oppositions, an approach which is

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[32]It has been suggested by Jikidō Takasaki in Kobutsu no manebi (with Takeshi Umehara) (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1969), as a matter of personal conjecture, that Dōgen deliberately altered or "creatively misunderstood" the meaning of Ju-ching's phrase from "cast the dust off the mind," which perhaps has a subtle substantialist implication, as if there were an enduring mind which could be defiled and purified.

[33]In contrast to Rinzai's doctrine of the "True Man of no rank," Dōgen proposes the "True Man with rank" (ui-shinjin) to emphasize the concrete personal embodiment of Buddha-nature in all affairs here-and-now, in SBGZ "Sesshin Sesshō" (Terada vol. II, p. 22).

antithetical to his own, but stresses full and dynamic existential seizure of the totalistic moment, encompassing past, present and future as well as self and world, all beings and all Buddhas, life and death. To totally exert oneself is to be totally released from bondage to oneself, to gain fully integrating immersion in the impermanence of self and phenomena. The difference between Dōgen's zazen before and after his breakthrough of the gateless gate (mumonkan) is that he has achieved a genuine experience of temporal reality beyond a particular attitude-response to time limited by perspective and situational context. It is full realization of the moment by virtue of the emptiness of the moment. Because nothing is expected or sought, everything is gained. As Dōgen has abandoned hesitation, reflection, and choice, he is free for immediate, spontaneous self-surrender and self-realization, profound awareness of the mystery and precarious beauty of ephemeral realities. "Right here," he later exults (echoing the historical Buddha's proclamation), "there is no second person!"[34]

On the basis of his awakening, Dōgen developed his philosophical understanding that busshō is fully rooted within, and not in contrast to temporal conditions and the mutability of dharmic factors because "time itself (ji)

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[34]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 1, p. 99 (Terada vol. I, p. 46).

already is none other than being(s) (u); and being(s) are all none other than time."[35] The Way is a continuingly spontaneous dynamism (zenki) to be manifest right here-and-now (genjōkōan) through single-minded sitting (shikan-taza), the reciprocal spiritual communion between oneself and a Buddha, disciple and master (kannō-dōkō), and the inexhaustible possibilities of the active Buddha (gyōbutsu). Awakening does not happen once, but must be ever-continuing and ever-renewed. The identities Dōgen maintains between theory and practice, life and death, the three tenses, mind and body, self and others are based on the primordial unities of mujō-busshō and of u-ji, which represent two-fold perspectives of the selfsame, holistic, dynamically unfolding reality conceptually ungraspable yet experientially ever-manifest in each and every particularity.

Dōgen's vision had become so clear that he willingly revised and even grammatically altered previous Buddhist teachings and expressions to bring the formulated Dharma in accord with his realization of the ideal Dharma.[36] Dōgen's

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[35]SBGZ "Uji" 286 (Terada vol. I, p. 256).

[36]Hajime Nakamura in Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1964), p. 353, shows several ways in which Dōgen deliberately and creatively revises or even distorts key textual phrases to expose what he considers their fundamental and essential meanings and implications. Dōgen's creative philosophical reading and interpretation will be examined in Chapter 2 in light of his notion of the totalistic passage (kyōryaku) of the Dharma simultaneously extending throughout past, present and future.

philosophical writings are to be seen as the transmission of his full comprehension, appropriation and duplication of Śākyamuni's awakening. When he says, for example, that the impermanence of Buddha-nature is seen in 'walls, stones, tiles, grasses,' this is not merely a cognitive claim or a non-conceptual metaphor, but a reflection of his existential liberation from, through and into time. "Great enlightenment is the daily activity of the Buddhas and Patriarchs but they never think about it. Their enlightenment controls time, includes time, and is controlled by time."[37]

Formative Elements in Heidegger's Philosophy of Time

Like Dōgen, Heidegger's thinking is propelled by one fundamental question concerning the existential and ontological meanings of time. The question of the primordial meaning of time has been long neglected by his philosophical tradition; its very asking generates the overcoming or destruction of previous statically-oriented ontologies. But in contrast to Dōgen, who stresses the existential and soteriological basis of his philosophy of impermanence and being-time, Heidegger downplays any personal involvement in or significance for his "fundamental ontology." Although existential and soteriological implications can be drawn

[37]SBGZ "Daigo" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, Vol. I, p. 34 (Terada vol. I, p. 118).

from his discussion of authentic Dasein, he believes that these are restricted to the ontic level of inquiry and do not pertain to the essential nature of his thought. Heidegger expresses disinterest in or a neutral attitude towards the question of personal involvement, emphasizing theoria in uncovering the foundations of logos. He insists that his thinking responds not to an existential quest, but to the question of Being which has been forgotten by the Western metaphysical tradition. Dōgen's philosophical career began with his intensely personal realization of mujō and culminated in his universalization of the meaning of time based on this experience. Heidegger's central concern is not personal reflection or emancipation in a soteriological pursuit in the experiential sense, but the disclosure of Being. As opposed to Husserl, however, who sought to establish phenomenology as an objective scientific discipline, Heidegger argues that phenomenologico-ontology can never be a rigorous mathematical procedure, nor should it seek to be one, because it presupposes the hermeneutic circularity of Dasein's existenzial comprehension of Being and existenziell potential for authenticity as essential to the philosophical endeavor.[38]

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[38]It is interesting that Heidegger assisted in editing Husserl's work on the phenomenological analysis of time, Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, near the time he was preparing Sein und Zeit for publication, and that his hermeneutic approach toward existenzial investigation differs so greatly from his mentor's method. In a telling comment, noted by Herbert Spiegelberg in The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Nijhoff,

Thus, Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity," to a limited degree, does stress the existential (in the sense of existenziell decisions which are explored for existenzial disclosure) foundations of ontological understanding.

Heidegger attempts to lay the foundation for metaphysics and scientific investigation by rendering the Seinsfrage problematic and worthy of the asking, and he comes upon the issues of time and human finitude as the best and necessary ways to accomplish this task. "In contrast to [the ways time has been ordinarily understood]," he asserts, "our treatment of the meaning of Being must enable us to show that the central problematic of all ontology is rooted in the phenomenon of time, if rightly seen and rightly explained, and we must show how this is the case."[39] This involves demonstrating, first of all, that 'temporal' can no longer mean simply 'being in time.' Indeed, Being and its modes and characteristics have their meaning determined primordially in terms of time, and the conventional view of linear sequential time reveals this even as it conceals it.

Heidegger considers afresh the meaning of Being

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1960, p. 302), which Heidegger makes on the draft of the Encyclopedia Brittanica article in which Husserl says, "If I carry out the [transcendental] reduction for myself, I am not a human ego," Heidegger underlines the final phrase and adds, "or perhaps I am precisely that in its most specific, most amazing (wundersamst) existential possibility."

[39] SZ 18 (BT 40).

because, he maintains, it has been trivialized by the Western metaphysical tradition's dogma that Being is the most universal, indefinable yet self-evident concept. Being is said to no longer require an investigation of its meaning since it is always 'used' whenever one cognizes or asserts anything either about entities or about oneself, as in the expressions, 'The sky is blue,' and 'I am merry.' Heidegger finds this dogma self-contradictory and problematic because it takes Being for granted as the most readily apparent concept and yet resists any attempt to define Being. The traditional view conceals the fact that Being has been veiled in darkness and never explicitly disclosed. This has resulted from a tranquillization of understanding, a self-alienating flight from the disturbing, thought-provoking and enigmatic nature of Being. Anxiety is subdued, though not authentically resolved, by concern with the seemingly obvious and actual, rather than being troubled by the remote and the possible. The inflexibility and false sense of clarity of this dogma demands that the question of Being, the most concrete and significant of questions, be directly confronted. "The very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again."[40]

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[40] SZ 14 (BT 34).

Heidegger was initially stimulated in his thinking when, as a young theology student, he read Brentano's work On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle, which explores the Greek philosopher's phrase, "A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its Being) in many ways."[41] Why, Heidegger wondered, had Being come to have a multiplicity of seemingly irreconcilable meanings for the founder of ontology proper (such as, Being as property, as possibility and actuality, as truth, and as schema of the categories), and "what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?" What is the relationship between the primary and derivative senses of Being? Why also, he asked, has Being generally been conceived in contrast to time? Heidegger soon abandoned his theological studies because he felt that the development of theology as an ontical science of faith is derivatively made possible by and must therefore be primordially grounded in genuinely conceived ontology: "Philosophy is the possible ontological corrective which can formally point out the ontic and, in particular, the pre-Christian content of basic theological concepts. But philosophy can be what it is without functioning factually as this corrective."[42] It is

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[41]See Heidegger's "Preface" to William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p. x.

[42]Martin Heidegger, Phänomenologie und Theologie, trans.

imperative to uncover the meaning of Being as logos, from which theology as well as traditional ontology have sprung.

In Einführung in die Metaphysik, Heidegger notes that Western metaphysics since Aristotle has been haunted by bifurcations between Being and becoming, Being and appearance, Being and thinking, by which Being is objectified through human representation as an abstract, independent realm which stands over and against human and temporal existence. Heidegger concurs with Nietzsche that the traditional conception of Being has become in modern times an "evaporating mist" or an "empty fiction," but he rejects Nietzsche's attempt to reduce Being to the "innocence of becoming" through the doctrine of eternal recurrence. Rather, he is compelled to clarify the heretofore obscure relationship between Being and time, indirectly revealed in that: (1) time appears in a fundamental yet unclarified way in all metaphysical doctrines from Anaximander to Nietzsche; and (2) philosophers for the most part have unquestioningly and unreflectively accepted Aristotle's definition of now-time so that they are never free from it without even being aware that they are bound to it. In "Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik," Heidegger writes, "Thus Time becomes the first name, which is yet to be heeded, of the truth of

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The Piety of Thinking by James Hart and John Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 20.

Being, which is yet to be experienced. A concealed hint of Time speaks not only out of the earliest metaphysical names of Being, but also of its last name, which is 'the eternal recurrence of the same events.' Through the entire epoch of metaphysics, Time is decisively present in the history of Being, without being recognized or thought about."[43]

Thus, for Heidegger to speak of "Being and time" is not to propogate one more limited dichotomization; for example, to substitute time for becoming or thinking in the traditional bifurcations. Instead, "it points in an entirely different direction of inquiry,"[44] one which is more basic and fruitful "because in the beginning of Western philosophy the <u>perspective governing the disclosure of Being</u> was time, though this perspective <u>as such</u> remained hidden -- and inevitably so."[45] The importance of time is established in <u>Sein und Zeit</u> because the sanctioned neglect and presumed self-evidence of Being is directly related to fundamental misconceptions about time; that is, to the everyday sense of

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[43]Martin Heidegger, "Der Rückgang in den Grund der Metaphysik," trans. "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," by Walter Kaufmann in <u>Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre</u> (New York: Meridian, 1967).

[44]Heidegger, <u>An Introduction to Metaphysics</u>, p. 171.

[45]<u>Ibid</u>., pp. 171-172.

"derivative" time carried over into metaphysics in the thought of Being as eternity and independence from the apparent passing away of time. The derivative view, given justification by Aristotle, though not false, conceals primordial temporality (Zeitlichkeit). "Must not one as much as the other, Being as much as Time --," Heidegger challenges metaphysics, "must not both become questionable in their relatedness, first questionable and finally doubtful? . . . The question of Being and Time points to what is unthought in all metaphysics. Metaphysics consists of this unthought matter. . . ."[46]

Although Heidegger's basic ontological question is the Aristotelean one -- ti to on, what is a being in its Being or the two-fold of Being's presencing through beings-present -- his approach is greatly influenced by modern philosophical perspectives, which in itself suggests to him that the Seinsfrage is historically determined and can never be abstracted from its temporal-historical context. The central clue for Heidegger's inquiry is that the question of the meaning of Being is to be worked out "concretely," that is, in terms of the structural unity of Dasein, that being which is factical yet projective in its understanding of Being and whose constituents of selfhood, including care,

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[46] Martin Heidegger, Was Heisst Denken?, trans. What is Called Thinking? by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 103.

death, guilt, conscience and they-self are in no way present-at-hand (vorhanden). Being is eminently temporal though not as 'beings in time,' but because Dasein, although generally preoccupied with now-time, is a dynamic temporal totality, a futural or transcendent potentiality permeated by its finitude or factical nothingness.

Dasein is the being for whom Being is an issue which is in each case "mine" (je meines) and which can be authentic (eigentlich, something of its own) by choosing and winning itself from out of the ensnarement of misconceptions of the anonymous they (das Man).[47] Although proximally and for the most part Dasein is not itself, its Being is never fully lost and it emerges in the mood of anxiety toward one's death and as the call of conscience which strip Dasein of its disguises and reliance on the they, impelling it toward self-confrontation and self-discovery. The question of Being is the ownmost matter for Dasein which is neither an arbitrary objective revelation nor subjective or solipsistic projection, but "the radicalization of an essential

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[47]Heidegger repeatedly and consistently stresses the neutrality or value-free status of his notions of authenticity (eigentlich) and inauthenticity (un-eigentlich) as varying existenziell modifications and possibilities of Dasein. Authenticity is not prior to or higher than the latter, which is not a moral imperfection or loss of purity. Both are variations of the unified totality of Being-in-the-world: authenticity is not Selfhood removed or isolated from the world; nor is inauthenticity merely a lostness into the world and elimination of self; the two are overlapping, simultaneous and by no means mutually exclusive possibilities.

tendency-of-Being which belongs to Dasein itself -- the pre-ontological understanding of Being."[48] Dasein is its own disclosedness, its own illumination, the basis for the determination of its authenticity or inauthenticity. Being is not a superior power, but symbolic of the self-attunement by which Dasein discloses to itself its possibilities.[49]

In his analysis of Dasein's temporality as the best access to the meaning of Being, Heidegger incorporates influences from other philosophical approaches to the nature of human existence, including those of Kant (epistemology), Dilthey (history and hermeneutics), Scheler (philosophical anthropology), Husserl (phenomenology), and Nietzsche (existentialist-oriented metaphysics). He is also greatly influenced by the religious reflections on man's ultimate choices of Augustine and Kierkegaard. As Otto Pöggeler notes, "Heidegger forces into harmony here the metaphysical tradition, which thinks Being in a hidden manner in the light of time, and a nonmetaphysical and anti-metaphysical tradition, which brings the temporality and historicity of man's factical eksistence into view."[50] Yet Heidegger does not merely abstractly or artificially synthesize two disparate

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[48] SZ 15 (BT 35).

[49] SZ 43 (BT 69), SZ 133 (BT 171), SZ 145 (BT 185).

[50] Otto Pöggeler, "Being as Appropriation" trans. Rüdiger H. Grimm in Heidegger and Modern Philosophy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 87.

traditions so as to present a static ontology modified by historicism. Rather, he absorbs, enhances and supercedes his influences in a unique way in that he does not subscribe to any particular standpoint, but fashions from the various ones the creative discipline of fundamental ontology. Heidegger's inquiry is relentlessly concerned with the essential ontological issue prior to the ontic dimensions of human experience which alone, he maintains, guides the above thinkers. Still, fundamental ontology must be and is grounded in the concrete elements of existence in the world of beings.

Heidegger is perhaps most influenced by Kant's investigation of the transcendental structure of a priori conditions for the possibility of rational and scientific knowledge in terms of the finite human subject. Kant, he says, is the "first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimensions of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion. . . ."[51] Kant, however, never questions the traditional understanding of now-time or its relation to the subjectivity of the subject, which he depicts in Cartesian fashion as isolated and detached from the world of everyday concern. Offsetting Kant's strictly epistemological analysis of finite knowledge, Heidegger recognizes the significance of

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[51]SZ 23 (BT 45).

Dilthey's "critique of historical reason" which emphasizes that human existence must be hermeneutically grasped in terms of the Erlebnis (lived-experience) of its entire historical reality in all its manifestations and complexities. From Scheler, Heidegger draws upon the notion that the person is "not a Thing, not a substance, not an object . . ."[52] merely thought of behind and outside what it immediately experiences; nor is it a subject of rational acts which follow certain laws. Husserl's investigations, from the standpoint of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, overcome the psychologism of Dilthey and the axiological thrust of Scheler. Phenomenology is a non-evaluative discipline which illuminates the multi-dimensionality of intentional consciousness, attempting to thereby bypass the traditional dichotomies of subject/object, realist/idealism. Husserl's quasi-scientific outlook, however, is offset in Heidegger's thought by Dilthey's interpretative stance, which calls into question the possibility of a purely "objective" description of transcendental states of consciousness.

Heidegger believes that traditional metaphysics is unable to free itself from its preoccupation with constantly abiding presence, by which it reduces man and Being to the status of something vorhanden. He is thus profoundly drawn to the evocative portrayals made by Kierkegaard and Nietzsche

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[52]SZ 48 (BT 73).

of guilt, dread, despair, loneliness -- the imminent and pervasive though generally concealed abyss of everyday existence -- as formative experiences in the development or achievement of selfhood. He maintains that Kierkegaard alone has articulated the notion of a dynamic present moment of vision (Augen-blick) experienced in man's encounter with dread, in contrast to the conventional static now-point. Yet the sense of urgency and immediacy in the existential imperatives which Kierkegaard and Nietzsche propose (and which presuppose an "ideal" human subject) remains secondary in Heidegger's ontology.

Heidegger is also moved by Augustine's thinking which functions on the basis of factually realized life-experience. Augustine is not interested in the measuring of "within-time-ness," by which man orders the objects of ordinary external perception. Rather, his concern is the time that is constituted by concrete decision-making human experiences themselves as singularly dynamic and creative occurrences, from which he reflects on the complex interrelatedness of the three tenses: "And thus passeth [time] on," Augustine writes, "until the present intent conveys over the future into the past; the past increasing by the dimunition of the future, until by the consumption of the future, all is past."[53] Heidegger is critical of Nietzsche for his

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[53]The Confessions of Saint Augustine (Book XI), p. 204.

attachment to the metaphysics of eternity, and of Kierkegaard for not conducting a meaningful ontological investigation of time. Whereas Kierkegaard unreflectively opposes ontology, however, Heidegger contends that Augustine uncritically allows an overlay of Neo-Platonism in his thinking to distort and falsify basic life-experience.

None of the previous philosophers or thinkers, Heidegger feels, were aware of or reflective about the traditional and misconceived ontological framework of their thinking. They were unable to liberate themselves from bondage to Aristotelean substance ontology based on the supposed endurance of ousia. The focus of modern thinkers on the human subject conceived as a static substratum only disguises, but does not overthrow reliance on ousiology (substance ontology). Heidegger's fundamental ontology is not a synthesis of their still misguided positions, but it represents a radical breakthrough from its influences through digesting and transcending them. Heidegger stresses that human existence is the unitary phenomenon of care as Being-in-the-world thrown-projection. Dasein's understanding of Being is always accompanied by its mood, its selfhood is grounded in the world of everyday concern, and its logos is historically and hermeneutically determined. In contrast to the metaphysical tradition's anthropological and/or theological definition of man as the rational animal who by the gift of logos reaches beyond himself to "eternal

truth," Heidegger maintains that understanding is not a purely abstract capacity of reason or facility for discourse, but a power of Being (Seinkönnen) which must, in turn, be conceived and rooted in the concrete factical existenzial structure of finite Dasein's temporal and historical environment. Dasein is essentially finite, not as an accumulation of imperfections or as opposed to the Infinite, but in its very nature and basis as Being-thrown-unto-death and permeated by the nothingness of anxiety and guilt. Yet Dasein is also futural and transcendent or ahead-of-itself in that its understanding consists of a fore-structure which is already involved in the area of its concern and inquiry.

Thus, the Seinsfrage is a matter of thinking (Gedankesache) of hermeneutic circularity. The hermeneutic circle which Heidegger acknowledges is not a problematic ontical vicious cycle created either by an impossible goal or self-contradictory thinking, but "is the expression of the existenzial fore-structure of Dasein itself . . . [in which] is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowledge."[54] Dasein, always already ahead-of-itself as its own possibility, constantly 'more' than it factually is, has a view and grasp of Being as well as of the world and itself in advance of the meanings it projects.

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[54]SZ 153 (BT 37).

The circle represents a "productive logic" (which lays the foundation for traditional logic that "limps along after it") that leaps ahead into the midst of Being. Dasein has an ontical priority amongst beings in that its Being is determinative for its existence by virtue of its ontological priority -- that it is always already familiar with its Being. Because of its ontico-ontological priority as the basis for any and all ontologies, however, Dasein is thrown and for the most part lost or fallen in the world which is then "reflected back upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted."[55]

Fundamental to the hermeneutic circle is the profound interrelation between the _existenzial_-ontological and ontic-_existenziell_ dimensions of the inquiry. Ontological disclosure of Dasein's _existenzial_ structure prior to particular attitudes and decisions is intimately connected with its choice to either be or not be its authentic self. Heidegger asserts, "Not only, however does an understanding of Being belong to Dasein, but this understanding develops or decays along with whatever kind of Being Dasein may possess at the time."[56] Also, "the question of existence never gets straightened out except through existing

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[55] SZ 16 (BT 37).

[56] _Ibid_.

itself. . . ."[57] One implication which may be drawn from this is that successful phenomenological ontology requires the authenticity of Dasein and vice-versa, a view which would approach Dōgen's insistence upon the simultaneity of the understanding of Buddha-nature and the attainment of Buddhahood. Yet, it is clear that Heidegger does not wish to be drawn into such a conclusion. He denies that ontology is wholly dependent upon Dasein's existenziell decisions, and claims that he is interested only in the matter of Being and not in any doctrine concerning or imperative for man. James Demske has suggested in Being, Man, and Death that there are two "sides" or two possible ways of reading Sein und Zeit: the "appropriate" reading according to the demands of the text itself focuses on "what the book really intends and accomplishes at its most profound level, even though this may not adequately come to light," which is the philosophy of Being; the "inappropriate" reading, however, "gives rise to the dark and forbidding picture of a being who achieves his true greatness by the joyfully stubborn affirmation of his own nothingness."[58]

While Demske helpfully cautions against losing sight of the all-important Seinsfrage in Sein und Zeit, it

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[57]SZ 13 (BT 33).

[58]James Demske, Being, Man, and Death (Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press, 1970), p. 59.

would be unfortunate and misleading to overlook the existential import of the book and thus accentuate the separation of theory and practice, ontology and existence suggested therein, despite the fact that Heidegger of course does encourage Demske's position. In his later works such as Humanismusbrief and Gelassenheit, he adamantly denies that he is to be associated with "existentialism," which he views as a consequence of the metaphysics of subiectität. There, he maintains that thinking is dependent upon and will come to pass through man's poetic homecoming to the unveiling of a remote and withdrawn Being whose self-revelation can only be "awaited," and he reinterprets key passages from Sein und Zeit to reflect his new stance.

## Approach and Scope

A central question to be explored here later is whether there is, in light of Dōgen's philosophy of Zen, anything problematic in Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein's factical decisions for deriving ontology and his suspension of the existential significance or of the soteriological meaning in his work. Does the unresolved tension in Heidegger's thought between ontology and existence, theory and practice reflect a limitation or lack of personal awareness which needs reevaluation? Does this very tension lead to the unfinished and unsettled nature of Heidegger's

philosophical enterprise? I will take up these critical points because Heidegger admits that his project is unfinished and its conclusions are more questionable and problematic than ever; because there seems to be a vacillation and uncertainty in his various approaches to Being and time from Sein und Zeit to the later works; and because his own critical examination and interpretation of previous thinkers from the standpoint of primordial time demands that his thinking be analyzed and evaluated by the same relentlessly critical and challenging standard. At the same time, Heidegger's careful and thoughtful concern with hermeneutics and language -- the non-traditional and non-substantive terminology and methodology of his creative questioning and dialogue -- as well as his understanding of the convergence of the existential and ontological dimensions of temporality, serves to highlight and deepen our understanding of Dōgen, helping to clarify many doctrines and expressions that would remain ambiguous without the critical comparative context. Thus, I will draw out meanings, implications and ramifications inherent in each thinker but perhaps not fully apparent without this critical juxtaposition, reconstruction and evaluation of their philosophies.

In any case, it is clear that Heidegger considers himself to be writing in Sein und Zeit from the standpoint of phenomenological neutrality. Although he asserts that phenomenology must be hermeneutic (that is, interpretive in

terms of Dasein's circular understanding of Being rather than merely descriptive) and based on the existence of Dasein, whether authentically self-chosen or inauthentically neglected, he consistently denies any proposal of a "moral" difference between authenticity and inauthenticity. The former is not morally superior or prior to the latter; falling is not the loss of purity, but the way of Being which Dasein is in-the-world for the most part.[59] Heidegger's disclosure of Dasein's temporal freedom is not to be construed as an existential injunctive, although it can be and frequently has been so interpreted. Dōgen, on the other hand, writes from the perspective of one who has "cast off body and mind and self and others," and who, on that basis, does exhort the Zen and lay practitioner. It is central to his task to deny any possible separation of theory and practice, and to think and philosophize only in terms of -- and not through the suspension of -- his personal attainment of True Manhood immediately and completely manifested and renewed in concrete situations. He insists in "Bendōwa," "You should know that for a Buddhist it is not a matter of debating the superiority or inferiority of one teaching or another, or of choosing the depth or superficiality of the teaching that matters; all we have to know is whether the

[59] SZ 176 (BT 220).

practice is authentic [shingi] or not."[60]

This disparity between Heidegger's and Dōgen's underlying methods and aims is reflective of fundamental differences in their respective views of primordial time. Although they seem to be in accord concerning the overcoming of linear, sequential time and of false eternalism as well as in their disclosures of key elements which constitute genuine temporality, they also disagree on the existential and ontological meanings of primordial time. For example, Heidegger considers time the "horizon" for understanding Being; there is a basic relatedness between time and Being in that temporality is the meaning of Dasein and thus the fundamental ground for an ontological discovery and interpretation of Being. Yet he admits that his interpretation is tentative and inconclusive. Dōgen, however, establishes a complete and harmoniously interpenetrating self-sameness of time, all beings, Buddha-nature and self-exertion at each and every totalistic moment. Also, Heidegger maintains that primordial -- and authentic -- time is futural, based on Dasein's anxious anticipation of its possibilities; he associates the present with fallenness, although this dimension too can be authentically transformed. Although Dōgen refutes the 'now' that has been isolated from existence and from past and future, he ultimately affirms the dynamism and

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[60] SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) 140 (Terada vol. I, p. 18).

totality of the fully realized all-encompassing moment.

These disagreements are intensified because it seems likely that each thinker, if positioned in mutual philosophical encounter and dialogue, would strongly disagree with many of the other's conclusions about the meaning and structure of primordial time. Heidegger, for example, does consider the notion of an eternal moment in Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same events by the will to power in the Moment, and discounts it as unliberated metaphysics based on the static view of now-time. Dōgen, on the other hand, refutes the Senika view that enlightenment is to be futurally anticipated by affirming busshō spontaneously renewed each and every totalistic moment.

The points of controversy between Heidegger and Dōgen will be considered in light of the guidelines which both thinkers would set for discourse with other philosophical viewpoints, which seems to demand that these other doctrines be challenged, criticized and -- if necessary -- overcome from the standpoint of an uncompromisingly non-substantive disclosure of primordial time. In "Dialogue with a Japanese,"[61] Heidegger stresses his deep reluctance to impose uncritically and unreflectively traditional Western

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[61]Martin Heidegger, "Aus Einem Gespräch Von Der Sprache" trans. "A Dialogue on Language" by Peter D. Hertz and Joan Stambaugh in On the Way to Language (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

metaphysical categories which are heavily laden with historically determined and self-limiting connotations on East Asian thought, so that the dynamism and insubstantiality of East Asian notions would not be obscured. Yet, he does recognize the philosophical need for dialogue with East Asia from an original and creative -- non-substantive or primordial -- perspective. Thus, Heidegger's attempted disclosure of the unity of temporality -- prior to the Western fixation with ousia -- is uniquely fruitful for an exposition of and critical comparison with Dōgen in order not only to reconstruct each thinker's views, but to evaluate their conclusions about primordial time. The grounds and the need for a critical analysis of Heidegger in light of a thinker such as Dōgen are implicit in Heidegger's stated intention of overcoming Western misconceptions of Being derived from inauthentic time. In order to determine the success of Heidegger's project, his work must be examined in a universal setting; that is, not strictly from a Western standpoint which may presuppose the very deficiencies he tries to challenge, but from the standpoint of a non-substantive view of time itself in comparison with an Eastern thinker who also claims to eliminate any trace of substantiality in his understanding of time as the preeminent philosophical task. The starting point of Dōgen's reflections is the universal encounter of man with the irrefutable and inescapable reality of impermanence. He maintains that

his approach to the problematics of temporal existence is "applicable to all" (<u>fukan</u>) or of universal significance and validity, and he would criticize any and all partial viewpoints, even those taken by Buddhists, which conceal the profound identity and insubstantiality of being-time. Without such a philosophical encounter, it would appear that Heidegger's notions are limited to his response to the Western tradition, which is precisely why Heidegger himself criticizes Nietzsche's will to power as the <u>reversal</u> rather than the surpassing of previous substance ontologies.

If, for example, Dōgen's conception of the fully realized moment, itself based on a critique of misguided eternalism, escapes the limitations which Heidegger finds with Western doctrines of eternity, there is then a serious challenge to Heidegger's view of futural temporality. The grounds for Dōgen's participation in a philosophical dialogue with -- and his possible overcoming of -- Heidegger's thinking is the standard set by both thinkers: any view which falls short in any subtle way of a full overcoming of derivative time must be exposed and destroyed. Thus, dialogue between Heidegger and Dōgen is not apologetic or statically standing still, but critical and progressive, pointing away from attachments to substantiality and toward a clear and consistent non-substantive view of primordial time justified in terms of and accounting for the multiple dimensions of existence. Heidegger suggests in <u>Was Heisst Denken?</u> that

because no original thinker fully understands himself, the unthought and the unspoken in his expressions must be explored and rediscovered. Similarly, Dōgen takes an adamantly non-sectarian stance, insisting only yet uncompromisingly on the realization of the true nature of impermanence and being-time. I will continually question and probe as to whose philosophy of the existential and ontological dimensions of primordial time represents the most complete, radical and thoroughgoing breakthrough from the derivative or substantive view.

Any presentation and analysis of Heidegger must take into account the entire development and range of his thinking in terms of his fundamental aims as carried out in various stages from "Being and Time" to "On Time and Being." It is equally necessary to limit the account to the most pertinent materials. I will focus on Heidegger's Sein und Zeit for two interrelated reasons. First, because it offers the most systematic and the richest material for comparison with Dōgen's philosophy of time in terms of its complex intertwining of the ontological and existential dimensions. Also, much of the recent scholarship on Heidegger has overlooked the continuing significance of Sein und Zeit, preferring to take up Heidegger's suggestion that it be seen as a stage, however essential, which leads to and is superceded by his later works, the so-called Heidegger II. Without attempting to unravel the issues involved in Heidegger's

"turn" (Kehre) as to whether there is ideological continuity or discontinuity between Sein und Zeit and Heidegger II, a task beyond the scope of this thesis, I will consider Heidegger's later reflections on finitude and temporality, such as the notion of Ereignis (the "event" which is not a particular occurrence but that which makes occurrence as such possible) as a temporo-historical designation for Being. I will also take up those works in which he criticizes previous thinkers in terms of their limited understanding of time. Of Dōgen's works, the Shōbōgenzō is central due to its philosophical breadth and profundity. It evaluates and critically revises many prominent Buddhist and Zen doctrines in terms of Dōgen's radical reinterpretation of the Buddhist understanding of time. His autobiographical and explicitly exhortative works, particularly Zuimonki, are also cited in accord with his refusal to allow any gap between theory and practice, living and understanding, universal significance and personal experience.

My investigation of the affinities and disparities between Heidegger and Dōgen concerning time will concentrate on: 1) their analysis and attempted overcoming of derivative time, which is achieved through 2) the disclosure of radical contingency inescapably pervading existence (revealed in terms of the notions of finitude in Heidegger and impermanence in Dōgen), which points to 3) the dynamic existential and ontological unity of primordial or non-substantive

temporality. The method includes both exegesis (through a reconstruction of each thinker's arguments) and critical-comparison (by the examination and evaluation of the disparities in the fundamental aims, approaches and accomplishments of the philosophical views of Heidegger and Dōgen as well as of the soteriological implications expressed therein).

An outline of the critical analysis:

Chapter 2 - The Origin of Derivative Time. The analysis of the arising and persistence of the conventional view of linear, calculative time expressed by "time flies." What is its supposed justification; why is it so deeply ingrained as to be considered beyond doubt; how does deficient existence lead to misconceived ontology based on a fixated, substantive present and infect philosophies of eternalism? In what sense is sequential time derivative of primordial time, and how is it to be uprooted and overcome? How is the authentically conceived past related to the overcoming of previous or traditional misguided ontologies? What differences emerge in the means each thinker uses to de-structure now-time by pointing to the primordial temporal unity of past, present and future?

Chapter 3 - Finitude and Impermanence. The disclosure of radical contingency in terms of nothingness pervading man's perpetual encounter with his dying, anxiety, vicissitude and suffering as the existential and ontological turning point

which undermines substance ontology and leads to the realization of primordial time. How death is more than a psychological issue, but a transcendental pointer to the ontological nature and structure of contingent existence. The differences between Heidegger's futural orientation in his analysis of Being-towards-the-end and Dōgen's notion of the totalistic presence encompassing the interdependence _and_ independence of life and death as fully manifest stages of time, in overcoming fixations with substance and attachments to eternalism.

Chapter 4 - _Primordial Time_. The common elements in their respective understandings of primordial time: the ontological nature of the three tenses, change and movement, continuity and duration, the genuine present, the world, language, space, self, Being and Buddha-nature; the temporal nature of existential authenticity through activity and expression. How do Heidegger and Dōgen each suggest a fundamental convergence of ontological disclosure and existential liberation? What are the apparent conflicts between Heidegger's conception of futural, anticipatory temporality and Dōgen's notion of the full and unimpeded realization of each present moment of _uji_ right here-and-now through one's utmost sustained exertion? And what are the implications for surpassing substance ontology? At the conclusion of this chapter, I will explore more fully the soteriological

implications which are both reflected in and determined by their respective philosophies of time. I will consider, for example, whether Heidegger's subtle separation between ontology and existential authenticity is in light of Dōgen Zen, philosophically problematic: ontologically limiting as well as soteriologically ambiguous; and whether Dōgen's insistence on the priority of awakening and deliverance establishes a more primordial and non-substantive basis for the ontological comprehension and existential realization of time.

# CHAPTER TWO

# THE ORIGIN OF DERIVATIVE TIME

## Problematics of Derivative Time

The analysis of the arising and persistence of the notion of derivative time, as presented by Heidegger and Dōgen, is essential to the disclosure of the possibilities for realizing primordial time. The deficiencies of the conventional fixation with linear sequence must be exposed and overcome in order to illuminate and establish the true nature and structure of unified and dynamic temporal existence. The two-fold focus of the analysis of derivative time attempts to unravel the deeply-rooted and self-perpetuating entanglements between inauthentic existential understanding that gives rise to and is, in turn, reenforced by ontological misconceptions. Both thinkers investigate the views of the average man, whose unreflective attachment to the supposed constancy of now-time seeks to deny his temporally determined contingency, and so becomes the disguised basis for the metaphysician's false claims of an eternity detached from the vicissitudes of existence. Their examination of the origin of derivative time attempts to reverse this

vicious cycle of ensnarement by showing that in the genuine ontological structure of history and continuity, the present is not static or substance but thoroughly pervaded by past and future, which makes possible an authentic reinterpretation and reappropriation of the traditional deficient ontologies.

In this chapter, I will critically reconstruct, compare and evaluate in light of the fundamental philosophical aims of Heidegger and Dōgen how they each analyze: the derivative nature of sequential time's relationship with primordial time; the inauthentic connection between an obsession with now-time or fixation with substance and speculations about eternity; and the possible authentic link between a true understanding of past and history and the overcoming of previously transmitted ontologies within their respective traditions. In the final or critical section of the chapter, I will contrast their attempts at de-structuring derivative time by examining their approaches to the relationship between self, world and time; past, present and future; as well as between the conception of history and creative philosophical interpretation. It will be shown that Heidegger's analysis of now-time leads to an emphasis on the priority of future and past and to an inability to disclose the temporality of entities, whereas Dōgen overcomes the inauthentic static now-point through disclosure of the all-inclusive simultaneous passage (kyōryaku) of the

three tenses.

I will first introduce and establish the predominant concerns which guide each thinker's analysis. The central concern for Heidegger is to discover why the meaning of Being has been concealed in the history of Western metaphysics in that Being is conceived as the first and/or highest immutable and enduring being because the increasingly rigid and supposedly self-evident presupposition that beings are actually 'now _in_ time' has not been challenged. Being in the primordial sense of the presencing (_Anwesenheit_) which holds sway has been reduced, according to Heidegger, to the objectified status of some substantive entity (_ousia_) that is merely present-at-hand (_vorhanden_); the emerging, arising or unconcealing process which illuminates Dasein's encounter with phenomena (and which Heidegger contends is the original meaning of _physis_ and _aletheia_) is mistaken for that-(actual thing-)which-emerges. In _Humanismusbrief_ Heidegger charges that, "The oblivion of Being makes itself known indirectly through the fact that man always observes and handles only beings. Even so, because man cannot avoid having some notion of Being, it is explained merely as what is 'most general' and therefore as some being, or as the product of a finite subject. At the same time 'Being' (_Sein_) has long stood for 'beings' (_Seiendes_) and, inversely, the latter for the former, the two of them caught in a curious and still

unraveled confusion."[1] Man always stands in the light of Being, but he tends to think only from beings back again to beings with merely a glance in passing toward Being as such. Just as genuine illumination is in every case a possibility for man, there are elements inherent in his existence which subvert or obstruct this potential, propelling him toward inauthenticity.

This existential-ontological deficiency is analyzed in Sein und Zeit in terms of the hermeneutic circularity of Dasein's ontico-ontological priority for the possibility of any and all ontologies, whereby its own specific state of Being remains concealed from it. Dasein is for the most part absorbed with or fallen in the world of its concern, so that it understands itself as a present-at-hand (vorhanden) being 'in' a present-at-hand (vorhanden) world rather than as the transcendental structure and unified totality of care (Being-in-the-world thrown-projection). Consequently, "the primary understanding of Being has been diverted to Being as presence-at-hand -- a diversion which is motivated by that [phenomenon] of falling itself."[2] Because Dasein is always in each case ontically already overly familiar with itself in that an average everyday self-understanding is for the

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[1]Martin Heidegger, Humanismusbrief (Brief über Humanismus) trans. "Letter on Humanism" by David F. Krell in Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 219.

[2]SZ 206 (BT 250).

most part idly and ambiguously presupposed, it remains ontologically farthest in that its essential nature is rarely questioned. Nevertheless, pre-ontologically it is surely no stranger to Being. The aim of fundamental ontology is to uncover on the basis of Dasein's factical-existenziell decisions the existenzial-ontological foundations of ecstatic temporality, and at the same time to see why an understanding of this ground is lost in ontically-oriented ontological interpretations based on now-time.

As Dasein falls back upon the world in which it finds itself, its misconceptions about time and history allow it to fall prey to the apparent dominance of the metaphysical tradition's preoccupation with infinitude. Thus, the analytic of Dasein's inauthenticity necessarily involves a destruction of the history of ontology since both everydayness and metaphysics derive from the common phenomenon of falling. This destruction is largely carried out in Heidegger's later works (Heidegger II).[3] The hermeneutic

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[3]Heidegger's later works on the overcoming of Western onto-theology include Nietzsche (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961) (on modern philosophy of subiectität from Descartes through Nietzsche grounded in "European nihilism"); Holzwege (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1950) (essays on Anaximander, Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche); Identität Und Differenz (Pfullingen: Neske, 1956) (discussion of the "step back" from modern technolgical Gestell or "framing"). For the use and meaning of "Heidegger II," a distinction acknowledged by and apparently acceptable to Heidegger himself, see William Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971).

starting point is shifted there, however, from a phenomenologico-ontological analysis of Dasein's inauthentic falling and the possible repetition of its authentic potentialities, to an historical "step back" which re-thinks the self-concealment of Being itself that has led to the current destitute aftermath of metaphysics and the global dominance of willful technology.

Dōgen's primary interest is to eliminate any rift, however subtle, that may appear in Buddhist expressions of theory or techniques of meditation which violates the absolute inseparability and simultaneity of practice and realization, original and acquired enlightenment, Buddha-nature and the attainment of Buddhahood as spontaneously manifest here-and-now in every activity and expression of the True Man who has "cast off body and mind." In "Fukanzazengi," Dōgen's first work after his enlightenment in which he begins the task of transmitting the Right Dharma to Japan where he felt that it had until then been impossible to learn, he insists that "if there is the slightest discrepancy [between practice and realization], the Way is as distant as heaven and earth."[4] But he also concedes that two powerful and pervasive doubt blocks -- which he himself endured before his breakthrough under the instruction of

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[4]Dōgen, "Fukanzazengi" trans. Abe Masao and Norman Waddell in The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 6, no. 1 (Oct., 1973), p. 121.

Ju-ching -- can create such a disparity and will, if not fully uprooted, become heretical views that ultimately obstruct awakening. "Indeed," he writes in that essay, "the Whole Body [or Way] is far beyond the world's dust. Who could believe in a means to brush it clean? It is never apart from one right where one is. What is the use of going off here and there to practice?"[5] The first question refers to the Senika heresy that Buddha-nature is immutable and unchanging, seemingly beyond and not approachable through the "mundane" efforts of daily practice, yet which can only be attained in the future at the conclusion of practice. The second question cites the naturalistic heresy which unreflectively affirms the everyday world prior to authentication by the resolute and dedicated exertions of the True Man. Although apparently contradictory, the common impact of both heresies is to negate the necessity for the utmost and sustained yet ultimately purposeless and non-striving exertions here-and-now of the "skin, flesh, bones, and marrow." The heretical tendencies thereby perpetuate what Dōgen calls the restrictive and debilitating "bonds of the Buddha" (butsu-baku)[6] -- an attachment to a static and contemplative enlightenment either artificially removed from or inauthentically acceptant of the incessant transformations

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[5]Ibid.

[6]See SBGZ "Gyōbutsu" for a discussion of butsu-baku.

of the impermanent world.

Dōgen tries to overcome the insidious "bonds of the Buddha" which shackle the primordially and spontaneously "active Buddha" (gyōbutsu) by analyzing in "Uji" why the average man's (bombu) deep-seated delusions misconstrue the true nature of being-time. The average view of time mistakes the essential dynamism and unity of being-time for a fixed, isolated point within the external framework of time. The incessant fluctuations of the dharma's dwelling-place (jū-hōi) are thus confused with the mere coming and going of horary sequence; and genuine passage of the three tenses is mistaken for "time flies." Because of these basic and generally undetected misconceptions, the primordial identity whereby all beings in the entire Dharma-realm are linked together as time's occurrence at each, every and any moment (jiji) is lost, and the totalistic here-and-now is either overlooked or confused with static constancy. Consequently, the supposed eternity of Buddha-nature is posited, and inauthentically bifurcated into the aspects of potentiality and actuality, present practice and futural attainment, and subjective pursuit of an objectified goal. "It is because," Dōgen writes, "this very time and this very being are learned as something other than the Dharma that the sixteen-foot golden body [symbolic of realization] is not recognized as myself. But even the evasion of [the truth] that I am the sixteen-foot golden body is a fragment of being-

time."[7]

In "Uji" and other chapters of Shōbōgenzō, particularly "Busshō," Dōgen challenges and reinterprets, radically revises and even deliberately changes or intentionally misreads both philosophically and expressionally the words of Mahāyāna sūtras and Zen masters which in any sense deny rather than fully and uncompromisingly reflect the profound existential significance of the transiency of being-time. Dōgen is unhesitatingly critical of what he considers misleading or obstructive scripture and authority. Yet he strongly disagrees with the orthodox Zen view of a "special transmission outside the scriptures without reliance on words and letters."[8] He insists on the continuing quest for creative expressions (dōtoku) which divulge the inexhaustible meanings of the Way as a matter of the spiritual "vines" or entwinements (kattō) by which Buddha(-master) and Buddha(-disciple) (yuibutsu-yobutsu) commune with, instruct and

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[7]SBGZ "Uji" 295 (Terada vol. I, pp. 258-259).

[8]Bodhidharma's dictum:
"A special transmission outside the scriptures,
Without reliance on words and letters,
Direct pointing to the mind,
Seeing into one's own nature and attaining Buddhahood."
Dōgen believes that Rinzai Zen overemphasis on kōan exercise may create a false bifurcation between silence and expression. Although Dōgen does hold that ultimate and complete realization is incommunicable, this only accentuates rather than negates the need for creative divulgences which convey its innumerable dimensions and manifestations. See SBGZ "Kenbutsu" for a critique of Rinzai.

enlighten each other. Dōgen's emphasis on full and unimpeded realization of the Right Law (shōbō) concretely embodied in the True Man right-now diverges significantly from the doctrines of his contemporaries, Hōnen, Shinran and Nichiren, which derive from a firm belief in the hopelessness of self-power (jiriki) in the Age of Degenerate Law (mappō).

## Heidegger's Analysis of Derivative Time

The question of Being is raised in Sein und Zeit in terms of how Dasein, the distinctive being for whom Being is the ownmost and determinative issue of its existence, comes to know itself in relation to -- and by standing out amongst -- entities in the world. The traditional metaphysical conception of man's relationship to the world presumes that Dasein is first of all a spiritual Thing which somehow gets placed 'into' a space consisting of material things that it perceives, knows and manipulates. Knowledge is considered an act that transpires "between" and as a result of the convenientia of two supposedly constant things present-at-hand -- the subiectum and substantia, which appear in Cartesian philosophy as res cogito and res extensa. "But because [the primordial] structure of Being remains ontologically inaccessible, yet is experienced ontically as a 'relationship' between one entity (the world) and another

(the soul)," Heidegger challenges the tradition, "and because one proximally understands Being by taking entities as entities within-the-world for one's ontological foothold, one tries to conceive the relationship between world and soul as grounded in these two entities themselves and in the meaning of their Being -- namely, to conceive it as Being-present-at-hand."[9]

Heidegger maintains, however, that neither the self nor the world nor their relationship is simply present-at-hand because something like the world is always already revealed to Dasein, which is never worldless or detached but in every case concernfully alongside entities and solicitously with Others. Heidegger seeks both to overcome and to analyze the origin of deficient representations of Dasein by uncovering the unified yet multi-dimensional phenomenon of Being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) prior to the distinctions of subject/object, theory/non-theory, spirit/matter, essence/existence, etc. "Ontologically," he suggests, "'world' is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself."[10] Worldhood is not an ontical collection of material or natural things external to a subject, but the a priori basis and region of Dasein's de-severant and

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[9]SZ 59 (BT 85).

[10]SZ 64 (BT 92).

directional spatiality, and of the practical involvements by which Dasein discovers and makes use of references, signs and equipment as it encounters Others. Being-in connotes dwelling and residing, an implicit familiarity of Dasein more fundamental than knowledge and will, cognition and volition, assertion and disposition, illumined or self-disclosed in the three-fold totality of care: (1) understanding, the forestructure for the possibility of self-transparency and hermeneutic interpretation; (2) facticity, by which the determination and limitations -- the "disclosive submissiveness" or thrownness -- of Dasein are revealed in the moods which assail it; and (3) falling, or absorption with entities as publicly interpreted with which Dasein finds itself alongside.

Care itself is grounded in ecstatic temporality, which is not a succession of sequential nows, but the integral dynamic process of Dasein as ahead-of-itself (understanding as future or coming-towards, Zu-kunft) yet already found (facticity as past or having been) in the world to which it is for the most part bound (falling as present or making-present). "The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the Present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future which makes present in the process of having been."[11] The ecstatic temporality of

[11]SZ 350 (BT 401).

care [to be examined more fully in the final chapter] is ontologically prior to and makes possible Dasein's transcendence, spatiality, metaphysical speculation, theoretical discovery and practical behavior as well as the dual existential possibilities of authenticity and inauthenticity, of Dasein's winning itself or its abandonment to the dictatorship of the they-self's public world.

For the most part, according to Heidegger, the unity and multi-dimensionality of temporality is ontologically concealed because Dasein is existentially preoccupied in deficient and indifferent modes of an evasive self-flight from the authentic possibilities of discourse, sight and interpretation into the idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity of the they-self (Man-selbst). In falling (Verfallen), everything primordial and mysterious is considered obvious and self-evident, and the unique dynamism of temporality is reduced to the monotonous uniformity of "all one and the same." This everyday outlook takes the form of an obsession with the measurement of time through the use of clocks, calendars and statistics, which in turn reflects the sense that one can either take or lose time that is considered all the more precious as it forever slips away. Inauthentic Dasein is increasingly concerned with the apparent actuality of the present so that the past and historical facticity as well as the future and possibilities for transcendence, which are primordially and ecstatically interwoven with the

present in the most essential and pervasive ways, get eclipsed and frequently seem to be entirely missing or appear in some derivative mode. Dasein is engaged in making-present in its relation to entities which it discovers and uses alongside itself in-the-world, an activity that is necessary for circumspective deliberation and scientific investigation, but which becomes problematic when the interpretation is turned back upon Dasein so that "Dasein understands its ownmost Being in the sense of a certain 'factual' Being-present-at-hand."[12]

Dasein's everyday state is a "way to be," a "how" of existence which neither disappears nor is fully eradicated by authenticity, but constitutes an _existenzial_ condition that can only be momentarily modified _existenzielly_. Falling is not the loss of a former moral purity, nor is authenticity a free-floating isolation above the troubles of the world. Because it is an inherent possibility of Dasein's ecstatic existence, falling is grounded in -- arising from even while concealing -- temporality itself. "Temporality has different possibilities and different ways of _temporalizing_ itself. The basic possibilities of existence, the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein, are grounded ontologically on possible temporalizations of

[12] SZ 56 (BT 82).

temporality."[13] In contrast to Hegel,[14] who according to Heidegger's interpretation holds that the Absolute Spirit must necessarily and first of all by its very essence fall 'into' time when it is not in itself complete as an obstacle in order to ultimately overcome time and realize itself, Heidegger maintains that falling is a mode of existence that belongs to temporality neither accidentally nor inevitably, but as an essential ever-present possibility that is never fully overcome.

By virtue of its facticity, Dasein prepares for itself a constant temptation for the alienating and tranquillizing acceptance of the public world. Only because Dasein is ecstatically stretched along from birth to death, traversing the time granted to it between these boundaries and maintaining itself throughout with a certain sameness, does it consider itself to be actual only in the present now -- "within-time" -- thereby forgetting its past and fearing its future so that its ecstatic movement appears to be stifled. As temporality, care reckons with time in a way already familiar to it in its planning, preventing and taking

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[13]SZ 304 (BT 351).

[14]Heidegger acknowledges in SZ and other works an apparent similarity in his analysis of falling, temporality, and Being with Hegel, and he is careful to distinguish his emphasis on finitude in contrast to Hegelian absolutism. See also Identität und Differenz and "Hegel und die Griechen" in Wegmarken.

precautions concerning that which will take place 'later on,' or happens 'now,' or has occurred 'earlier.' There is in time-reckoning itself a recognition of the unified relational structure between the three tenses that is characterized both by datability and existential significance, but this remains for the most part unclarified and vague. Furthermore, Dasein is thrown into the world and surrendered to the seemingly arbitrary but maddeningly regular changes of day and night, light and dark which in certain foretold and unavoidable sequences take away the possibility of sight that is needed for social intercourse and practical endeavors. The sun already dates the time with which Dasein is concerned, so that something like a clock is discovered along with the world, and this readily translates into a publicly available measure for time.

Dasein's problems arise when it no longer regards the clock as an expedient tool created by and at the disposal of its concern, but looks at it and says 'now' and measures how long this now lasts. It determines the frequency and duration of the now's presence in that stretch in terms of an unchanging standard. Dasein falls precisely when it says to itself that the present moment, however fleeting, is an enduring substance and that the endlessness of time, however lasting, seems to slip or fly by. The nows are present-at-hand along with entities. Although they are not <u>vorhanden</u> in exactly the same way as things, they are seen in the same

general horizon, simply ranging themselves along one after another in succession. The nows pass away and those which are gone make up the past; the nows come along and those which are approaching define the future. The constancy of the now is common for all nows whether of past, present or future. Even though it is said to change so swiftly, this persistent and forbidding presentness of the now is always thought to prevail. The sequence itself is considered vorhanden in the same way as the now, but it has its own time which includes particular now-points, carrying them along without interruption, and perpetuating the existential gap Dasein has created between itself and time.

Once committed to ontological misconceptions derived from an existential deficiency that is supported though not necessarily dictated by its factical conditions and submission to the world, the datability, significance and interrelatedness of ecstatic temporality are forgotten. Time seems to be passing away 'out there.' Dasein feels that time must not be lost, and the more it tries to track and define time, the more time is controlling and determining Dasein. Surrender to now-time reflects the lurking anxiety which Dasein feels about its own passing toward its end, which is inauthentically transmuted into a fear of something vorhanden though not-yet actual -- a now which is constant and substantive that is approaching in the endless sequence. "Dasein knows fugitive time in terms of its 'fugitive'

knowledge about its death."[15] Rather than admit that it is perpetually in the process of dying as Being-towards-the-end and resolutely facing death, Dasein firmly and inauthentically believes that time in-itself is forever flying by. Dasein finds false comfort in the appearance of time as endless on both sides, receding ever behind and advancing ever forward, so that an end can never be found on either side. The more insistent Dasein is that something be done "now, at this instant!," expecting more time while realizing that there is less and less, the more it refuses to confront its finitude, taking refuge in the thought that time keeps coming along and going by -- as if time does not let itself be halted. "Here it is not as if the finitude of time were getting understood," Heidegger writes, ". . . In the everyday way in which we are with one another, the levelled-off sequence of 'nows' remains completely unrecognizable as regards its origin in the temporality of the individual Dasein."[16]

Just as Dasein fearfully refuses to acknowledge its future which pervades the present as the imminence of death, it also obliterates its past, which is reduced to what is merely no-longer present-at-hand. Heidegger distinguishes between two conceptions of the past, which lead to two

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[15] SZ 425 (BT 478).

[16] SZ 425 (BT 477).

radically different understandings of history. The derivative view of the past is that vorhanden time has vanished and is left behind (Vergangenheit) by Dasein, although it can still be carried along in the present as a vorhanden monument, ruin or artifact to be idly and curiously gazed at without authentic existential engagement or ontological reflection. "Lost in the making present of the 'today,' [Dasein] understands the 'past' in terms of the 'Present.'"[17] Scientific history (historiology) surveys and records the supposedly objective facts which are over and done with. In considering Dasein a substantive entity subjected to the events, circumstances and vicissitudes which befall it, historiology simply gathers information about the deeds Dasein has performed.

The primordial meaning of the past, Heidegger maintains, is the ecstatic having-been-there (dagewesen) of Dasein fully integrated with, and continuing to influence and permeate the present and future. Authentic Dasein hands down to itself and takes over afresh its past through existenziell repetition of what it has-been as its ownmost fate in light of its resolute freedom for death and the possibilities of what it can-be. Dasein is its past, not as a no-longer-there which follows limply along after it, but in the sense of thrownness going ahead of and coming towards it

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[17] SZ 391 (BT 443).

as thrown-projection that is never, in Heidegger's image, "caught" or "coming to a stop."[18] Dasein's past influences its futural projects which in turn generate the decisions it makes. Genuine historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) does not merely observe Dasein's behavior; it is rather Dasein itself fatefully recalling and renewing its choices, alive to the full multi-dimensional unity of its temporal foundations. "History (Geschichte) as happening (Geschehen)," Heidegger writes in Einführung in die Metaphysik," is an acting and being acted upon which pass through the present, which are determined from out of the future, and which take over the past. It is precisely the present that vanishes (verschwindet) in happening."[19]

The derivative obfuscation of the ecstatic unity of Dasein's future and past lead directly, according to Heidegger, to the deficiencies of the metaphysical tradition. Out of time-reckoning -- the phenomenal aspect of temporality which is closest to us -- "arises the ordinary everyday understanding of time. And this understanding evolves into the traditional conception of time."[20] Infinitude, an unwillingness to acknowledge the future out of fear of one's finite existence, is the hallmark of and the

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[18]SZ 348 (BT 400).

[19]Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 36.

[20]SZ 235 (BT 278).

highest value-standard sought by metaphysics since its inception. The self-surrender by philosophers to the apparent but false mastery of the tradition itself, which claims self-evidence for the material it offers for a redundant reworking rather than a radical and repetitive reexamination, is due to the obliteration of the having been and the consequent hardening and rigidifying of past thinking. An understanding of authentic historicality, however, makes possible the loosening of this sedimentation that conceals Being-as-presence through the ecstatically-grounded hermeneutic circularity of creative questioning and dialogue, which uncovers and clarifies the primordial foundations of previous thinkers' expressions of Being prior to their conscious or deliberate intentions.

A de-struction of the history of ontology based on the phenomenologico-ontological repetition of Dasein's ecstatic temporo-historical ground is imperative for two interrelated reasons: first, because fundamental ontology must probe deficient ontologies as exemplary expressions derived from everyday understanding; second, because Dasein as historical cannot regain its authenticity unless it appropriately takes over its past interpretations. By destruction, Heidegger does not mean something negative like shaking off the tradition, or the "vicious relativizing of ontological standpoints." Rather, he seeks to re-discover the tradition's "birth certificate" by the analysis which

frees up Dasein's heretofore concealed phenomenal content. Nevertheless, such an ontological revision cannot help but "do violence" (Gewaltsamkeit) to the claims of the ordinary understanding of time, or to its complacent and tranquillized obviousness that is all-too-apparent in metaphysics itself.

The projected overcoming of traditional metaphysics remains in rudimentary form in Sein und Zeit, but is executed in Heidegger's later works, many of which consist of or include lengthy interpretations or "hermeneutic conversations" with past metaphysicians from Anaximander to Nietzsche, based on the view that while no thinker fully understands himself, each essential thinker does express a partial disclosure of Being.[21] In Heidegger II, however, the dilemmas of derivative metaphysics are no longer seen as a consequence of inauthentic, irresolute Dasein, but as the "error" or pervasive un-truth which permeates human ek-sistence due to the self-concealment of the destiny of Being as such (rather than any particular mistake made by man). The mysterious closure of Being precipitates a fateful decline in thinking inevitably consummated in the willful conceptualization and manipulation of beings by the triumphant human subject. History is the mission on which man has been sent by the epochal or eschatological clearing (Lichtung) of Being; and the errancy of wandering amidst beings to seek

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[21] Heidegger, What is Called Thinking?, p. 185.

and never find Being is the fate man must endure due to Being's self-withdrawal. "Oblivion of Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of Being. . . . This means that the history of Being begins with the oblivion of Being, since Being -- together with its essence, its distinction from beings -- keeps to itself."[22] Being was disclosed to the earliest Greek thinkers as the illuminative event or presence of Dasein's encounter with beings, variously named as logos or physis -- the process of self-emergence or bursting-forth into openness. The primordial difference between presence and things-present, however, has subsequently been forgotten and hypostatized through an "abundance of transformations" into Idea, Substance, God, Cogito and finally the self-certifying and self-objectifying Will.[23]

The understanding common to both Sein und Zeit and the later Heideggerian approaches toward overcoming the tradition is that the fundamental and perdurant entanglements of metaphysics occur when infinitude is reified in Plato's notion that lived-time is an "image of eternity." The supposed constancy of now-time is thus elevated to a supreme though well-disguised position in that Being is conceptualized

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[22]Martin Heidegger, "Der Spruch des Anaximander" in Holzwege trans. "The Anaximander Fragment" in Early Greek Thinking by David F. Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 50.

[23]Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des Denkens trans. On Time and Being by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 7.

as an immutable supra-sensuous and supra-temporal realm over and beyond temporo-historical existence. Time is thus considered a self-limiting condition or negative attribute of cognition that prohibits man from full access to the eternal Truth removed from ecstacy and finitude. The insidious connection between now-time and eternity appears in Aristotle's conception of the endlessness of causally-connected now-points. It is also perpetuated by the medieval theological preoccupation with the "nunc-stans," timelessness represented as the standing-now.

Heidegger considers Kant the first thinker for whom time becomes problematic in its ontological meaning. Kant does intend -- although not explicitly, according to Heidegger's hermeneutic reconstruction -- to put the time of the finite human subject at the synthesizing and creative center of the transcendental imagination as the universal condition for the possibility of encountering phenomena and as the origin of space. Yet Kant misrepresents finitude as an ontical limitation, Heidegger asserts, and the original Platonic bifurcation between eternity and temporality emerges in the Kantian separation of the noumenal and phenomenal realms. By holding back from a genuine disclosure of the temporal ground and constitution of existence, Kant further shows the poverty and entanglements of the traditional conception of time that binds his thought.

At the culmination and conclusion of metaphysics, an

insatiable longing for infinity prevails in the modern dominance of the absolutized subiectum. Hegel, according to Heidegger's critical interpretation, seeks to fully and finally surpass finitude by elevating all phenomena to the status of eternal Being. "Hegel alone apparently succeeded in jumping over this shadow," Heidegger contends, "but only in such a way that he eliminated the shadow, i.e., the finiteness of man, and jumped into the sun itself. Hegel skipped over the shadow, but he did not, because of that, surpass the shadow."[24]

Although Nietzsche claims to undermine human fixations with the "fable" of a so-called eternal Reality that stands over and against the temporal world condemned as illusory appearance, he merely reverses, according to Heidegger, the traditional priorities by valuing now-time rather than eternity. Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the self-same will to power attempts to preserve the constancy of the now through the monotonous uniformity of the redundancy of the will to will more will, the most unvarying perpetuation of that which is ceaselessly unvarying.[25] Nietzsche thus reduces Being to the level of the becoming of beings without penetrating to temporality

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[24]Martin Heidegger, Die Frage nach dem Ding trans. What is a Thing? by W.B. Barton and Vere Deutsch (Chicago: Regnery, 1967), pp. 150-151.

[25]Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. II, p. 287.

which underlies this distinction, thus fully obfuscating the primordial in blurred indistinguishability with the derivative. The possible permutations of the links between now-time and eternity, according to Heidegger, are thereby fully exhausted, though by no means overcome.

## Dōgen's Analysis of Derivative Time

Dōgen seeks to overcome any tendency to dichotomize Buddha-nature and obstruct the path to realization by analyzing and uprooting the unenlightened views of the average man who fabricates separations between beings and time, self and time, time present and the time of past and future, t1 and t2 as well as between passage and that-which-passes, arrival and the process of coming, time and space. All such fabricated dichotomizations may continue to haunt and subvert the efforts of the Zen disciple. These existential and ontological rifts constitute the self-imposed and self-perpetuating barriers to genuine understanding of the impermanent nature of busshō and the primordial unity of practice and realization in that they project enlightenment onto a supra-temporal realm severed from "daily being-time right within this very 24 hours."

In "Busshō" Dōgen presents his own interpretation of a Zen parable concerning the 14th Patriarch (Nāgārjuna) in order to illustrate how subtle yet insidious misconceptions

concerning time impede the here-and-now realization and explanation of Buddha-nature. In the legend, Nāgārjuna sat before a congregation and he "manifested a body of absolute freedom while sitting -- it was just like the round full moon . . . expressing thereby the original body of buddhas."[26] Yet the members of the congregation were unable to see or comprehend the master's form, although his foremost disciple Aryadeva pointed out that it was, indeed, right before them.

According to Dōgen's exegesis, Nāgārjuna did not literally transform himself into the moon, but his dropping-off of body and mind spontaneously manifested the illuminating power, vastness and clarity of busshō. The disciples' dilemma lay in their egocentric effort to look beyond the fully concrete, active embodiment of busshō in the personhood of Nāgārjuna, in their futile pursuit of a symbolic vision of the self-limitation or literal transformation of Eternity into a round moon. Because of their self-centeredness, they thereby falsely bifurcated Buddha-nature into the aspects of essence and manifestation, reality and symbol, changelessness and apparent form -- a self-entangling and highly problematic stance that is for the most part supported by traditional interpretations of the legend which misunderstand the pedagogical nature of the Mahāyāna doctrine of

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[26]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 2, pp. 93-94 (Terada vol. I, p. 56).

three Buddha-bodies (Triyāka)[27] as being distinct from the majestic activities of the active Buddha (gyōbutsu-igi). Dōgen insists, however, that "The form in which [Nāgārjuna] manifested his body was just the same as that of any one of us sitting here right now. This very body of ours is manifesting a round moon shape. . . . Nowhere is there even one buddha not making this 'thereby expressing' his buddha-body. The buddha-body is the manifesting body, and there is always a body manifesting Buddha-nature."[28] Neither Nāgārjuna nor any other Buddha "symbolizes" or represents busshō; rather, each single moment of his selfless activity is the immediate and complete practice, penetration and expression of enlightenment.

In the "Uji" fascicle, Dōgen analyzes the source of the bifurcations of Buddha-nature by focusing on the self-deceptive and egocentric preoccupations of the average man. Dōgen distinguishes between derivative and primordial meanings of the term uji which can be deduced from an interpretation of the Zen saying: "Sometimes (uji) standing so high up on the mountain top/ Sometimes walking deep down on the

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[27]The threefold body of Buddha consists of the Body of Law (Dharmākāya, hōsshin), Body of Bliss (sambhogakāya, hōjin) and Body of Transformation (Nirmānakāya, ōjin). According to Dōgen's radical interpretation, the three bodies are ultimately equalizable through sustained here-and-now practice of the active Buddha (gyōbutsu).

[28]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 2, p. 95, 98.

bottom of sea/ Sometimes a three-headed eight-armed [demon or Acala]/ Sometimes a sixteen- or eight-foot [Buddha]. . . ."[29] In the literal or conventional usage of "sometimes" or "at a certain time," uji seems to refer to a fixed point in which events occur, an irreducible instantaneous sequential segment that is considered separable from existence and towards which man takes the attitude that it is either appropriate or unfavorable, either useful and fitting or unmanageable and untimely -- in short, that it is either in the form of a Buddha or a demon at a particular point in time. If, in the derivative sense, uji takes one form at a certain time, it cannot for that time be said to take any other form. The two forms are considered mutually exclusive possibilities; one is previous and finished, the other is current, and they do not overlap.

Uji can, however, also be understood in the primordial sense that all beings and all times are originally, perpetually and without exception, partiality or interval (encompassing Buddha and demon simultaneously) -- inseparably linked together each and every moment. Beings are invariably temporal occurrences; time always presences as all beings. There is no being in the entire Dharma-realm outside this very moment of time. In "Kūge" Dōgen writes, "Not only flowers but each and every moment has colors such

[29]SBGZ "Uji" 286 (Terada vol. I, p. 256).

as blue, yellow, red, or white. Spring brings flowers, flowers bring spring. There is no opposition between them."[30] Although the average man is inauthentically or egocentrically attached to the supposedly self-evident coming along and going away of 24 regular and repetitive horary sequences, the truth of the self-sameness of being-time prevails whether or not it is ever realized. "Any false step taken is still being[-time]. Moreover, even before and after the misjudgement is shown, still there is found the dwelling-place of being[-time]."[31] Man's doubts about time, or even his lack of doubt, his understanding or misunderstanding, his realization or failure to realize its true meaning, show variation and inconsistency from one moment to the next and are themselves shaped and determined by the incessant fluctuations of being-time. Thus, even misconceptions about being-time are evidence of its pervasive nature and represent an opportunity -- generally not taken -- for creative re-investigation and re-reflection which may lead to genuine realization. As the Zen poem suggests, the primordial meaning of uji is embedded and always partially revealed as the true basis, even if disguised and not recognized, in the everyday expression, "sometimes," itself.

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[30]SBGZ "Kūge" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens (see footnote 24 in Chapter 1), vol. I, p. 50 (Terada, vol. I, p. 153).

[31]SBGZ "Uji" 296 (Terada vol. I, p. 259).

The initial and fundamental breach between beings and time necessarily and inescapably involves other delusory bifurcations between self and time, self and beings, t1 and t2, present and past/future, passage (kyōryaku) and that which passes, arrival and the process of coming, intention and expression, etc. All of these gaps, if not thoroughly uprooted and overcome, result in the heretical and ultimately obstructive conceptions of Buddha-nature, which is falsely separated in terms of eternal/transitory, supramundane/24 hours, potential/actual, end/means. Dōgen does not suggest that the breach between u and ji is first in an actual sense -- that would violate his whole approach -- but that all bifurcations occur at the same time any egocentric misjudgement is made; each is implicated in every other one. Thus, all the derivative views in their multiple variations and insidious consequences must be refuted in order to cast off the inauthentic self and to spontaneously manifest busshō. Without such radical analysis, the temporality and mutability of busshō remains unrealized. Buddha-nature is indeed beyond everyday 24 hours if conceived as a linear sequence leading to an end-point, but it is, as are all experiential factors of existence, right here-and-now within primordial daily being-time.

Once the various inauthentic separations are accepted in their presumed self-evidence, however, average people believe that time passes by in-itself 'out there'

because they seek to disassociate themselves from their own temporal activity, longing for relief from responsibility for the exertion and dedication required by spiritual practice. The view that _uji_ is "sometimes" a Buddha or "sometimes" a demon is likened by Dōgen to crossing a river and climbing a mountain. The _bombu_ inauthentically aspire for the attainment of a ruby palace at the summit, a remote pinnacle from which they could idly oversee the landscape, secure and triumphant, without having to labor through the task of making their way in the "mud and water," symbolic of the _bodhisattva_'s compassionate vow to save all sentient beings. The palace symbolizes all the idle hopes and expectations which existentially fear or reject and ontologically deny through self-fixation here-and-now present activity. Obsessed with the fabricated and romanticized future represented by the grandiose palace, which may or not exist or ever be reached, the past is considered to have vanished, and the present is overlooked or discounted so that the separation between self and mountain-river is as great as that between heaven and earth.

This self-deception, ontologically misleading and existentially foolhardy, is hardened by a deep-seated anxiety about impermanence and attachment to _ātman_, the ego's dread of being passed over by the flight of an external framework of time coming from the future and going through the present into the past without end. The ruby palace does

not represent the attainment of a genuine selfless, holistic perspective, but an inauthentic attempt to remove oneself from the vicissitudes of the temporal setting with which one is directly and unavoidably involved. Attachment to the fabrication posited as a futural goal attainable only at the mountain peak aggravates the gulfs created between self and time, beings and time, and the three tenses so that they assume enormous and seemingly insurmountable proportions, obliterating the immediacy and comprehensive totality of the here-and-now (nikon). But Dōgen insists that in climbing the mountain and crossing the river, which are never left far behind, man exists through time so that in man there must be time. "I already am, and time cannot slip away."[32] Whether in the form of coming and going or not coming and going, being-time invariably transpires right now. Furthermore, the Buddha (symbolic of today) and the demon (symbolic of yesterday) lie precisely in this very moment of climbing the mountain; they are like various peaks in the range of mountains that represent the interconnected manifestations of temporal occurrences as daily being-time. For Dōgen, the concrete activity of the time of the mountain and river has preeminence -- it is altogether ontologically more real and existentially more significant -- than the fabricated ruby palace. "Does or does not," he demands, "the

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[32] SBGZ "Uji" 291 (Terada vol. I, p. 257).

very moment of ascending the mountain and crossing the river chew up and spit out the time of the palace made of rubies?"[33] Nikon at once encompasses and underlies ("chew up") and overcomes and refutes ("spit out") the conventional or derivative fixations and attachments.

Dōgen also seeks to eliminate the deceptive gap between arrival or attainment and the activity or movement of coming, in his interpretation of the Rinzai school's saying, "Sometimes the intended meaning gets there, but the expression does not get there . . . [sometimes the reverse, sometimes both get there concurrently, sometimes neither get there]."[34] In his exegesis, Dōgen radically shifts the emphasis from the question of getting there or not, to the temporality which is fundamentally the same at all stages of development. The important issue is not attainment per se, but the dynamic interrelated processes of getting there, not getting there, intended meaning and expression, all of which constitute unique momentary perspectives of being-time. "While the time of getting there is unfinished, the time of not getting there is already here."[35] Not getting there is of no lower status than getting there in that both manifest uji. Nothing slips away, no time is lost or to be

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[33]SBGZ "Uji" 292 (Terada vol. I, p. 258).

[34]SBGZ "Uji" 302-303 (Terada vol. I, p. 261).

[35]SBGZ "Uji" 303 (Terada vol. I, p. 262).

considered more or less appropriate than any other interdependent moment, just as there is no 'right' or 'wrong' time for instruction, practice or realization of the Dharma. Dōgen says elsewhere, "The occasion (jisetsu) is not in the past or the future but right here-and-now."[36]

Dōgen accentuates the dynamic nature of movement and continuity, which is no longer statically conceived as time-points "piled up on top of one another or lined up side by side" in a linear uni-directional fashion. Rather, it is disclosed as the simultaneous interpenetration of all beings occurring right-now and throughout the unity of past, present and future. Dōgen distinguishes the genuine significance of passage (kyōryaku) from the derivative view that "time flies," conceived as "something like the wind and rain moving from east to west."[37] The apparent "flight" of time is artificially separated from and considered an obstacle to existence, and is thought to possess an inevitability and inviolability at once terribly remote and voraciously victimizing. Dōgen does not deny the reality of past or history, which he claims is ironically the position taken by the average man who believes that the past has disappeared, but he reorients and deepens the existential meaning of this temporal dimension by showing its ontological inseparability

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[36]SBGZ "Kankin" (Terada vol. I, p. 345).

[37]SBGZ "Uji" 299 (Terada vol. I, p. 259).

from the totalistic presencing of being-time encompassing all tenses in ultimately equalizable simultaneous realization. Kyōryaku is not merely passing away. Rather, it signifies the comprehensive asymmetrical process of the True Man's enlightened existential projection and ontological understanding right-now moving simultaneously in and through past, present and future, actively engaging the passenger and passageway as well as the full context of the experiential reality surrounding and permeating the movement. "There is passage from today to tomorrow, passage from today to yesterday, passage from yesterday to today, passage from today to today, and passage from tomorrow to tomorrow."[38] Kyōryaku at once extends through all dimensions and gathers the total weight of previous and futural activity into this very present moment. By virtue of kyōryaku, the lives of former Zen masters are not to be added up backwards in terms of chronological sequence, but are to be understood as interpenetrating occasions of the spontaneous manifestations of being-time.

The derivative view of the past, according to Dōgen, gives rise to the grave misconception that the "selfsame mind-to-selfsame mind transmission" of Zen awakening to the Buddhist Dharma, as symbolized by Bodhidharma's coming from the West, was an event that merely took place at some former

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[38]SBGZ "Uji" 293-294 (Terada vol. I, p. 258).

time in some other place, as if removed from one's own immediately present temporal existence. ". . . the Dharma that makes passage is misunderstood as moving eastward a hundred thousand worlds and a hundred thousand epochs away."[39] Such a misjudgement about being-time reduces the spontaneous Zen transmission to the mere transporting of doctrine from one country to another, represented by artifacts such as rare copies of sūtras, images and idols, and documents. Dōgen, however, unlike many of his contemporaries, proclaimed himself "empty-handed upon returning to his native land" (kūshu-genkyō) from his visit to China, having acquired nothing but a "soft and flexible mind" (nyūnan-shin). He insists that Dharmic transmission and realization is itself kyōryaku, and therefore all past enlightenments are fully and directly duplicated and recreated right-now and continually throughout all ages. No time is overlooked. Every moment of exertion is a unique occasion at which "the bright star [symbolic of Śākyamuni's awakening] appears, the Tathāgata appears, the [Dharma-]eye appears, the uplifted flower [symbolic of the inital Zen transmission to Mahākāśyappa] appears,"[40] simultaneous with the present realization.

Thus, Dōgen must specifically and adamantly reject

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[39] SBGZ "Uji" 300 (Terada vol. I, p. 260).

[40] SBGZ "Uji" 302 (Terada vol. I, p. 262).

the view emphasized in the Pure Land and Nichiren sects that the world since the times of Śākyamuni had become so degenerate in the Kamakura Period, and men so inferior, that they could not hope to attain enlightenment through their own exhaustive power. In the era of mappō, according to the other Japanese doctrines, man must resort either to the recitation of nembutsu to remove sin and win the grace of Amida Buddha (in Hōnen), or to a life of naturalism (jinen-hōni) with simple faith in and utter reliance on the power of Amida (in Shinran), or to the chanting of the sacred title (daimoku) of the Lotus Sutra to gain salvation (in Nichiren). Belief in the sheer degeneracy of mappō, Dōgen feels, could also encourage one to postpone the spiritual quest in expectation of a later and perhaps more worthy and fruitful time. Dōgen stresses that "All human beings are born with this potential [to successfully practice Buddhism]. . . . Students of the Way, do not wait until tomorrow. This very day, this very moment, practice in accordance with the teaching of the Buddha."[41] No one is condemned by the historical epoch to which he is born. Selfless action and strenuous yet purposeless effort alone make possible full emancipation here-and-now.

Furthermore, Dōgen's notion of kyōryaku leads him to diverge significantly from Rinzai Zen which he feels

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[41] Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, p. 72.

overemphasizes the view that the Dharma cannot be communicated through words (the expressions of masters) or letters (sūtras and commentaries). Although Dōgen acknowledges the limitations of unedifying or distracting and indulgent discourse, he maintains that the simultaneous interrelatedness of past and present enlightenments demand that the Dharma be perpetually reexplored and renewed by the True Man through creative divulgences of the innumerable and inexhaustible dimensions and meanings of the Way. "During such practice no time must be wasted," Dōgen writes, ". . . Therefore, speaking of the Way in the present contains no doubt or error. The present speaking of the Way possesses the observation of the past. Observations of the past contain the present speaking of the Way. Consequently, observation and speaking exist in the past and present and there is no gap between them. Our present practice is based on speaking and correct observations of the Way."[42] Because the transmitted Dharma is nothing but this very being-time of the True Man, continuing appropriation and emulation must entail continuing observation and expressiveness. Sustained exertion

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[42]SBGZ "Dōtuku" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. II (Tokyo: Nakayama Shobō, 1977), p. 17 (Terada vol. I, p. 384). Also, in SBGZ "Shisho," there is a recorded conversation in which Dōgen asks master Ju-ching how the Dharma of aeons past could be transmitted by Buddhas of the present. Ju-ching responds that the question itself presupposes a fixation with linear sequential time and reduces the spontaneous transmission of Dharma to the mere coming and going of something 'in' time.

(gyōji) necessarily involves creative speaking (dōtoku), seated meditation (zazen) invariably entails "explaining mind, explaining nature" (sesshin sesshō), and spiritual communion between master and disciple (kannō-dōkō) includes the "vines" (kattō) of Dharmic dialogue, to unfold and clarify the inexhaustible dōri of the temporal nature of busshō.

Similarly, the genuine passage of the Dharma does not allow for an arbitrary bifurcation into the aspects of its being 'inside' or 'outside' scripture.[43] Nor should there be an artificial hierarchy which distinguishes between superficial speech (symbolized by the Bodhidharma's "skin" in the traditional interpretation of a Zen legend) and profound silence (symbolized by his "marrow"), or between illusory expression and the reality of experience.[44] Dōgen reinterprets Zen notions such as kūge (flower in the sky), gabyō (painted rice-cake), muchū (dream), and kattō (entwinements), which usually designate illusory states of mind and uses of language, to free them from any contrast between truth and falsity, reality and metaphor. For example, he maintains that kūge does not indicate "one who has eye

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[43]Dōgen, "Hōkyō-ki" trans. Norman Waddell in The Eastern Buddhist, vol. 10, no. 2 (Oct., 1977), p. 119. When asked by Dōgen, Ju-ching emphatically asserts that the Way of the Buddhas has nothing to do with the distinction of 'inside' or 'outside' the scriptures.

[44]See SBGZ "Kattō" for Dōgen's reinterpretation of the traditional Zen legend.

disease," but the manifold blossoming petals (ge) of genuinely realized emptiness (kū). Yet Dōgen does not advocate idle preoccupation with mere words lest the practices of reading sūtras and composing commentaries take priority over active meditation. Rather, he accentuates the expressive reality fully manifest by the true form (jissō) of all temporal phenomena which comprise the "universal sūtras": "The trees, grasses, and land involved in [self-fulfilling samadhi] all emit a bright and shining light, and preach the profound and incomprehensible Dharma; and it is endless."[45]

Dōgen's radical reinterpretation and reformulation of Buddhist expressions is justified in terms of his understanding of the true kyōryaku of the Dharma. Previous theories must be revised by creative hermeneutic reading which can even involve grammatical "distortion" so that the expressions reflect and convey the perpetually renewed endeavors of True Manhood of shinjin-datsuraku which permits not the slightest ontological or existential discrepancy between self-realization, all beings, each moment, Buddha-nature, and active realization. The sham of the "ruby palace" which takes the form of the false eternalization of mujō-busshō that has infiltrated scripture, doctrine and practice must be radically uprooted and entirely destroyed.

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[45] SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) 136 (Terada vol. I, p. 14).

In "Busshō," Dōgen exposes a variety of misconceptions permeating Mahāyāna and Zen theories and practices derived from fundamentally derivative views of being-time. Busshō, he suggests, is frequently posited as an eternal substance which is actual yet transcendent of moral causation and the life-death process, thereby reflecting an inauthentic attempt to deny the self. It is also represented as an original potentiality that can only be attained as a teleological end; or, either homocentrically as a human possession idealistically projected upon the world of phenomena or as a cosmological absolute that embraces man. In all such views, the conventional understanding of uji as an enduring, fixed time-point is presupposed in disguised fashion and -- out of existential/ontological blindness or ego-fixation -- fabricated into the "ruby palace" of false transcendence and eternalism. Dōgen seeks to destructure these misconceptions, not to do away with the notion of busshō, but to restore to this central Mahāyāna doctrine the true meaning and significance of primordiality as a dimension of experience inseparable from and simultaneous with total and immediate here-and-now realization. Although assertions about busshō in Mahāyāna literature are intended as provisional and pedagogical constructions which are not to be hypostatized as ultimately real, Dōgen is not satisfied with that rationale. He contends that any possible misleading implication in any doctrine betrays a deep-seated and insidious misunderstanding

that must be challenged and overcome. If the expression is even slightly derivative, Dōgen suggests, then the ontological understanding and existential experience on which it is based must be inauthentic as well. After all, any subtle gap that is falsely created is, from the primordial standpoint, as great as that between heaven and earth.

In order to fully eliminate the "slightest discrepancy" between Buddha-nature and the totalistic moment Dōgen radically reinterprets Huai-hai's Zen injunction which seems on the surface not to be problematic concerning time, but under careful primordial inspection reveals how profoundly and insidiously disturbing are the permeations of derivative time. The Zen dictum (which may represent a paraphrase from the Nirvāṇa Sutra) is: "If you wish to know the Buddha-nature's meaning, you should watch for temporal conditions. If the time arrives, the Buddha-nature will manifest itself."[46] Although these words appear to successfully relate busshō as inseparably connected to temporal conditions, Dōgen feels that they may reenforce both the Senika and naturalistic heresies unless appropriately interpreted. An inauthentic reading would assume that Buddha-nature is beyond daily being-time and yet comes about as a "matter of natural course." If the time is suitable, the Buddha-nature will

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[46] SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 1, p. 102 (Terada vol. I, p. 47).

arrive whether or not there is sustained exertion. But, "if the time does not come," Dōgen comments on the derivative view, "then whether you go to a master in search of the Dharma, or negotiate the Way in concentrated practice, it is not manifested."[47]

All of the existential and ontological breaches the average man has generated in his misunderstanding of being-time become apparent here in the implication that the time-in-itself can and will "arrive" as an independent process separable from the transiency of uji. "Should watch for," Dōgen maintains, however, does not imply a rift between watcher and the watched, or between 'right' and 'false' seeing. Rather, "it is just seeing" precisely what is here-and-now fully manifest as all temporal occasions -- genuine ontological insight that does not gaze beyond itself to "find and see" time. "If the time arrives" (jisetsu nyakushi) is taken by Dōgen to mean "the time has already arrived" (jisetsu kishi), not in some futural realm to be anticipated and pursued like the "ruby palace," but right here-and-now. There is no "if" from the standpoint of uji because there is no time of the 24 hours that is not the "proper" time; not one moment that is separable from complete realization. The time already here is itself the full presencing of

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[47]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 1, p. 104 (Terada vol. I, p. 48).

Buddha-nature, which does not have to "arrive" on the scene. "There has never yet been a time not arrived. There can be no Buddha-nature that is not Buddha-nature manifested right-here."[48] The True Man, indeed, does not await the coming and going of temporal conditions, but must spontaneously penetrate all beings at all times through sustained exertion.

## Critical Examination

In contrast to the teleological orientation of their respective philosophical traditions, Heidegger and Dōgen radically reverse the deep-seated and perdurant tendency to pursue the attainment of a supra-temporal realm supposedly superior in origin and value to daily existence. Instead of gazing beyond time by separating reality from time or expecting to achieve a goal outside of the temporal context, they explore and clarify ontologically the meaning of time that is already within or inseparable from existence. Both thinkers disclose the temporal structures that prevail in spite of -- by underlying and betraying -- claims of infinitude. Heidegger's notion of ecstatic temporality and Dōgen's notion of being-time are discovered as the

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[48] SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 1, p. 105 (Terada vol. I, p. 48).

foundations of existence itself. Whether or not it is ever realized or acknowledged, primordial temporality holds sway as the generally disguised basis for both a preoccupation with the measuring of time and speculative flights which attempt to surmount time. Although the unity of time may not be seen or may appear fragmented, it still prevails and is evident even in those inauthentic modes of being which tend to conceal it. Derivative time is neither to be disproved as a logical flaw or contradiction nor negated as mere illusion, but it is exposed by Heidegger and Dōgen as a limited and inauthentic standpoint that is obstructive to genuine understanding if taken as the sole approach to temporality.

Although both thinkers challenge the stranglehold of now-time, and consequent loss of the authentic significance of past and future, central differences are apparent in the aims and scopes of their philosophical investigations, as reflected in the analysis of the origin of derivative time. The fundamental disparity between them is that Heidegger tries to de-structure now-time by deepening an understanding of past and future on the basis of the temporo-historical constitution of Dasein, whereas Dōgen deepens the existential and ontological meaning of the present by incorporating the past and future within the totalistic passage of all beings spontaneously appearing as all-times. Heidegger does maintain that the inauthentic now can be partially reclaimed

as an authentic moment of vision. Yet he clearly gives priority to the future and transcendence as the primordial basis of the past and historicality in his overcoming of derivative time. Falling, he maintains, is invariably related to a preoccupation with the present. Also, throughout authentic temporal happening (Geschehen), the present "vanishes" (verschwindet) in relation to the preeminence of the past and future. Genuinely conceived as Dasein's repeatable having been, history for Heidegger is never simply left behind, but neither is it in any sense fully identified with the present.

For Dōgen, however, the authentically realized right-now is nothing other than the complete spontaneous presencing of uji extending simultaneously throughout past, present and future; the past is one inseparable dimension of the selfsame dwelling place at each and every occasion of being-time. From Dōgen's standpoint, Heidegger's analysis of temporo-historicality does not overcome the "ruby palace" which symbolizes the ontological fabrications and existential deceptions that insidiously lurk and dominate so long as the ultimate and complete unities of beings and time and the three tenses are obscured in any subtle way. If there is the slightest gap, Dōgen maintains, between temporality and immediate realization here-and-now, the separation between truth and existence remains as great as that between heaven and earth.

The distinction between Heidegger's conception of the circular interrelatedness of past, present and future and Dōgen's notion of the simultaneity of the three tenses is, in turn, grounded in differences in their means of defining and reorienting the ensnarements of derivative time. Heidegger closely associates Dasein's falling with its preoccupation with the derivative present. Once this connection is drawn, Heidegger places himself in the position in which he must give priority to the future as the true basis of the past over the present and to possibility over actuality. He is also unable to successfully relate human temporality to the time of other beings. Heidegger maintains that falling is inextricably related to existence as an inherent component of the three-fold structure of care which Dasein for the most part _is_ so long as it exists alongside and uses entities. Falling can never be fully overcome, but only _existenzielly_ modified "for the moment." Inauthenticity is such a pervasive possibility of existence because Dasein's circumspective making-present of entities present-at-hand, a necessary mode of comportment in both science and handiwork, is the condition of temptation that leads to Dasein's deficient understanding of itself as one more _vorhanden_ being amongst others. Heidegger writes that ". . . _falling_ has its _existenzial_ meaning in the _Present_. . . . As this making-present which gets entangled in itself, curiosity has an ecstatical unity with a corresponding [inauthentic]

future and a corresponding [inauthentic] having been."[49]

Because falling is defined as a state intrinsic to Dasein's Being, Heidegger is reluctant to existentially criticize derivative time or to offer injunctives for overcoming it (although he does offer an ontologically critical exposition and de-struction of its limitations), lest authenticity be misconstrued as an escape from world-concern and phenomenological neutrality be mistaken for moral exhortation. Although Heidegger claims that his analytical depiction of falling is not "disparaging" in a moral sense,[50] it appears that the very notion of hermeneutic phenomenology (as ek-sistentially interpretive rather than merely descriptive) does and should imply some criteria for evaluation -- a hierarchical framework which relentlessly challenges and uproots various modes of existential and ontological deficiency. At the same time that Heidegger insists that he does not pass moral judgement on falling, however, he clearly suggests that man is necessarily bound to inauthenticity by the very conditions and nature of care as thrown-projection. Heidegger's later works accentuate the implication of an inescapable determinism of existence through the doctrine of the eschatological structure of Being's concealment-in-unconcealment, which is said to precipitate an inevitable decline

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[49]SZ 346 (BT 397).

[50]SZ 167 (BT 211).

in thinking. Heidegger seems to suggest that modern man is "condemned" to the current destitute era of willful technological dominance by the withdrawal of Being as the fundamental ground of history. Man cannot exist authentically without attending the futural advent of Being itself emerging from the past as Dasein's having been and coming towards Dasein.

Furthermore, Heidegger is not capable by his own admission of investigating the time of vorhanden entities because he associates Dasein's concern for things present-at-hand with the state of falling into now-time. Dasein loses itself in the static now precisely when it deals with entities which are thereby excluded from the true nature of ecstatic temporality that uniquely belongs to Dasein's multi-dimensional structural totality. Although Heidegger is not uninterested in disclosing the time of entities in-the-world (Weltzeit) whose Being is distinct from that of Dasein, it seems that the framework of fundamental ontology prohibits a resolution of this matter. He writes that, "Such entities can never be designated as 'temporal' in the strict sense. Like every entity with a character other than that of Dasein, they are non-temporal, whether they Really occur, arise and pass away, or subsist 'ideally.'"[51] Heidegger's Dasein-orientation in Sein und Zeit, which tends to overlook

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[51]SZ 420 (BT 472).

the temporality of other beings, functions to a large extent within the horizon of Kantian transcendental analysis, and it is not fully free of the elements of modern subiectität, which is an ontological inversion of rather than a liberation from substance ontology, of which Heidegger himself is critical of Kant as well as Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche. From Dōgen's (Buddhist) standpoint of non-ego or non-self (muga, thoroughgoing impersonal and insubstantial nature of existence), Heidegger's exclusive focus on Dasein seems to perpetuate but not overcome or eliminate substance ontology, now disguised by a still derivative reversal, the limitations of which Heidegger has exposed in other modern thinkers and acknowledges at the conclusion of Sein und Zeit and in later essays (particularly Humanismusbrief). This dilemma embedded in Heidegger's hermeneutics -- his inability to escape from the subiectum and therefore the ousia -- is a key reason for his "turn" from Daseinanalytik to a more naturalistic and aesthetic access to Sein als solches in the investigations of art, poetry, spatiality and thinghood in Heidegger II. The consequent lessening of the significance of the existential dimension by abandoning a concentration on Dasein, however, accentuates a sense of vacillation, uncertainty and imbalance in his approach, for which there is no resolve without a breakthrough from any conception of substantiality or its inversion, subjecticity.

Because Dōgen's definition and method of analyzing

derivative time is different than Heidegger's, his conclusions are quite distinct. In contrast to Heidegger, Dōgen does not presuppose the distinction between _existenzial_ and _existenziell_ levels which implies (in Heidegger's thought) that since falling is a necessary _existenzial_ condition, it is never completely surpassed but merely altered in an _existenziell_ mode for the moment if the time is right. Rather, Dōgen maintains that the conventional conception of time is only one possible and partial perspective which can and must be fully overcome through the absolute and inalterable inseparability of the sustained (_existenziell_) exertion of here-and-now realization which comprehends the (_existenzial_) interpenetration of all beings at all times. His soteriological concern grounded in an emphasis on existential injunctive for ontological insight is illustrated in "Genjōkōan" by the example of someone who ventures out into the middle of a great sea and observes no other aspect than the circularity of the water, and thus assumes that the ocean is round. Because of a particular experience, a particular perspective which betrays a self-centeredness or ego-fixation is presupposed. The most obvious feature to observe and the easiest conclusion to draw becomes an ultimately debilitating fixation if never questioned or challenged. Like a fish out of water or a bird out of the sky, existential deficiency and misguided ontology, according to Dōgen, is an unnatural, debilitating and hopelessly self-destructive state. But the

sea can be experienced in innumerable ways -- to a fish it is a palace, to a _deva_ it is a necklace of precious jewels. The partial and one-sided standpoint must be superceded by a holistic perspective which penetrates and realizes each and every phenomenon as the dwelling-place of being-time. "To understand the [true] nature of all things, we must know that in addition to apparent circularity or angularity, the remaining virtue of the mountains and seas is great and inexhaustible, and there are worlds in [all] the four directions. We must know that this is not only so all around us, it is the same both with us right here and within a single dewdrop."[52]

Heidegger maintains that the _Seinsfrage_ is in each case "_je meine_" as something at stake in my existence, but Dōgen unhesitatingly and unquestionably stresses that soteriological deliverance through existential awakening to non-self is necessarily and essentially fully coterminous with overcoming of derivative ontologies based on an inauthentic self-fixation. Dōgen does acknowledge the limitations of language and instruction in conveying the ultimate meaning of being-time, for even someone, he says, who has been able to express the truth for a long time is "still groping in the darkness for his original face." But Dōgen

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[52]SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) pp. 137-138 (Terada vol. I, p. 37).

repeatedly and uncompromisingly affirms the capacity for the simultaneous realization by the True Man of existential (encompassing Heidegger's <u>existenzial</u> and <u>existenziell</u> levels) and ontological truth at all moments of the passage of being-time. In his rejection of the notion of <u>mappō</u> and his radical reinterpretation of the dictum "if the time arrives," Dōgen refutes any historical or metaphysical doctrine which tends to delay or impede full realization by separating truth from the eternal present moment. The truth of being-time is not a matter of projection or recollection, or of the awaiting of an advency and the repetition of previous possibilities in which the present "vanishes." Rather, it is the immediate and complete realization of the totalistic now during which the past and future no longer disappear, but are encompassed and profoundly explored each moment.

Being-time, according to Dōgen, does not arrive on its own in any subtle sense, but is perpetually enacted, enhanced and renewed through the True Man's sustained exertions. "It is through the exertions of all Buddhas in the past, present and future that all the Buddhas of the past, present and future are spontaneously manifested."[53] Ontological truth (the presencing of being-time) and existential effort, primordiality and spontaneity are absolutely coterminously realized here-and-now without expectation,

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[53] SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 165).

hesitation or deliberation. The occasion of the truth of being-time lies precisely in this very present moment of exertion. Dōgen's position on the limitations inherent in language is far removed from Heidegger's tension about or inability to offer a moral or existential critique of inauthentic now-time since it is defined by him as the way Dasein _is_ for the most part. "Teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes [symbolic of realization] is a mistaken being-time," Dōgen concedes. But, he concludes, "Not teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes is an even more misleading being-time."[54]

Similarly, because Dōgen does not associate now-time with the necessary and inevitable state of man's everyday concern with thing-like beings, he does not need to exclude the totality of phenomena from his notion of _uji_. Primordial time, for Dōgen, is not the ground by which man comes to know the phenomenal world as a matter of finite transcendence or of standing out amongst entities. Rather, being-time is the absolute inseparability of time's spontaneous manifestation as all beings at any occasion, a comprehensive and pervasive self-sameness of all particular selves, beings and Buddhas manifest at each and every totalistic moment without distinction, partiality or any sense of barrier or exclusiveness.

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[54]SBGZ "Uji" 306 (Terada vol. I, p. 259).

Dōgen challenges what he considers the limitations of the heretical tendencies in the homocentric conception of Buddha-nature as a substantive human possession, the idealistic view of it as a psychological projection upon beings, and the absolutistic view of busshō as an abstract and infinite (derivative) identity underlying phenomena uneffected by their contingency. He eliminates any possible separation of any dimension, manifestation or standpoint of being-time by pointing directly to the temporal nature of the innumerable and inexhaustible appearances of the "true form of all dharmas" (shohō-jissō): "You must realize that it is by this very reason [of uji] that there are all the phenomena and all the many grasses in the world as well as each particular blade of grass and each particular phenomenon in its own place in the world. To survey the matter in this way is the initiation of practice."[55] In "Sansuikyō," Dōgen insists that an understanding of the movement of mountains is not separable from -- but is essential for -- an insight into the innate and unceasing dynamism of human activity.

There seems to be an agreement between Heidegger and Dōgen about the essential role in philosophy of creative interpretation founded on the recovery of the primordial existential realization and understanding of time. Because deficient ontology does express, however partially or

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[55]SBGZ "Uji" 289 (Terada vol. I, p. 257).

misleadingly, the true nature of time, both thinkers must insist on taking license to radically revise previous ontological expressions, not arbitrarily or destructively, but in order to reduce the false separations created and perpetuated in philosophy between self, world and the three tenses of time. Heidegger's hermeneutically circular approach toward interpretation is oriented in terms of the past and future, in accord with the temporal-historical constitution of Dasein. "In working out the question of Being, we must heed this assignment, so that by positively making the past our own, we may bring ourselves into full possession of the ownmost possibilities of such inquiry. . . . From the phenomena of handing down and repeating, which are rooted in the future, it has become plain why the historizing of authentic history lies preponderantly in having been."[56] The hermeneutic circle is grounded in the ecstatically dynamic interplay between the having been which is authentically repeated through anticipation of the future. Recovery of the past is made possible because logos as the potentiality-for-discovery is always already involved in the forestructure of Seinsverständnis. The circle, for Heidegger, is a pathway of thought which can never be completed in that it perpetually falls into untruth in the present as it attempts to repetitively wrest authentic

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[56]SZ 21, 386 (BT 42, 438-439).

resolve and ontological transparency from out of the hiddenness of the future.

Dōgen's creative interpretation, however, is based on his understanding of the kyōryaku of Dharma and, thus, the totalistic presence of being-time which encompasses in ultimate selfsameness all previous and forthcoming realizations and expressions. The total penetration and realization of any single practice, explanation or experience at this very time fully discloses the entire Dharma-realm because all beings, all selves and all Buddhas at each and every moment are harmoniously and simultaneously linked together. "To fully enlighten the sixteen-foot golden body [symbolic of the presencing of being-time] by means of the sixteen-foot golden body is to spontaneously manifest resolve, practice, bodhi and nirvāṇa; this itself is being, this itself is time. Ultimate and complete realization of all times as all beings is to have no left-over dharma because the left-over dharma is itself a dharma left-over."[57]

Creative speaking and explaining of the Way, according to Dōgen, reaches at one and the same time without distinction or limitation or obstruction "back" to recall Śākyamuni's original enlightenment and "forth" to project inexhaustible means of divulging its innumerable implications and dimensions. It extends simultaneously "upwards" to the

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[57]SBGZ "Uji" 296 (Terada vol. I, p. 259).

universal awakening experience not limited to any particular time but continually presencing here-and-now as well as "below" to unique expressions whose evocative power arises from and stimulates a specific temporal and historical context. In contrast to Heidegger I who expresses disinterest in existenziell awakening and in soteriological edification and Heidegger II who portrays modern man as primordially limited by the destitution of the current epoch, Dōgen uncompromisingly stresses direct and immediate realization that allows no gap between past, present and future or between possibility and actuality. In his reinterpretation of Huai-hai and his refutation of the notion of mappō, Dōgen discloses the various temporal dimensions as ultimately non-differentiatable yet experientially ever-variable as unique monetary perspectives of the totalistic passage of being-time.

The definition and analysis of derivative time carried out by Heidegger and Dōgen at once influences, reflects and is determined by conclusions concerning primordial time. The separations in Heidegger's thought between the "theoretical" (existenzial disclosure) and the "practical" (existenziell decision), self-as-temporality and the time of entities in-the-world, the primordial intertwining of past and future and the derivative present -- all of which Dōgen insists must be fully and finally overcome without the slightest gap -- derive from the fact that he has so closely

associated the nature of derivative time with the present tense in the sense of Dasein's making-present that which is present-at-hand. Heidegger's analysis of the problematics of derivative time, which posits the inevitability of Dasein's falling into a fixation with the present as a necessary existenzial condition inherent in existence, involves certain presuppositions which tend to diminish the radical nature and universal significance of his projected overcoming of conventional conceptions of time which are represented in traditional substance-oriented metaphysics. These basic differences between Heidegger and Dōgen will be further explored in the following chapter, which examines the nature of the future and its relation to past and present as portrayed in the notions of finitude (in Heidegger) and impermanence (in Dōgen).

# CHAPTER THREE

# FINITUDE AND IMPERMANENCE

## Problematics of Finitude and Impermanence

The aim of this chapter is to show that the notion of finitude in Heidegger and the interpretation of impermanence in Dōgen have a parallel role for each thinker's project in overcoming fixations with substance and attachments to eternalism and in establishing the basis for realization of the dynamism, unity and insubstantiality of primordial time. The disclosures of finitude in Heidegger's fundamental ontology and later writings and of impermanence in Dōgen's philosophy of Zen have a profound and significant affinity in that they serve as the necessary and essential turning points that lead from the deficiencies of derivative time to an understanding and realization of primordial time. Finitude and impermanence, while quite distinct in terms of many of the conclusions and implications drawn by each thinker (as will be discussed in the critical section of this chapter), do commonly point to the radical contingency of existence ontologically revealed through nothingness which pervades man's existential encounters with vicissitude,

anxiety, dying and loss. The aim and function of these notions is two-fold. In a negative-destructive sense, they dislodge and undermine misguided ontologies of constancy and infinity derived from man's inauthentic fixation with now-time by showing the underlying unified movement and contingent or insubstantial nature of the three tenses of temporal existence. The positive-constructive meaning of finitude and impermanence is to lay the foundation for the establishment of thoroughly non-substantive and non-static philosophies of temporal continuity, duration and change. Thus, the central issue for our critical examination is to evaluate how complete, thoroughgoing and radical is the break with and the overcoming of substance ontology achieved in Heidegger's notion of finitude or in Dōgen's interpretation of impermanence, because the success of each thinker in this task will very much determine their accomplishments in analyzing and disclosing primordial time (to be shown in the following chapter).

In the previous chapter, I critically reconstructed, examined and evaluated how Heidegger and Dōgen each investigated the relationships between deficient existence and misconceived ontology and between derivative conceptions of substance and the hypostatization of eternity. Here, I will explore the ways Heidegger and Dōgen disclose the contingent nature of reality that is fundamentally and universally prior to any particular authentic or inauthentic human

decision but which, if resolutely experienced and appropriately conceived, can lead to authentic existence and genuine ontological disclosure. My philosophical ordering or arrangement of the underlying structure of each thinker's arguments suggests that in order for Heidegger and Dōgen to make possible in their respective ways the transition from derivative time to primordial time, they must portray in an ontologically and existentially persuasive manner the profoundly meaningful permeations of radical contingency in the existence of the average man. The conventional fears of the apparent inescapability of death, of the future, and of "time flies," for example, are from the primordial standpoint an inauthentic acknowledgement and expression of a stifled awareness of the true evanescence of time. The ontological truth of radical contingency is thereby partially and unavoidably revealed although man may be existentially incapable of fully disclosing it.

Both thinkers portray contingent reality as underlying and uneffected by any person's attitude, acceptance or understanding, yet intimately, directly and forcefully related to and perceived in terms of -- because it continually influences and determines -- one's ownmost concerns. Radical contingency must be ontologically ("objectively" and non-evaluatively, universally and impartially) clarified on the basis of authentic existential response. In addition, Heidegger and Dōgen attempt to overcome previous doctrines

in their respective philosophical traditions which tend to overlook or betray the full ontological and existential significance of radical contingency. They maintain that because contingency has not been understood radically or fundamentally, but derivatively as a realm in contrast to and of inferior status than eternity, the meaning of finitude in Western metaphysics and of impermanence in Buddhist thought have for the most part been misrepresented. Thus, they expose the deficiencies involved in previous limited ways, Western and Buddhist respectively, of tackling the problem and stress how it is important to restate the question of contingency without already presupposing derivative conceptions of time.

Heidegger and Dōgen uncover contingency neither as a human condition in contrast to an Eternal power, nor as a partial and temporary drawback of man or an unfortunate yet correctible flaw, nor as a psychological or factual emotional problem. Rather, contingency is the universal and undeniable, ultimate and all-pervasive basis, nature and structure of existence. In the concluding portion of this chapter, I will critically compare and evaluate their efforts to surpass the problematics of substance ontology. I will focus on their respective approaches to death and dying, non-existence and nothingness as the existential pointer to an impartial or neutral analysis of the ontological nature of radical contingency, and contrast Heidegger's futural

orientation in terms of Being-toward-the-end with Dōgen's emphasis on the impermanent and insubstantial totality of life/death here-and-now.

Heidegger maintains that the essential meaning of finitude has been overlooked in the Western metaphysical tradition because it has been conceived as an ontical collection of finite vorhanden entities either created by or of a lesser realm than the Eternal. Although Heidegger is critical of Christian theology (which he believes remains a part of and determined by onto-theological forgetfulness of Being), he attempts to surpass substance ontology by integrating fundamental ontology with anti-metaphysical Christian eschatology, which reveals a more primordial relationship with time and temporality in terms of man's standing-out toward a future not at one's disposal for which dying, dread, guilt, and the call of conscience are the formative experiences. By introducing Christian doctrines, however, Heidegger does not merely attempt a new synthesis between speculative metaphysics and theology, but to highlight and deepen the original significance of the Greek notions of aletheia and logos which, in Heidegger's understanding of Pre-Socratic thought, suggest the inherent limitation, concealment or hiddenness that comes-to-pass in all presencing or disclosure. The two main modern influences on Heidegger's disclosure of finitude seem to be Kant, whose "metaphysics of metaphysics" or critique of the tradition from within it

is based on the finite nature of the possibility of human knowledge, and Kierkegaard, whose Christian psychological studies of dread, sin and despair show human choices about one's ultimate limitations to be the basis of religious freedom. Heidegger seeks to overcome Kant by grounding epistemology in the phenomenologico-ontological analysis of Dasein's everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*), which thereby provides the *existenzial* foundations for Kierkegaardian dogmatic psychology (which in itself remains restricted to the *existenziell* level of inquiry). Heidegger philosophically moves, for example, from an analysis of Dasein's *existenziell* encounters with death to the *existenzial* disclosure of finitude as Being-thrown-unto-death or Being-toward-the-end.

The central task of fundamental ontology, Heidegger maintains -- unlike the apparently similar disciplines of Scheler's philosophical anthropology and Kantian epistemology -- is to investigate the finitude (*Endlichkeit*) of Dasein, which is not an end that comes as the termination of life, but the unavoidable limit which Dasein perpetually *is* as existing. Such an inquiry into finitude is no arbitrary exploration of the properties or the imperfections of man. Because the possibility of *Seinsverständnis* is intrinsically rooted in the finitude of Dasein, the task of laying the foundation of metaphysics is itself founded on the question of finitude, in such a way that this finitude can first become a problem that is appropriately unfolded, explicated

and interpreted. In Vom Wesen des Grundes, Heidegger writes that Dasein's power of freedom or potentiality-for-Being is inherently limited and bound by its thrownness amidst beings, and it is thus pervaded by a non-power. As Dasein's freedom for understanding is permeated by the unfreedom of its concrete circumstances, so is truth permeated by untruth and authenticity by inauthenticity. "This sort of powerlessness (thrownness)," he asserts, "is not due to the fact that beings infect Dasein; rather it defines the very Being of Dasein. Every project of world (Weltenwurf), then, is thrown (geworfener). We must clarify the essence of finitude of Dasein in terms of the constitutive features of its Being before proceeding to any 'self-evident' definition of the finite 'nature' of man, any description of those characteristics which follow from finitude alone, and certainly any hasty 'explanation' of the ontical heritage of finitude."[1]

The intrinsic powerlessness of existence is analyzed in Sein und Zeit in terms of the Grenzsituationen of anxiety, guilt and death which bring Dasein face to face with the nullity (Nichtigkeit) or null ground and conclusive end that permeates everydayness. The totality of Dasein is always an outstanding issue still to be settled, which Dasein is

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[1]Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen des Grundes, trans. The Essence of Reasons by Terence Malick (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), pp. 129-131.

continually moving towards in the time allotted to it between birth and death. In his later works, Heidegger explores the mysterious concealment of Being's illuminative mission which demarcates the temporal-historical boundaries of the finite epochal-regions holding sway over the inevitably needful yet forgetful human destiny.

Dōgen maintains that the fundamental significance of impermanence is directly and inseparably related to onto-logical/existential realization of the Buddhist truth of non-self (muga, the thoroughgoing insubstantiality of human and phenomenal existence); to overlook, deny or betray mujō is to necessarily miss the essential meaning of muga. He is critical of previous doctrines in the development of Buddhist philosophy which tend to violate the ultimate and complete selfsameness of mujō and muga, by portraying impermanence in terms of some trace of substantiality and by associating non-self with a realm that transcends contingency. For example, Abhidharma speculation and controversies concerning the duration of the momentary dharma in terms of the stages of arising, abiding, desistence and cessation and the question of the eternity of past, present and future presuppose an enduring substratum which can be analyzed into reducible yet persistent segments as well as the permanence of nirvāṇa. Dōgen also suggests, however, in a more stunning, original and forceful critique, that a misconception of mujō (and therefore of muga) may haunt Hui-neng's Zen doctrine of

kenshō ("seeing into one's own nature"), or at least prevalent interpretations which fail to realize the essence of impermanence in its most radical dimensions. Although Hui-neng himself is generally hailed as truly sensitive to and perceptive of the issue of non-substantiality, Dōgen contends in "Busshō" that the sixth patriarch's utterance, "men have norths and souths, Buddha-nature does not," may be misunderstood to mean that man has substance (or permanent self which possesses directions, attributes and markings) but that Buddha-nature is eternally transcendent of mujō, devoid of substance and all-pervading. Such a view recreates the Senika heresy by implying that Buddha-nature is an attainable goal reached at the end of linear sequence through inauthentic self-denial rather than genuine realization of muga. It thereby perpetuates derivative bifurcations between substantive phenomena or self and the impermanent movement it undergoes and between the contingency of unenlightenment and the eternity of enlightenment.

Dōgen insists that the problem of life and death (shōji) and of the swift changes of impermanence is the "one great matter" of Buddhism which requires the diligent and authentic attention of all practitioners of the Way who seek to selflessly cast off body and mind of self and others. The true nature of the universal and continual processes of arising-desistence and generation-destruction consuming all insubstantial phenomena must be thoroughly clarified,

ontologically penetrated and existentially realized. A profound and deeply-moving awareness of impermanence stimulates the mind's resolve (hosshin) to seek enlightenment with the necessary sense of urgency, determination and continually renewed exertive effort. Dōgen maintains, "When the transient nature of the world is recognized, the ordinary selfish mind does not arise; neither does the mind that seeks for fame and profit. Aware that time waits for no man, train as though you were attempting to save your head from being enveloped in flames. Reflecting on the transient nature of body and life, exert yourself just as the Buddha Śākyamuni did when he raised his foot [symbolic of sustained effort]."[2] Furthermore, impermanence is not merely one issue amongst others, nor a question to be logically resolved or removed through trance, but the preeminent existential and ontological concern leading to the truth of non-self. "This realization [of impermanence] is not achieved by some temporary method of contemplation. It is not creating something out of nothing and then thinking about it. Impermanence is a fact before our eyes. Do not wait for the teachings from others, the words of the scriptures, and for the principles of enlightenment."[3]

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[2]Dōgen, "Gakudō-yōjinshu" trans. Yūhō Yokoi in Zen Master Dōgen (New York and Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1976), p. 48.

[3]Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, p. 39.

Dōgen's understanding of impermanence is shaped by a confluence of factors, including the doctrinal-metaphysical (Buddhist concepts of dependent organization, anātman and karma which depict the universal in-substantial flux); the poetic-emotional (the Japanese aesthetic category of mono no aware, poignant sadness about the passing of things naturalistically symbolized by the morning dew or scattering leaves); and the historical-cultural (social upheavals and natural disasters in Kamakura Japan leading to the commonly-held belief in epochal degeneracy). These influences are at once distilled in terms of Dōgen's intensely personal experiences of suffering and lamentation which are uniquely reflective of the all-pervasive ephemeral nature of momentary existence, and transcended through his "casting off" any subtle attachment to self. Dōgen explicates and interprets the inexhaustible meanings of impermanence as a means of exhortation and edification concerning the directness and immediacy of the spiritual quest through the use of poetic and naturalistic metaphors as well as ontological analyses of the totalistic, insubstantial dwelling-place of being-time and the radical impermanence of Buddha-nature.

## Heidegger's Disclosure of Finitude

Heidegger maintains that finitude must be recognized as the primordial basis of ontology in that the possibility

for the comprehension of Being is itself the innermost essence of finitude. "As a mode of Being, existence is in itself finitude and, as such, is only possible on the basis of the comprehension of Being. There is and must be such as Being only where finitude has become existent."[4] Heidegger concedes that in Aristotelean metaphysics, there would seem to be no significant relationship between ontology and finitude. But Heidegger's thinking is greatly influenced by -- even as it attempts to reinterpret and overcome -- Kant's analysis of finitude as a fundamental condition of transcendental knowledge. Kant, the one and only philosopher in the Western tradition who genuinely explores the meaning of finitude, according to Heidegger, does not establish the finitude of _vorhanden_ entities by showing, ontically, that they have been created by an infinite God. Rather, he explains their finitude by pointing out that they are things only insofar as they are possible objects of finite knowledge. Knowledge, in turn, is finite because it is essentially receptive; it must be solicited and affected by those entities which announce themselves to it. Thus, finitude for Kant is the very necessity of reason to objectify entities which it represents by forming concepts. Finitude manifests itself

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[4]Martin Heidegger, _Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik_, trans. _Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics_ by James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 236.

as the uncreative, receptive basis of an otherwise creative act -- knowledge.

In Heidegger's critical reading, however, there is an even deeper meaning of finitude implied, though not fully articulated by Kant. Heidegger notes in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik that Kant grounds his three primary philosophical inquiries (the cosmological, what can I know?; the psychological, what ought I to do?; and the theological, what may I hope?) in a fourth and more fundamental question, What is Man? According to Heidegger, the relationship between the first three questions and the fourth one is not merely accidental because the three are nothing other than the fourth query and must be reducible to it. The full significance of finitude does not merely pertain to the problem of knowledge, as Kant asserts. Rather, as Heidegger creatively interprets Kant, finitude lies in the very Being and total factical structure of man who has been thrown and is stretched-along in the midst of beings on which he is dependent, such that he can never fully be master of himself. "It follows that human reason is not finite only because it propounds these [first] three questions," Heidegger observes, "but, on the contrary, it propounds these three questions because it is finite and so radically finite, indeed, that in its rationality this finitude itself is at

stake."[5] If man were an infinite power, he would not have to question the nature and meaning of his Being. The questioning process itself indicates that man's power-of-Being (Seinkönnen) is pervaded by a non-power (Nicht-Können); his freedom is restricted by a transcendental need (transzendentale Bedürftigkeit). In choosing any particular possibility, countless others must be overlooked, discounted, or left unknown or unacknowledged.

In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger investigates the powerlessness and precariousness of Dasein's Being in terms of the null ground permeating the three-fold structure of care. "Care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through."[6] As Being-in-the-world, Dasein occupies an open yet bounded realm defined and delineated by inherent limitations. Dasein has not been granted absolute presence but exists on an always problematic borderline. The ultimate conditions under which it can act are not at its disposal and are constantly being taken away from it. The primordial "Not" or nothingness at the very basis of Dasein is not a mere privation in the sense of a lack, flaw or imperfection. It does not signify a state which Dasein at one time possessed but has since lost or surrendered, or which it has not yet had but could still achieve. Nullity

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[5]Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 224.

[6]SZ 285 (BT 331).

is not something that has happened to Dasein once or that may occasionally happen and from which it can seek reprieve; nor is it an obscure quality that attaches itself to Dasein and which might be eliminated through sufficient progress. Rather, this nullity is the perpetually encountered borders of Dasein's finite existence.

A central aim of hermeneutic phenomenology is to uncompromisingly portray the essential and all-pervasive character of Dasein's nullity as the best means of overcoming substance/eternalist ontology which derivatively attempts to leap beyond finitude to attain a supratemporal suprahistorical truth. The genuine meaning of the "Not" has remained obscure in traditional ontology and logic, Heidegger maintains, because of the inauthentic fixation with constant actuality which confuses the multiple and profound dimensions of nothingness with privation. Heidegger's procedure is to analyze the existenziell origins of the deficient understanding of finitude in order to authentically disclose its underlying and universal existenzial structure. Finitude haunts Dasein even in the most innocuous circumstances that are seemingly protected from its permeation by the tranquillizing shell of the they-self's commitment to substance and eternity. In the extreme Grenzsituationen of anxiety, guilt and death, finitude is revealed, whether authentically or inauthentically encountered, as the eerie and indefinite yet forbidding and overbearing horizons of

Dasein's intrinsic confinements that can strip bare all attachments to infinitude.

Anxiety, according to Heidegger's analysis, continually pursues and threatens everyday Dasein which is for the most part submissive to the public interpretation of self and world as the two interacting substantive or present-at-hand (vorhanden) entities of subject and object. In falling, Dasein flees from the true nature of its unified yet multidimensional and contingent selfhood into the deceptive ensnarements and temptations of feeling constantly "at-home" in the public world. Anxiety, the feeling of uncanniness or not-being-at-home (das Nicht-zuhause-sein), brings Dasein face to face with the "nothing and nowhere" of worldhood -- its eminently non-vorhanden and interdependent status -- which is so disturbing to the obstinate self-assurance and seemingly obvious familiarity of das Man. Uncanniness does not come from a definite direction, but is already "there" with Dasein's clearing (Lichtung). It is so close and potentially oppressive that it stifles the breath and creates an overwhelming claustrophobia, and yet it is nowhere at all. The nothingness revealed in anxiety does not come from an absence, denial or elimination of entities, but from the finitude which Dasein suddenly realizes in itself as the pervasive basis of thrown-projection. Anxiety individualizes Dasein, bringing it back from its absorption in the public world, and making it aware that the possibilities of

inauthenticity and authenticity are matters of its ownmost choosing.

Anxiety discloses Dasein's freedom precisely because it exposes Dasein's finite dependence on the world no longer conceived as a random gathering of vorhanden entities. Finitude is further revealed as Dasein's Being-guilty in that Dasein has in every case already been thrown and abandoned to a particular set of conditions and contexts which limit and determine its choices. Dasein's potential for self-illumination is perpetually clouded by the lurking and disturbing unknown and unseen, that which is concealed and cannot be brought forth by any amount of decisive volition. "In being a basis -- that is, in existing as thrown -- Dasein constantly lags behind its possibilities. It is never existent before its basis, but only from it and as this basis. Thus 'Being-a-basis' means never to have power over one's ownmost Being from the ground up."[7]

Primordial Being-guilty is inauthentically experienced or ontically conceived, Heidegger observes, as an indebtedness pertaining to a particular misdeed, debt or unfulfilled responsibility, a failure to satisfy some requirement incurred in a broad range of values and standards, from the loftily moral to the strictly legal, for which some form of punishment is required. The genuine ontological

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[7] SZ 284 (BT 330).

meaning of guilt as the nullity of thrownness, however, is prior to and makes possible first of all any notion of indebtedness or of moral failures and omissions, and not the other way around.

Hurled into the world of definite circumstances and environment, Dasein projects itself upon possibilities largely determined by the conditions of its facticity, including its imminent and inevitable end as the final and unmistakable factor. The totality of Dasein is continually permeated by the possibility of its ultimate and unavoidable impossibility. This end is neither a point at which Dasein just stops nor a condition added on at the conclusion of life, but the nullity of care as the thrown basis of death. Death is perhaps the fullest and most overwhelming reflection of finitude. Even the everyday Dasein concedes a sense of certainty about the fact that it is forever passing away. The they-self, however, attempts to existenziell<u>y</u> avoid, escape or ignore the existenzial and ontological significance of its end by ascribing to it the quality of remoteness -- that endless time is flying by on its own. The end of Dasein is inauthentically considered an actual state when man will no-longer-be-there, something which will invariably happen in the future but has not yet taken place, and which is fearfully awaited rather than resolutely anticipated. Certainty of the end is objectified on empirical grounds alone: death has been observed, there is ample evidence for

it, and its occurrence cannot be denied.

The inauthentic view of end as mere demise is reflected in various ontically-oriented approaches to death which gather information about particular ways dying has been dealt with at different points in history by various individuals or social groups. Heidegger's existenzial analysis, which uncovers the universal meaning and structure of the being for whom the inevitable possibility of its end is the central concern of its Being, is more primordial than and takes precedence over derivative approaches. Heidegger includes among these: science (biology, medicine and physiology which obtain data and statistics about the longevity of living organisms, including man, that reach a point of demise); social science (psychology, biography and ethnology which are concerned with the emotional reactions of someone who is about to die); as well as the quasi-scientific outlook of theology and theodicy (which are preoccupied with the possibility of an afterlife or immortality, and with reconciling human suffering in terms of the unfailing justness of an omniscient divinity).

The primordial meaning of the end as a continuing process which is nothing other than Dasein's thrown-projection can be understood, Heidegger maintains, when death is no longer misrepresented as a one-time event which happens to Dasein as a culmination or even conclusion. Rather, dying is the way to be which Dasein authentically takes over as

soon as and so long as it dwells towards its end (not at its end). "In death, Dasein has not been fulfilled nor has it simply disappeared; it has not become finished nor is it wholly at one's disposal as something ready-to-hand. On the contrary, just as Dasein is already its 'not-yet,' and is its 'not-yet' constantly as long as it is, it is already its end too. The 'ending' which we have in view when we speak of death does not signify Dasein's Being-at-an-end, but a Being-towards-the-end of this entity."[8] Thus, death is the ownmost and non-relational possibility which is in each case uniquely mine and is never to be taken over and experienced by anyone else. Death is also the uttermost possibility of existence because it is the inescapable, ultimate and unsurpassable impossibility of Dasein, and therefore the possibility which is purest and furthest removed from actuality.

As Being-thrown-towards-its-end, Dasein is permeated by nothingness from top to bottom and from beginning to end as the "null basis of its null projection."[9] Death discloses the potential nothingness of Dasein as projectively ahead-of-itself, and guilt reveals the nullity of Dasein at its very ground as two-fold aspects of the selfsame care. Thus, Heidegger argues, there can be no substantive now-point isolated from the totally null structure of finitude. The

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[8]SZ 245 (BT 289).

[9]SZ 287 (BT 333).

question of the relationship between finitude and infinitude is not one of how the derived infinite time somehow lessens itself to become primordial finite temporality. "The problem is rather that of how inauthentic temporality, as inauthentic, temporalizes an infinite time out of the finite. Only because primordial time is finite can the 'derived' time temporalize itself as infinite."[10] Once finitude is genuinely disclosed, Heidegger maintains, the derivative nature of "endless" time is clarified, and the basis for the establishment of the primordial features of finite temporality has been lain.

The central element of continuity throughout Heidegger's Werke is its relentless ontological concern with the essential nature of finitude, so that "it is no longer thought," as is noted in Zur Sache des Denkens, "in terms of the relation to infinity, but rather as finitude in itself: finitude, end, limit, one's own -- to be secure in one's own. The new concept of finitude is thought in this manner. . . ."[11] In his later writings, Heidegger explores "finitude in itself" from the standpoint of the nothingness of Being which is prior to Dasein's existenziell encounters with and decisions concerning its existenzial Grenzsituationen. Finitude is the inherent powerlessness of Dasein,

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[10]SZ 331 (BT 379).

[11]Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 54.

the primordial and universal condition which comes to pass independent of the authenticity or inauthenticity of man's approach or attitude. Therefore, it is necessary for Heidegger II to portray the ontological nature and structure of the boundaries of existence from the standpoint of "finitude in itself" rather than from the Dasein-oriented perspective of Sein und Zeit; or, from the standpoint of the Nothingness of Being's self-concealment rather than in terms of man's resolve or lack of resolve in confronting his nullity in existenziell situations. Heidegger writes in Was ist Metaphysik? that "Being itself is essentially finite and reveals itself only in the transcendence of Dasein which is held out into the nothing. . . . We are so finite that we cannot even bring ourselves originally before the nothing through our own decision and will."[12] Finitude is the essential nature of Being's self-concealment from man who experiences it as no-thing, a process which is intrinsic to the unconcealment or presencing of Being in manifold beings, and precedes all human volition and cognition.

The shift of emphasis in Heidegger's hermeneutics from an existentialist orientation to a "more primordial" (mehr ursprüngliche) access to the ontological disclosure of finitude is evident in the essay "Das Ding," in which

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[12]Martin Heidegger, Was ist Metaphysik?, trans. "What is Metaphysics?" by David F. Krell in Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 110, 108.

Heidegger explicitly ontologizes the meaning of death as "the shrine of Nothing, that is, of that which in every respect is never something that merely exists, but which nevertheless presences, even as the mystery of Being itself. As the shrine of Nothing, death harbors within itself the presencing of Being. As the shrine of Nothing, death is the shelter of Being."[13] Death-as-finitude, experienced by man as his imminent end, remains ontologically significant in Heidegger's thinking, but is now disclosed as the mysterious realm of Nothingness which simultaneously conceals/reveals Being and thus makes possible all human limitations and boundaries.

In Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, Heidegger investigates finitude as the concealment which invariably comes to pass in and pervades the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein. The inner possibility of propositional truth as correctness, Heidegger maintains, is derivatively founded on Dasein's freedom to "let beings be" (Seinlassen von Seiendem) -- the primordial attunement or openness which disclosively and poetically illuminates the emerging or unfolding presencing of phenomena prior to the management, preservation and planning of beings encountered or sought out. Permeating truth, however, is the possibility of the indefinite and indeterminable, the

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[13]Martin Heidegger, "Das Ding," trans. "The Thing" by Albert Hofstadter in Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 179.

puzzling and unexplained, the undecided and questionable, which constitutes the mystery of Being and creates the needful condition of Dasein's intrinsic constraints. "Precisely because letting be always lets beings be in a particular comportment which relates to them and thus discloses them, it conceals beings as a whole. Letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a concealing. In the ek-sistent freedom of Dasein a concealing of being as a whole comes to pass [ereignet sich]."[14]

The mysterious concealment of Being conceals even itself in the process so that a forgetfulness (Seinsvergessenheit) of the mystery takes precedence in Dasein's comportment. Perpetually turning to and fro amidst beings which turn towards and away from it, Dasein clings to the readily available and controllable, taking itself as the subjective standard for the evaluation and manipulation of all other supposedly substantive beings. Finitude is manifest in the inevitable insistence of Dasein's relation to beings which accompanies and pervades ek-sistent freedom because of the primordial concealment of the presence of Being. "Even in insistent existence the mystery holds sway, but as the forgotten and hence 'inessential' essence of truth."[15] The

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[14]Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Wahrheit, trans. "On the Essence of Truth" by John Sallis in Basic Writings, p. 132.

[15]Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," p. 135.

space-time which Dasein inhabits is bound by the non-appearance of Being which comes to pass in all that is illuminated, compelling Dasein to increasingly abandon its freedom for truth.

Thus, errancy or untruth, according to the later Heidegger, dominates man through and through. Errancy is not a particular mistake, but the ground and open site of any error, which makes possible the history of those entanglements in which all kinds of erring get interwoven. Primordial errancy is paradoxically at once the richest and most prodigious historical event in that it is the source of history which opens up all possibilities for creative questioning, reflection, dialogue and speculation, and also the most tragic occurrence because it inevitably involves the insistent forgetfulness of its mysterious essence. Since history is something human and finite it necessarily entails a fateful going-astray. Without this factor of error there could be no relation from one fate to the next, and thus no possibility of history. Errancy is the very nature and structure of history because Dasein as a finite being has untruth due to the concealment of Being in the very constitution of its clearing. Finitude, from the standpoint of Heidegger II, is therefore the primordial ground of Dasein's "turning into need" (<u>Wendung in die Not</u>); the source of the various intertwining temporal-historical epochs which it fatefully traverses; and the basis of the forgetfulness of

Being as its overriding destiny permeating these epochal realms.

## Dōgen's Disclosure of Impermanence

Dōgen maintains that the thorough penetration and clarification of the meaning of impermanence is essential for the comprehension and realization of the thoroughgoing mutability and insubstantiality of Buddha-nature. He criticizes the heretical tendencies of those who presuppose a separation between the incessant vicissitudes of all phenomena, symbolized by the blooming of flowers and the falling of leaves, and the true form (*jissō*) or essential nature of the *dharmic* factors of experience (*hosshō*). "If we think that the mind moves and nature remains stable," he asserts, or that nature remains pure and still while form changes, it is the view of heretics."[6] Any subtle clinging to the notion of an enduring substantive substratum or fixation with a permanent self (*ātman*; *ga*) either existentially or ontologically underlying impermanence must be challenged and overcome to achieve a breakthrough to full, unimpeded realization of non-self (*muga*). Dōgen argues that his radical understanding of *mujō* is quite distinct from the derivative

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[16]SBGZ "Sesshin Sesshō" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens (see ftn. 24 in chapter 1), vol. II, p. 56 (Terada vol. II, p. 22).

concept of "impermanence deduced by non-Buddhists and Hinayānists" (and by implication some Zen Buddhists as well) who debate the length, content and appearance of the transient moment carefully distinguished from an unchanging eternity, and who are certainly "suspicious, surprised, and frightened"[17] by truly disclosed impermanence as the clear pointer to existential and ontological realization of non-self, because this directly threatens their insidious and disguised ego-fixations.

Dōgen's initial and most formative experience of impermanence -- the death and funeral of his mother at age 7 -- preceded his study of Buddhist doctrines concerning the universal flux or any significant contact with Japanese cultural attitudes about the sadness of "the floating world." Dōgen was at once painfully distressed by his personal suffering and sorrow, and aware of the unavoidable and all-pervasive conditions of transiency beyond particular experiences and yet most directly and despairingly realized through them. Even as a youth, Dōgen's mind was deeply stirred by the dual longing for soteriological deliverance from the anguish of suffering through ontological understanding of the true nature of mujō. He pursued the Way with an existentially uncommon

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[17]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 2, p. 93 (Terada vol. I, p. 55).

and uncompromising attentiveness of spirit and selfless power of concentration and insight. He resolved that any view about impermanence which negated, overlooked, trivialized or fell short of authentically reflecting the ontological truth of the radical momentariness and unimpeded insubstantiality of reality permeating his profound existential experience of suffering needed to be radically revised.

In encountering the cultural outlook of Kamakura Japan, Dōgen was struck by its pervasive emotional and aesthetic sensitivity to the fleeting beauty and evanescent poignancy of the world. As a legacy from the Heian era, there was a heightened and almost ritualistically refined awareness amongst aristocratic poets and writers of the uncertain, unenduring and unstable quality of things (<u>hakanashi</u>) metaphorically represented by the change of the seasons, and of the fragility and frustration of human emotions involved in tragic love affairs as symbolized by the bird's winter flight or the falling of cherry blossoms. Prevalent social attitudes about impermanence were at once greatly influenced by and yet a grave distortion of central Buddhist doctrines which analyzed the roots and perpetuation of suffering in terms of the relative, interdependent and insubstantial nature of transient existence. The Buddhist concept of <u>karma</u> (inescapable moral causation) was inauthentically used as a psychological crutch to explain away loneliness and longing, and to rationalize the sense of the

hollowness and unfulfillment of ephemeral and illusory phenomena, circumstances or human endeavors. Such misconceptions betrayed deep-seated attachments to a fixated self or ego which was inauthentically believed to persist through and endure troubling and unsettling changes of emotion and circumstance.

The potentially genuine need for profound ontological reflection stimulated by an existential attunement to the unavoidable changes of life was unfortunately dissipated, Dōgen observed, either into pessimism, stoicism, resignation and fatalism as an attempt to withdraw from impermanence and escape into the false eternalism of the "ruby palace," or into an idle and even hedonistic self-indulgence in the aesthetically conceived and inauthentically affirmed substantive moment. Furthermore, widespread natural and social disasters had led to the belief in an apocalyptic crisis being consummated in the current degenerate age of utter human strickenness and helplessness, thereby placing responsibility for suffering in the hands of an uncontrollable and ineluctable "destiny," rather than a lack of genuine existential awakening to and ontological insight into the ultimate selfsameness of mujō/muga.

Dōgen entered the monkhood precisely because of his overwhelming concern -- as the ultimate matter of life and death, enlightenment or unenlightenment -- in comprehending mujō as mujō as the most profound realization of

muga beyond ego-fixated sentimental attitude or resignation to fate, and unbound by any arbitrary and inauthentic decision to accept and enjoy or to flee and escape from incessant change. In the Japanese monasteries, however, he found that Śākyamuni's dispassionate philosophical analysis of conditioned (impermanent and insubstantial dependently originated) existence without reference to an eternal substratum or persistent self had been rendered almost inapplicable to serious practice in the quest for authentic attainment. The romanticized nostalgia and/or nihilism of the aristocracy had infiltrated Buddhist practices so that the essence of impermanence was mistaken for the mere coming and going of things, and insight into the universal nature and structure of non-self was reduced to the question of an individual's response to dying, loss or unhappiness. The misleading approaches to the flux were manifested in what Dōgen considered heretical tendencies to seek transcendence from contingency (sennigedō) or to celebrate a shallow affirmation of transient reality (jinen-gedō), ego-oriented standpoints not necessarily overcome by Hui-neng's doctrine of "seeing into one's own nature." On the other hand, Dōgen was positively influenced by the aesthetic-naturalistic concern with impermanence of the poets, which helped to offset an overly speculative preoccupation with the issue of the duration of momentariness that had long haunted Buddhist scholasticism by directing attention and concern toward the depth

of existential and ontological meaning in one's personal encounter with and overcoming of the deception of an enduring ego.

Dōgen's breakthrough to a genuine understanding of impermanence was largely inspired by two experiences as a Zen disciple which enabled him to penetrate beyond the appearance of change into the essence of the impermanent and insubstantial moment itself. A passage in Zuimonki records the tremendous impact Zen master Myōzen, a famous disciple of Rinzai whom Dōgen accompanied to China, exerted on Dōgen shortly before their departure. At the time of their scheduled pilgrimmage, one of Myōzen's beloved teachers on Mt. Hiei, Myōyū, became seriously ill and lay on his deathbed, imploring his student to put off the journey until after his death. Myōzen, acknowledging his great indebtedness to his mentor, queried the other monks for advice. Dōgen, supporting his colleagues, counselled Myōzen to delay the voyage: "'If you feel that your Buddhist enlightenment is adequate now, it would be better to put off your trip.'"[18] Myōzen, however, refused to be deterred in his quest because he realized that the great question of impermanence was not merely a matter of how or when one dies. He re-oriented the problem of the individual's passing away in terms of the more fundamental issue of the universal

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[18] Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, p. 86.

and insubstantial nature of generation-destruction, which is too urgent for any ego-preoccupied sentimental hesitation or regretful deliberation. "'You all seem to agree,'" Myōzen lectured the monks, "'that I should stay, but my view differs. Even if I were to stay now, it would not prolong the life of a dying man. Even if I were to stay now, and take care of him, I could not stop his suffering. Even if I were to comfort him in his final hours, it would not have anything to do with his [freedom] from the cycle of birth and death. . . . It would be of absolutely no use in [detaching] from the world and gaining the Way.'"[19]

Myōzen's clear observation and rugged determination to abandon any subtle clinging to ego-fixation illustrated the profound and universal permeation of impermanence throughout all aspects of experience as an issue more urgent and demanding than any particular individual's demise. Ju-ching, however, taught Dōgen that impermanence was nothing other than the self-generating and self-renewing momentariness of existence unobstructed by desirous expectation and self-centered longing. Upon his satori, Dōgen no longer viewed impermanence from the standpoint of a spectator or self overseeing a continuing process of change moving from one point in time to the next -- the derivative view which presupposes a substantive substratum enduring throughout multiple

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[19]Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, p. 87.

transformations. Rather, he realized impermanence from the liberated perspective of shinjin-datsuraku (having spontaneously cast off or abandoned any fixation, obsession or preoccupation with an enduring ego in 'self' or phenomena). He fully and spontaneously penetrated into mujō as the purposeless and selfless totality of each and every moment encompassing before and after, past and future, life and death and yet "cut off" (saidan) from before and after, life and death in that it is absolutely without substratum. There is no-thing/no-self which changes. Impermanence is no more or less than the impermanently innate and unceasing dynamism of non-self without reference to or contrast with any other supposedly stable thing or process outside it. Dōgen writes in "Genjōkōan," "To learn one's self is to forget one's self . . . [by] casting off one's own body and mind and the bodies and minds of others as well."

In "Busshō," Dōgen maintains that the "preaching, practicing, and realizing of impermanence by the impermanent themselves all must be impermanent."[20] Impermanence is not relative to anything beyond or underlying it which is not impermanent. If both saints and ignorant men were not thoroughly and radically impermanent, there could be no possibility for transformation. Dōgen discloses impermanence

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[20]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 2, p. 91 (Terada vol. I, p. 54).

in its most essential nature as the insubstantial foundation and constitution of all aspects and dimensions of existence. Therefore, Buddha-nature is the very impermanency of "grass and tree, thicket and forest, men and things, nations and lands, mountains and rivers"[21] and every other of the innumerable human and naturalistic phenomena. All impermanent phenomena are Buddha-nature because they are impermanent; the Buddha-nature, because it is impermanent, is nothing other than all impermanent phenomena.

Busshō does not in any sense limit or lessen itself to "become" impermanence. Rather, Buddha-nature (busshō) and impermanence (mujō) are the primordially selfsame mujō-busshō. In order to stress that impermanence is not to be contrasted with permanence in a subtle way, Dōgen acknowledges that there is an authentic meaning of "permanence" if it is understood in the sense of "'prior-to-turning' (mi-ten) [that] is never connected with the aftertraces of coming and going."[22] The genuine conception of permanence, which is ultimately indistinguishable from the genuine meaning of impermanence, points to the vigorously dynamic and non-substantive totalistic present moment beyond the mere appearance of change.

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[21]Ibid.

[22]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 2, p. 92 (Terada vol. I, p. 55). I have added hyphens in "prior-to-turning."

Although Dōgen disdains unedifying aesthetic indulgence, he is also a masterful poet who harnesses lyrical metaphor and imagery to deeply evoke the ontological significance of existentially realized impermanence, as in the following waka:

"Impermanence"

The world? Moonlight
reflected in dewdrops
falling from the waterfowl.[23]

According to this stanza, the entire world is fully contained in each and every of the manifold dewdrops symbolic of the inexhaustible contents of all impermanent moments. For this very occasion, the breadth and vastness of moonlight comes to rest in each single waterdrop, and every drop of dew reflects the whole illuminative panoramic display. Dōgen's waka at once suggests the beauty and sadness of the natural setting and the complete calmness and tranquility of the True Man of shinjin-datsuraku who has cast off all ego-fixated emotions of longing and regret. Dōgen does not point to an abstract synthesis of universality and particularity, but divulges the ever-varying and ever-renewable possibilities of each singular impermanent and insubstantial totalistic moment. The duration of the moment is a matter

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[23] Dōgen, "Mujō" in Dōgen zenji zenshū, 2 volumes, ed. Ōkubo Dōshū (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1970), vol. II, p. 416. The original waka:
"Mujō"--Yo no naka wa nan ni ta toen mizutori no
hashi furu tsuyu ni yadoru tsuki kage

of existential penetration and exertion, and is thoroughly incalculable. As Dōgen observes in a passage in "Genjōkōan" which further explores the metaphor of moonlight reflected in water, "The depths of the one will be the measure of the other's heights. As for the length or brevity of time, one should fully examine the water's breadth or smallness, and clearly discern the size of the moon and the sky."[24] There is no measure for impermanence because it is not relative to anything else which does not partake of impermanence. It lasts so long as total dynamism is fully exerted by every insubstantial and interpenetrating experiential factor.

The dimensions of Dōgen's interpretation of impermanence throughout his works include the exhortative, poetic-naturalistic and ontological. First, in his autobiographical works, Dōgen offers numerous parables, anecdotes and homiletic injunctions to inspire his disciples with a sense of immediacy and urgency in the soteriological quest for the Way of non-self so that they will train as if their lives were directly at stake with each decision and effort. He tries to recreate Myōzen's dedicated and selfless spirit which penetrates past the coming and going of things into the great matter of mujō itself. In Zuimonki, Dōgen stresses the inseparability of the meaning of impermanence and the arousing of the Bodhi-seeking mind (hotsu-bodaishin) which

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[24] SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 136 (Terada vol. I, p. 37).

pursues existential and ontological realization of muga. "Think only of this day and this hour, for tomorrow is an uncertain thing; and no one knows what the future will bring. Make up your mind to follow Buddhism as if you had only this day to live. To follow Buddhism means, on all occasions and at the risk of your life, to make it flourish and bring benefit to all beings."[25]

Secondly, in Shōbōgenzō Dōgen frequently uses naturalistic metaphors, such as the withered plum tree (baige) which blooms ever anew, to illustrate the interpenetration of life and death, arising and desistence in each impermanent and insubstantial self-generating moment. Aging, dying and destruction, according to Dōgen, do not indicate some negative condition -- as is understood in the derivative view of impermanence -- but point to the ever-renewable and selfless possibilities of evanescence. He refers to Ju-ching's words, "'Reuin attained enlightenment when he saw the peach blossoms in bloom, but I attained it when I saw them falling.'"[26] Dōgen also observes that the old plum tree endures and withstands various conditions -- strong winds, harsh storms, the vicissitudes of sunlight and other elements -- but it invariably returns anew, reflecting, stimulating and containing (through the law of

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[25]Dōgen, Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki, p. 24.

[26]SBGZ "Udonge" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. I, p. 120 (Terada vol. I, p. 218).

interpenetration) the awakening of all other phenomena. Withering represents the total detachment and selfless imperturbability of existential and ontological realization of <u>muga</u> which is fully and profoundly integrated with and revealed by the radical transiency of momentary existence. "When the old plum tree blooms, the entire world blooms. When the entire world blooms spring comes. . . . Each and every moment, countless and limitless, is renewed."[27] The idea of "newness" thereby expressed is not novelty contrasted with antiquity, but the vigorous and insubstantial activity inherent in both living and dying.

The exhortative-soteriological and naturalistic-aesthetic dimensions of Dōgen's understanding of impermanence are grounded in his ontological analysis of the totalistic moment or <u>dharma</u>-stage (<u>jū-hōi</u>) that "is possessed of before and after . . . and cut off from before and after," encompassing simultaneously the interpenetration and independence of life and death. In "Genjōkōan" he writes:

> Once firewood turns to ash, the ash cannot turn back to being firewood. Still, one should not take the view that it is ashes <u>afterward</u> and firewood <u>before</u>. He should realize that although firewood is at the dharma-stage of firewood, and that this is possessed of before and after, the firewood is cut off from before and after. Ashes are in the stage of ashes, and possess before and after. Just as firewood does not revert to firewood once it has turned to ashes, man does not return to life after his

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[27] SBGZ "Baige" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. II, pp. 123, 127 (Terada vol. I, pp. 45, 49).

> death. In light of this, it being an established teaching in Buddhism not to speak of life becoming death, Buddhism speaks of the unborn. It being a confirmed Buddhist teaching that death does not become life, it speaks of non-extinction. Life is a stage of time and death is a stage of time, like, for example, winter and spring. We do not suppose that winter becomes spring, or say that spring becomes summer.[28]

In this and related passages, Dōgen maintains first of all that life and death are not separable, but occur simultaneously within each moment. Life and death appear every moment instantaneously, naturally and thoughtlessly. There can be neither life nor death without the other at the very same time. Life and death together constitute the total dynamic activity (zenki) of the dharma-stage. Consequently, life should not be clung to and affirmed nor death feared and negated. Also, life and death together should not be hated and escaped from nor should nirvāṇa, conceived as the resolution to the problem of life and death, be greedily desired outside of impermanence itself. In "Shōji" Dōgen asserts, "This present life and death itself is the life of Buddha."[29] If life and death (shōji) is rejected with distaste or abided in with attachment, the life of Buddha is lost and one is left only with the appearance of the Buddha. Total detachment and selfless freedom from the

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[28]SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 136 (Terada vol. I, p. 36). I have changed to "cut off from before and after" (from "beyond before and after").

[29]SBGZ "Shōji" in Dōgen zenji zenshū, vol. I, p. 778.

dilemmas of life and death demands full immersion in life and death non-obstructively realized through each impermanent and insubstantial moment. "Clinging in attachment to life, shrinking in abhorrence from death, is not Buddhist. Realizing that both life and death are a combination of various conditions being manifested before your eyes, you utilize a way of complete and unrestricted freedom."[30]

The first dimension of <u>jū-hōi</u> refers to the aspect "possessed of before and after," encompassing the totality of simultaneous possibilities. The second dimension is the directness, immediacy, and spontaneity "cut off from before and after," without endurance or substance. Dōgen paradoxically maintains that while life and death are harmoniously interpenetrative, "life is life itself and death is death itself." These two elements are independently impermanent and insubstantial in and of themselves, and stand alone without requiring any outside existence or reference. "Life is not obstructed by death, death is not obstructed by life. . . . Life is the total activity of life and death is the total activity of death."[31] From the standpoint of each element, life and death are unimpeding and independent stages which contain the totality and

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[30]SBGZ "Shinjingakudō" (Terada vol. I, pp. 78-79).

[31]SBGZ "Zenki" trans. Norman Waddell and Abe Masao in <u>The Eastern Buddhist</u>, vol. 5, no. 1 (May, 1972), p. 76 (Terada vol. I, p. 276).

insubstantiality of temporal events in the entire Dharma-realm. Life is the total stage of the dynamic working (kikan) of zenki encompassing multitudinous dharmas manifesting their unique dynamism. Life and death are not consecutive transformations of an essentially constant entity. Life does not turn into death, just as the ash must be considered a completely different manifestation of jū-hōi than the firewood; nor does death turn back into life, just as the ash does not once again become firewood.

The conception of life and death as sequentially-related occurrences would imply that the entity which contains them consists of a stable or enduring substratum. Ordinary people, Dōgen notes, think that life is like a tree which begins with a seed, grows, then perishes, and that death is the tree which is no longer alive, as if life were the first activity and death the second. This view actually harbors a dichotomy between life and death as well as between the object and the life-death process it undergoes. Dōgen maintains, "Life is the manifestation of the total dynamic working; death is the manifestation of the total dynamic working." When there is life, there is nothing but life. When there is death, there is nothing but death. In maintaining that life is life itself (although it depends upon death) and that death is death itself (although it depends upon life), Dōgen does not contradict his emphasis on the simultaneity of life and death, but enhances it so

that it is not understood in an average or derivative way. Life and death each possess before and after in that they are determined by the influences they simultaneously receive and project. Yet they are cut off from past and future because they manifest absolute and insubstantial presence without reference to any other tense or relative phase of time. Examining impermanence from the perspective of impermanence itself directly, clearly and profoundly discloses no-self, of which death is a unique and complete manifestation in itself, just as is life.

Finally, Dōgen suggests that from the standpoint of radical impermanence, the activity of each dharma-stage is neither life nor death, which suggests freedom from life-death in terms of (without trying to escape) life-death. The time of no-life and no-death is the spontaneous and perpetually vigorous impermanent and insubstantial motion of jū-hōi "prior-to-turning," which cannot be categorized in terms of going or coming, eternity or momentariness, permanence or impermanence, being or non-being, life or death. "Though [life and death] is not oneness, it is not difference; though it is not difference, it is not sameness; though it is not sameness, this is not multifariousness. . . . And the manifestation of their total dynamic working exists within what is neither life nor death."[32] At this very

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[32] Ibid.

impermanent moment which is both unique and universally insubstantial there is at once life and death and therefore the life of Buddha; life itself and death itself; and the life of no-life and the death of no-death. All represent shifting perspectives of the multiple dimensions of full realization of no-self. Furthermore, Dōgen emphasizes that the total dynamism is itself nothing but impermanence. To say that zenki is inseparable from the impermanent dharma-stage does not mean that there was no previous manifestation of zenki. The previous manifestation is contained within, but is likewise independent of the present manifestation. No manifestations of total dynamism, regardless of when or where they occur, impede any other manifestation; each impermanent and insubstantial moment is continually and expansively renewed.

## Critical Examination

The notions of finitude and impermanence seem to share a common starting point in that they disclose the profound and complex interrelatedness between the existential and ontological dimensions of primordial time which, if appropriately conceived, overcomes the inauthentic entanglements of derivative time. The analysis of the origin of derivative time, examined in the previous chapter, uncovers the direct link between deficient existence and

misguided ontology. With the disclosure of radical contingency, Heidegger and Dōgen attempt to fully and clearly undermine attachments to now-time by illuminating the non-substantiality of existence so overwhelmingly and inescapably manifest through each individual's encounter with death, anxiety and suffering. Radical contingency is the ultimate ontological condition which is independent of existential choice. Yet it becomes visible only through the resolve of someone willing to face it, which in turn makes possible the continuing cultivation of authenticity. Because contingency is universal, it is of utmost significance to the individual; only when the individual sees contingency in its universality can there be existential transformation. Heidegger's notion of the hermeneutic circle seems to be an appropriate explication of the dynamics of overcoming deficient existence through ontological disclosure, which is made on the basis of and simultaneously lays the foundation for existential authenticity.

Heidegger and Dōgen share a concentration on death and dying as the extreme experiential point for the convergence of the dimensions of existential decision and ontological disclosure concerning radical contingency. Death is the preeminent transcendental matter always pointing beyond the particular experience of loss and forcing one to come to terms existentially with the underlying ontological meaning of contingent existence. Both thinkers are in accord in

their refutation of basic misconceptions concerning death. They maintain that death is not an end to existence which arrives as a termination or culmination, or as a passage to another existence. Death is not merely a psychological concern to be investigated only at the time when someone is about to die. Nor should it be approached as a speculative issue in order to justify the apparent arbitrariness of its occurrence or to rationalize the suffering it creates in terms of certain metaphysical or theological presuppositions about eternity. Rather, death penetrates every moment and aspect of life, so that the ways one encounters his dying become normative for his approach toward living. Underlying the self-flight and self-deceptiveness of "time flies," there is expressed the understanding that death is always being confronted -- even if in a derivative mode of fear as one possible and perhaps the most prevalent approach. Not only can death take place at any time; it pervades each and every moment. Death frames existence to such an inevitable and all-pervasive extent that it must be taken into account in all one's affairs.

Despite these similarities of viewpoint, however, key differences in the analysis of death by Heidegger and Dōgen reflect fundamental disparities in their approaches to the central issue involved in uncovering finitude and impermanence: that is, the overcoming of substance and eternalist ontology derived from now-time through the

neutral or non-evaluative disclosure of the universal nature of radical contingency. The central aim of Heidegger's thought is the de-struction of traditional substance ontology through a "fundamental ontology" of finite Dasein as Being-towards-the-end. Heidegger shows the permeation of death-as-end throughout life (in Sein und Zeit) and death-as-Nothingness pervading unconcealment (in Heidegger II), such that existence itself is a continuing response to the end because the end itself is essential to existence. By emphasizing the imminence of Dasein's end as the ultimate and unsurpassable limitation of its presence, Heidegger shifts the focus of ontology from the derivatively conceived actual present to the anticipation of futural possibilities which become historically repeatable as Dasein's having-been. "[Dasein's] finitude," he writes, "does not amount primarily to a stopping, but is a characteristic of temporalization itself. The primordial and authentic future is the towards-oneself existing as the possibility of nullity, the possibility which is not to be outstripped."[33]

Heidegger does not, however, really diverge from the presupposition that life exists or is stretched along from beginning towards the end in a particular span of time allotted to it. Thus, his emphasis on death heightens the view that life is to be evaluated in terms of

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[33] SZ 330 (BT 378-379).

accomplishments achieved before the span runs out. In the later works, this quasi-substantive framework is not dissolved, but is expanded to encompass the finite historical epochs whose spans are greater than the life of any particular Dasein which is, in turn, limited, determined and bound by the unfolding of the fateful consequences of these eras. Heidegger's reversal from actuality to potentiality, now-time to the future, everydayness to the end does not necessarily overcome substance ontology or the presupposition of an enduring substratum.

Dōgen, however, seems to more clearly surpass any subtle clinging to a concept of a substratum of a supposedly constant entity which is thought to undergo death as well as other transformations. Dōgen's analysis goes beyond an accentuation of the interweaving of life and death, existence and non-existence, presence and absence, by focusing on the total activity of the durationless and selfless yet inexhaustible stages of life itself and death itself as independent, non-relative and complete manifestations of impermanence. He writes, "The total activity of life and death holds sway imperceptibly. You should learn of going and coming that there is life and death in going, there is life and death in coming, there is going and coming in life, there is going and coming in death . . . throughout

all the realms of the world."[34] Impermanence, according to Dōgen, is not generated by a specific outside cause, but it arises by itself as each and every present moment. It is dynamic, indivisible and insubstantial and cannot be segmented into parts, so that non-existence is not said to follow upon existence as if they were two distinguishable and separable states of an essentially constant entity. Rather, death or non-existence is the impermanent present completely fulfilled in and of itself. In death, there is nothing other than death itself in all its impermanent and insubstantial multi-dimensional dynamism -- possessed of before and after yet cut off from before and after -- just as in life there is nothing but life itself.

Both thinkers emphasize human encounter with death and dying, contingency and vicissitude, non-existence and nothingness to undermine and overcome fixations with substance and attachments to eternalism and teleology, yet they reach different conclusions in terms of the radicalness and depth of their respective breakthroughs with derivative time. Heidegger's approaches -- his investigation of Dasein's existenziell confrontation with dying and guilt in terms of the existenzial condition of finitude in Sein und Zeit, and disclosure of the pervasive boundaries of Nothingness in Heidegger II -- do not seem to be free of all

[34] SBGZ "Shinjingakudō" (Terada vol. I, p. 80).

traces or elements of substance ontology and do not point to the thorough and unobstructedly insubstantial nature of all phenomena. Dōgen, on the other hand, profoundly uses the meaning of impermanence to deepen and rediscover the existential, ontological and soteriological dimensions of non-self, which is the basis for his analysis of being-time (uji).

The central differences between Heidegger and Dōgen are highlighted by the most intriguing and suggestive passage from the Shōbōgenzō:

> To learn the Buddha Way is to learn one's own self. To learn one's self is to forget one's self. To forget one's self is to be confirmed by all dharmas. To be confirmed by all dharmas is to effect the casting off one's body and mind and the bodies and minds of others as well. All traces of enlightenment [then] disappear, and this traceless enlightenment is continued on and on endlessly.[35]

First, Dōgen insists upon the total inseparability of what Heidegger calls the existenziell and existenzial levels of inquiry and dimensions of realization. To learn the Buddha Way, that is, to ontologically clarify the ultimate selfsameness of mujō/muga in terms of life-death, the incessant falling of flowers, and the complex inner dynamism of the dharma-stage, is necessarily to existentially explore the responses and feelings of the self's (in a non-fixated sense) poignant and tragic awareness of impermanence. There

[35]SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) (Terada vol. I, p. 36).

can be no avoidance of personal reflection, insight and experience at every stage and level of clarification. The Way and the self are inseparably interrelated, each determined by the other and realized only upon realization of the other; neither dimension is penetrated either before or after the other. Heidegger's distinction between the existenziell and existenzial levels may indeed be philosophically useful and significant, from Dōgen's standpoint, but only if understood as entirely provisional (for the sake of analysis) and ultimately discardable (for the sake of true realization).

Second, Dōgen maintains that the unity of Way and self necessarily leads to and is simultaneously based on genuine self-forgetfulness, or immediate and complete existential/ontological/soteriological realization of non-self. To learn the self is to spontaneously leave it behind without a trace. "To forget the self" does not mean, for Dōgen, to merely set it aside for the time being, as Heidegger phenomenologically brackets the existenziell level for the sake of existenzial disclosure. Nor is it to replace the self with a new concept or substratum, which only betrays a fixation with substance and subject in however a subtle or disguised fashion. Rather, genuine self-forgetfulness is to "cast off" all delusory or inauthentic bifurcations between mind/body, self/other, self/non-self as well as between enlightenment/unenlightenment and impermanence/

permanence. All such distinctions are spontaneously released without residue, compromise, or the slightest attachment when the ultimate identity of <u>mujō</u> and <u>muga</u> is clarified and penetrated. From Dōgen's standpoint of non-self, Heidegger falls short of overcoming substance ontology. For example, Heidegger is critical of Kant for continuing to define the Self in terms of the traditional inappropriate ontology as the selfsameness and steadiness of something that is always present-at-hand, a view of the <u>subiectum</u> which revises but still derivatively presupposes and perpetuates an inauthentic fixation with the apparent constancy of <u>ousia</u>. Although Heidegger reorients the meaning of Self-constancy in terms of Dasein's anticipatory resoluteness in confronting its nullity, he does not fully abandon the concept of the endurance of the self or of any subtle distinction between finite/infinite. Heidegger's notion of finitude is not sufficiently radical to uncover the complete existential and ontological insubstantiality of self and world revealed by Dōgen through spontaneous forgetfulness which penetrates impermanence at once possessed of and yet cut off from life and death.

Finally, Dōgen's words, "to forget one's self is to be confirmed by all dharmas" (as well as his analysis of the <u>dharma</u>-stages of firewood and ash and of spring and winter, and his poetry), shows that his understanding of contingency in terms of impermanence has a more naturalistic

and holistic orientation than Heidegger's notion of finitude. In contrast to Heidegger's existential focus on Dasein in Sein und Zeit and to his attempted trans-homocentricism in later writings, Dōgen clearly shows that the identity of mujō/muga is realized when and only when all phenomena, encompassing the human and the natural, totality and particularity, simultaneously cast off self-fixations, each dimension experientially realized in and through all other ones. Dōgen thus seems to overcome the subtle gaps Heidegger presupposes between existenziell and existenzial levels, potentiality and actuality, future and present, finitude and infinitude, homocentricism and a realm beyond man, all of which prohibit a breakthrough to realization of non-self.

In light of these critical differences between the two thinkers, it seems that any claim to universal applicability, meaning or relevance for Heidegger's disclosure of contingency is similarly limited. Unless Heidegger's fundamental ontology has a significance that is universal and unbound by the particular epoch from which its observations and conclusions are drawn, then his enterprise represents a philosophical anthropology of "modern" Western man's sense of alienation from the curious anonymity of the public world. In Sein und Zeit, Heidegger attempts to universalize the condition of finitude through the existenzial analysis of Dasein as anxiously Being-thrown-towards-the-end, an approach to the problem of dying which still views death as

an end that is arriving from the future. Although death is not merely in the future, according to Heidegger, it is not said to be fully coterminous with the present moment. In his later writings, especially Was Heisst Denken?, Heidegger maintains that the finitude of Being in its epochal unfolding pertains to the temporal-historical development of the Western metaphysical tradition, and not to the Indian or Chinese or any other tradition. This position seems to be a consequence of the fact that Heidegger's understanding of finitude is itself a reinterpretation or attempted ontologization of Western theological doctrines concerning death and dying, guilt and conscience which presuppose the prior incapacity of man to fully attain truth in terms of metaphysical doctrines which posit the necessity of historical-epochal developments. Heidegger draws an intimate relationship between man's finitude and his submissiveness to fate. Although he denies an Eternal power which controls man, Heidegger does hold that finitude makes it impossible for man to fully free himself from the historical consequences his inherent limitations fatefully generate. Thus, Heidegger's issue -- death-as-end -- is not universally disclosed because his method of analysis is based on Christian eschatological notions that he inherits in an unacknowledged and unclarified manner.

For Dōgen, on the other hand, impermanence is more fundamentally, universally, naturalistically and

insubstantially conceived than as an end which is perpetually approaching or as a history which encompasses and determines man's fateful decisions. Impermanence accounts for the transiency and inevitable decline of any and every historical epoch; nations and lands, as much as grasses and trees and all other phenomena, are primordially nothing other than mujō-busshō. But Dōgen rejects any attempt to identify impermanence itself with Japanese or Buddhist history. He clearly refutes the doctrine of mappō, for example, which assumes a necessary link between the aggravation of human suffering and the epochal decay of Buddhist Dharma. "Do not think," he writes in "Bendōwa," to adherents of mappō, "because ours is [currently] not a land of benevolence and wisdom, or because the people's knowledge and understanding is feeble, that the Buddhist Dharma cannot be comprehended here. What is more, people all possess in abundance the right seed of [wisdom]. It appears only that, having rarely been in accord with it, our countrymen have as yet not realized and lived it."[36]

Furthermore, Heidegger's notion of finitude is not neutral or value-free in that it does imply the inability of man to fully liberate himself from the deficiencies of the existence in which he is thrown, a problem also exposed in the previous chapter in the case of Heidegger's

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[36]SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) 155 (Terada vol. I, p. 31).

associating derivative now-time and the present with falling. Heidegger connects finitude with the inherent limitations, dependency and errancy of man which necessitates his inauthenticity. "The finitude of Dasein -- the comprehension of Being -- lies in forgetfulness. This forgetfulness is nothing accidental and temporary but is constantly and necessarily renewed."[37] The later Heidegger attempts to clarify the universality of finitude by asserting that falling or forgetfulness is not due to man's responsibility or lack of it, but to finitude in itself as the primordial condition which inevitably leads to Seinsvergessenheit (oblivion of Being). He thus puts himself in the problematic position of at once indirectly and confusedly criticizing finitude because it invariably involves inauthenticity, and yet refraining from any existential injunctive to overcome forgetfulness since as part of finitude, it is proximally and for the most part the way of human existence.

Dōgen does not cast a negative judgement on the condition of impermanence itself, but he criticizes the deep-seated ignorance of the average man which prevents him from penetrating the truly dynamic and selfless nature of the present moment. He thus exhorts Zen disciples neither to submit to nor to transcend impermanence, but to realize its genuine meaning beyond the mere appearance of change,

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[37] Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, p. 241.

which is bound by the concept of an enduring substantive entity, through the simultaneous fulfillment of existential and ontological understanding each and every impermanent, insubstantial moment. Dōgen's analysis of impermanence accentuates the depth and totality of the totalistic present. Heidegger's view, however, seems to suggest that man in his finitude must necessarily undergo repeated forgetfulness even as man gazes towards and anticipates the futural end. His definition of the dilemmas -- and therefore his attempted overcoming -- of metaphysics that arises from an inauthentic approach to finitude, is bound by the very pitfalls of substance ontology and Christian eschatology he seeks to expose and overcome.

In the following chapter, I will show that the gaps created in Heidegger's analysis between the derivative present (now-time) and the primordial future (disclosed in terms of finitude) as well as the primordial past (disclosed in terms of historicality) lead to a subtle yet problematic separation between the ontological and existential dimensions of temporality that appears to be overcome by Dōgen's notion of the total simultaneous exertion of all beings as the here-and-now "perpetuation of the Way" (gyōji-dōkan).

# CHAPTER FOUR

# PRIMORDIAL TIME

## Problematics of Primordial Time

The aim of Heidegger's and Dōgen's expositions of primordial time is to show that true temporality does not merely stand in some ontical connection with that which exists, but it is fundamentally and essentially interrelated with and inseparable from existence, holding sway throughout the multiple dimensions and by means of existence itself. Primordial time is neither an eternal realm beyond existence nor another attribute of existence which could be logically or ontologically added onto it either before or after existence is described; nor does existence, conceived substantively, persist 'in' objectified time. Temporality is neither a cause of existence that chronologically or cosmologically precedes it nor a product that is teleologically attained at the conclusion of linear sequence; nor is it a statically conceived evolution working its way into existence. Such conceptions unacknowledgedly assume and unreflectively betray fixations with substantiality and actuality characteristic of derivative time.

In their analysis of the origin of derivative time in the inauthentic tendencies of the average man and in their refutation of the apparent legitimation and perpetuation of the conventional view that appears in their respective philosophical traditions, Heidegger and Dōgen both presuppose an underlying temporal unity and inner dynamism that prevails even if concealed and seemingly stagnated, and which undermines deficient attachments to now-time and eternalism and the consequent surrender of the genuine significance of the past and future. According to the derivative view, the present is considered to be a fleeting yet substantive time-unit which is severed from existence and endures while the future approaches and forever recedes into the past. As man feels that he is continually losing his grasp on time, truth is posited as an eternal realm transcendent of and uneffected by temporal vicissitudes, thus disguising and reenforcing an attachment to objectified time. Having established the basis for a non-substantive disclosure of time through the analysis of radical contingency, primordial time is uncovered by Heidegger and Dōgen in terms of a unique convergence of authentic existential response to contingency and the ontological clarification of the non-objectifiable temporal meaning of self, world, language, space, the three tenses, transcendence, and truth.

In order to offer a successfully non-substantive philosophy of primordial time, Heidegger and Dōgen must

highlight the dynamic interrelatedness of the three tenses and their profound inseparability with the dimensions of existence in a way which clearly avoids and overcomes any and all of the most obvious as well as the most subtle and insidiously veiled deficiencies they have challenged in the many varieties of derivative time. They must account for the true nature and structure of the present moment (deeper than, underlying and in contrast to now-time) and of change and continuity (deeper than "time flies") as well as illustrate the non-substantive temporal foundations of truth (in contrast to the false eternalism traditionally accepted in Western metaphysical approaches to the question of Being or in Mahāyāna Buddhist interpretations of Buddha-nature). That is, for Heidegger and Dōgen to clearly resolve the issues which are central to their respective philosophical projects, it is necessary for them to successfully (fully and unquestionably) overcome the inadequacies in both the conventional everyday and the traditional speculative views of time, which they have exposed for their common derivative basis.

The following elements of a doctrine of primordial time seem to be essential for the fulfillment of this task:

1. <u>non-substantialism</u> -- time must be freed of all traces of objectification so that it is no longer conceived as an hypostatized framework apart from activity, but as the

inherent dynamism and fluidity of movement that characterizes both the immediate present and the continuity of duration; time must be de-objectified so that the truth of Being or of Buddha-nature can be so liberated.

2. non-reductionism -- the temporal unity of all phases of existence -- selfhood, authenticity and inauthenticity, language, space, history, etc. -- must be shown in a way that is at once true to experience and yet unbound by conventional fixations, without reducing the multiple dimensions of existence to a monolithically conceived time or merely equating them with time; time is not a first cause beyond existence nor is existence in all its aspects uniformly time.

3. non-homocentrism -- although the existential dimension is stressed as essential for the disclosure of primordial time, true temporality is not limited to human experience (such a view would be a new form of reductionism), but must be shown to have universal breadth and significance in terms of its naturalistic dimensions; this point is a continual source of tension in Heidegger's thought and is crucial to the contrast between Heidegger and Dōgen.

4. non-differentiation -- true time must be disclosed as a unity of existential and ontological dimensions to eliminate any possible gap between time and existence or between truth and time, lest time be misconstrued as an independent realm somehow separable from or beyond existence or as a gap

to be surmounted for the attainment of truth.

In the final section of this chapter, I will critically compare Heidegger's and Dōgen's approaches to these points of disclosure in order to evaluate their respective achievements both in overcoming their own philosophical traditions and in formulating a universally applicable doctrine of the true nature of time; and I will construct a five-fold hierarchical schema to highlight and contrast the relations between their views of primordial time and those conceptions they have refuted as derivative and therefore limited. By contrasting Heidegger's notions of the authentic present (Augenblick) and historicality (Geschichtlichkeit) with Dōgen's notions of the here-and-now (nikon) and passage (kyōryaku) as well as Heidegger's notion of the self-same (Ereignis) with related notions in Dōgen, such as zenki (total dynamism), I will attempt to discern the fundamental and significant points of philosophical controversy between the two thinkers. For example, I will discuss the apparent gaps or separations in Heidegger's understanding of primordial time between theory and practice as well as between present and past/future, Dasein and world-time, which are both grounded in and reflected by limitations in his analysis of derivative time and his disclosure of finitude. Heidegger's views will be contrasted with Dōgen's uncompromising emphasis on the absolute simultaneity of the manifestation of being-time directly realized by the

True Man's utmost selfless exertion at each and every impermanent moment, such that, "The Way which is called 'now' does not precede exertion; 'now' is itself the immediate and complete realization of exertion (gyōji-genjō)."[1] Finally, I will discuss the divergent soteriological (practical and experiential) implications in Heidegger's futural temporality and Dōgen's totalistic present moment in terms of how this reflects differences in their respective attempts at overcoming substance ontology.

For Heidegger, time as presencing is the "first name" of Being. Together in their essential underlying unity, Being and time constitute the great unthought matter at the basis of and propelling -- yet for the most part derivatively veiled by -- Western metaphysics. The uncovering of Being as such demands the genuine disclosure of time which is, in turn, to be thought in terms of its Being. The complex interrelation between Being and time is that time must be disclosed as time in its Being or un-vorhanden essence so that Being can be shown as non-objectifiable and non-substantial in light of its temporal presencing. Thus, the key to liberating Being from the thing-like or substantive status to which it has been derivatively reduced by traditional metaphysics is to demonstrate its primordial relation to time, which requires that time be disclosed in

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[1] SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 166).

an appropriately non-ousiological manner. Time is not something which stands alongside Being and which must be superceded if Being itself is to be understood and expressed; nor does it stand in connection with existence. Rather, it is the fundamental and essential horizon that determines the truth of Being as the basis of self, world, and space. But in order to reveal the Being of time as the access to the truth of Being as such, Being itself must be already in view through the forestructure of projective understanding. Furthermore, time itself is not the answer to the question of Being, nor is Being merely time. In one of his last works, Zur Sache des Denkens, Heidegger reflects on the hermeneutically circular nature of his philosophical undertaking as well as on the problematics of interpretation embedded therein: "Being and time determine each other reciprocally, but in such a manner that neither can the former -- Being -- be addressed as something temporal nor can the latter -- time -- be addressed as a being. . . . Time -- a matter, presumably the matter of thinking, if indeed something like time speaks as presence. Being and time, time and Being, name the relation of both issues, the matter at stake which holds both issues toward each other and endures their relation."[2]

In Sein und Zeit, the profound hermeneutic reciprocity

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[2]Heidegger, On Time and Being, pp. 3-4.

between Being and time is investigated and provisionally disclosed in terms of Dasein's anticipatory resoluteness as authentically Being towards one's ownmost, distinctive potentiality-for-Being no longer closed off by curious expectation, which reveals the futural nature and ecstatic-horizonal structure of temporality. On the basis of Dasein's existenziell encounters with the inherent limitations of the existenzial condition of finitude, the unity and primordial movement of ecstatic-horizonal temporality is shown as that which ontologically makes possible the interrelation of the three tenses and the priority of the future; temporality is the foundation for Dasein's transcendence, its fateful self-repetition, its spatial encounters, its capacity for discourse as well as the average everydayness of falling. Whereas in Sein und Zeit Heidegger seeks to re-state, re-orient, and re-solve the traditional metaphysical questions of self, space, transcendence in terms of their basis in Dasein's temporal structures, Heidegger II claims to attempt a more radical project. In the later works, Heidegger does not try to answer the old questions in a new way, but to explore the unity of the three tenses of time from a trans-homocentric, trans-metaphysical perspective in terms of the event (Ereignis) or belonging-together of Being and time. By virtue of its "nearness" (Nahheit) as the true fourth dimension of time underlying the other three, Ereignis allows for the historical-epochal possibilities of thinking

and for the naturalistic configuration of the four-fold (*Geviert*).

Dōgen's aim is to show that Buddha-nature is not an objectifiable transcendent realm or an eternal absolute which somehow manifests itself in the relative and transitory world of appearance, by his reorienting the understanding of Zen enlightenment in terms of a radical re-discovery and reaffirmation of the totality of the present moment, or the ultimate non-differentiatability of ontological penetration or transparency (*tōdatsu*) and existential realization (*shō*) of fully dynamic activity at each and every occasion of being-time. Through one instant of utmost selfless exertion of *shinjin-datsuraku*, all interpenetrating phenomena appear and harmoniously permeate past, present and future. The creative multi-dimensional unity of the three tenses, all beings and elements, and all possibilities and aspects of insight and experience is expressed metaphorically in "Zenki" by the parable of a man (symbolic of each particularity of exertive endeavor and selfless detachment) riding a boat (symbolic of the holistic presencing of being-time). Aboard the craft, the man turns the rudder, sets the sail, and poles the boat along, his leverage providing its aim and direction. The boat carries the man, giving sustenance and support to his efforts, but without the man riding in and maneuvering it, the boat cannot be what it is or fulfill its course -- an image which conveys the unimpeded

inseparability of manifestation and practice, each dimension making possible, enhancing and continually renewing the other. "At such a time," Dōgen writes, "there is nothing else but the world of the boat. The heavens, the water, and the shore are all in all engaged in the time of the boat and they are not the same as that which is not the boat's time. Therefore, live lives through me and I am me because of life. In boarding the boat, the true interdependence of body and mind is the dynamic working of the boat; both the whole earth and vast space are the dynamic working of the boat."[3]

In "Uji," Dōgen analyzes the structure of the totalistic moment in terms of the interrelated notions of right-now (nikon), spontaneous presencing cut off from before and after, and passage (kyōryaku), uniquely dynamic continuity possessed of before and after. He must justify that his emphasis on the moment is not a new and subtly disguised form of eternalism by uncovering the essential nature of temporal reality and experience underlying derivative time through a focus on the full unity and insubstantiality of the existential and ontological foundations of the manifestations of being-time. Dōgen's disclosure of nikon and kyōryaku lays the basis for his radical reinterpretation of Mahāyāna ontological doctrines and of Zen existentialist

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[3]SBGZ "Zenki" (Terada vol. I, p. 276).

imperatives. First, he reorients central notions such as _busshō_ (original Buddha-nature), and _juki_ (prediction of future Buddhahood) to free them from any trace of objectification by emphasizing the inseparability of primordiality and immediacy, and of attainment and total present activity. Second, Dōgen accentuates the unified arising of the three stages of existential awakening -- the spontaneity of resolve, the simultaneity and totality of practice, and the continual renewal of realization -- as an essentially and fundamentally temporal process that at once mirrors and contains the innate, unceasing and complex dynamism of _uji_.

## Heidegger's Understanding of Primordial Time

Heidegger's hermeneutic procedure for establishing the truth of primordial time involves two interrelated dimensions of the "productive logic" of circular interpretation. The ontological disclosure of the dynamic process of temporality is achieved on the basis of the existential possibility of authenticity, by which Dasein is liberated from the stranglehold of now-time through direct experience of the unity of time and of its own non-_vorhanden_ nature. "The ontological 'truth' of the _existenzial_ analysis," Heidegger writes, "is developed on the ground of the primordial _existenziell_ truth. However, the latter does not necessarily

need the former."[4] Authenticity is essential for the disclosure of temporality, but primordial time holds sway regardless of whether it is realized or not by encompassing both authenticity and inauthenticity. Similarly, authentic existence does not necessarily depend upon or result in ontological understanding. Nor does an ontologically appropriate interpretation guarantee the attainment of authenticity. Heidegger acknowledges that he is forced by the very nature of his hermeneutic approach to grant that there may be a definite ontical way or a factical ideal underlying ontological interpretation. Yet he refrains from, and expresses a disinterest in exploring such an implication. That is, existenzial truth is grounded in and justified on the basis of the existenziell level, but it does not in turn propose any particular existenziell behavior that must be accepted as binding.

Nevertheless, the second level of hermeneutic circularity requires a concrete factical basis for uncovering authenticity. Just as ontology needs to be disclosed on the basis of authentic existence, authenticity itself must be appropriately grounded in terms of the definite existenziell determinations of Dasein's thrownness. Authenticity is not a "free-floating" behavior detached or withdrawn from or soaring above existence; nor is it a

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[4] SZ 316 (BT 364).

seclusion from the world. Rather, authenticity is the sober anxiety of individualized Dasein fully founded within and realized on the basis of its finitude. "Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealments."[5]

The two-fold nature of anticipatory resoluteness reflects Dasein's authentic appropriation or self-retrieval of its thrownness-unto-death by means of its perpetual and meaningful encounters with its inescapable and pervasive nullity. Dasein's authentic response to its finitude or non-power is precisely the power of its freedom. Anticipation of death, which brings Dasein face to face with its imminent impossibility, shatters the bondage of the they-self tc a fixation with actuality that closes off genuine possibilities. Inauthentic Dasein derivatively transforms its anxious certainty that death can, does and invariably will befall each person into the fear of something actual which is deterred to a later time, such that "the possible is drawn into the actual, arising out

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[5]SZ 310 (BT 357).

of the actual and returning to it."[6] In saying "one dies too, sometime, but not right away," everydayness concedes something like a certainty of death, but in an altogether ambiguous manner in order to weaken that certainty and to alleviate anxiety by covering up the abyss of dying. Freedom towards death, on the other hand, first makes futural projection possible _as_ possibility by reclaiming the forestructure of care from its submission to the future derivatively conceived as the not-yet now.

Dasein's resolute response to guilt is aroused by the call of conscience which awakens Dasein with the momentum of an abrupt push, stirring it from its _existenziell_ deficiency by revealing the nothingness of finitude. Conscience bypasses or cuts through the illusions of _das Man_ which has abandoned itself to the apparent unchanging persistence of actual circumstances. The call of conscience penetrates to the genuine Self which is thrown into possibilities that are limited and defined but never completely staticized. "The appeal calls back by calling forth: it calls Dasein forth to the possibility of taking over, in existing, that thrown entity which it is; it calls Dasein _back_ to its thrownness so as to understand this thrownness as the null basis which it has to take up into

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[6] SZ 262 (BT 307).

existence."[7]

Conscience exposes the deceptions of the they-self, rooting them out of their most insidious hiding places by disclosing their null ground. The call must not be conceived as a vorhanden entity which reports events, puts the self up for 'trial' and passes judgements as if Dasein were an object, or offers soliloquies in which causes get pleaded. The conventional view holds that conscience performs an essentially critical function concerning problems of good and evil by reproving and warning in the sense of a disinterested spectator which surveys a person's behavior and offers practical injunctions as well as threats of punishment. According to Heidegger, the message of conscience is so clear, forceful and unequivocal, and its impact so profound and uncompromising because in calling Dasein back to the nullity of guilt, it says "no-thing." Conscience communicates the meaning of nothingness by keeping silent. "What does the conscience call to him to whom it appeals? Taken strictly, nothing. The call asserts nothing, gives no information about world-events, has nothing to tell. . . . 'Nothing' gets called to this Self, but it has been summoned to itself -- that is, to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being."[8] Conscience

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[7] SZ 287 (BT 333).

[8] SZ 273 (BT 318).

appeals to one who wants to be brought back from falling into the public world. It comes from the resources of Dasein itself to recall Dasein itself, forcing the collapse of das Man.

Anticipatory resoluteness reveals primordial time as the meaning of care which is not an entity outside of or an objectifiable cause of existence, but it is nothing other than the inner dynamism and complex unified processes of thrown-projection, expressed tautologically by Heidegger as the "temporalization of temporality": "The meaning of Dasein's Being is not something free-floating which is other than and 'outside of' itself, but is the self-understanding of Dasein itself. . . . Temporality 'is' not an entity at all. It is not, but it temporalizes itself."[9] The essential features of primordial time are futurity, ecstacy and finitude, in contrast to the derivative preoccupation with the constant now separated from the approaching not-yet now that is continually subsumed by the no-longer now. Heidegger repeatedly stresses that he is interested in the phenomenon of anticipatory resoluteness as authentic Being-towards-the-end not for the sake of moral judgement or to offer any practical proposal, but to discover the existenzial-ontological foundations which make possible the multiple variations and dimensions of existence. That

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[9]SZ 325, 329 (BT 372, 377).

is, his concern is not with anticipatory resoluteness as such, but with the primordial structure it reveals and which, in turn, underlies authenticity as one possible existenziell mode.

Heidegger maintains that anticipatory resoluteness is made possible only because Dasein lets itself "come towards" (Zu-kunft) itself in Being-towards-death as the ownmost potentiality of its nullity. Anticipation discloses the priority of the future because the future is the true basis for the possibility of Dasein's authentic self-approach as well as its inauthentic expectation of the not-yet now. Future is not the endless passing by of objectified time, but the self-generating movement of Dasein's forestructure of understanding, always projecting ahead-of-itself into novel and creative possibilities of knowledge, activity and expression. The primordiality of the future is demonstrated in three interrelated aspects: it is the basis of temporal existence, of the possibility of authenticity, and of the possibility of inauthenticity. First, the future is the true ground of the three-fold structure of care, allowing Dasein to project ahead-of-itself towards the end, to take into itself what it already is or has been as Being-guilty (past), and to make present vorhanden entities it finds itself alongside (present). The past as having been (Gewesenheit) and the present as making present (Gegenwärtigen) arise fundamentally from

the future. Thus the designations about care -- that it is "ahead-of" or "already-in" -- do not by any means refer to now-points in actual time, but must be understood in terms of their essential temporal meaning and structure. Just as the future is not something 'out there' hypostatically in front of Dasein, but is inherent in the care-structure as its self-approaching process, the past is not simply left behind but is fully carried along as the thrown determinations of Dasein. "This phenomenon has the unity of a future which makes present in the process of having been; we designate it as '_temporality_.'"[10]

Second, the primordiality of the future makes possible authenticity, not by causing Dasein to avoid or escape from its factical conditions, but precisely by allowing it to resolutely come to terms with them through profound acceptance and selective repetition (and not mere toleration) of its having been that is continually projected as futural possibilities. The authentic future and past coalesce as the anxious rapture of a present moment of vision (_Augenblick_) in a concrete yet eminently active situation (embracing the passivity of resistance). In the authentic _existenzial_ moment of vision, resolute having been and anticipatory self-approach _come-towards_ and meet each other as the clearing or openness (_Da_) of

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[10] SZ 326 (BT 374).

Dasein. Finally, the future, when falsely objectified, is the basis of inauthentic modes of expecting or awaiting the not-yet, forgetting the no-longer, and making-present a substantive now-point that arises and fades away in hypostatized time. Although hermeneutically disclosed by Heidegger through Dasein's potentiality for authenticity, temporality is equiprimordially the ground of inauthentic everydayness, whereby futural possibilities are closed off and merely expected to arrive on their own in the derivative not-yet now-point, while the past remains forgotten. Dasein's self-entanglements and self-deceptions as well as its deficient moods of indifference and carelessness are fundamentally temporal in the same way as the joy of anticipation and the equanimity of resolution.

Heidegger stresses that the present must be appropriately recovered along with the future and past in the mode of authenticity; resoluteness is not an empty ideal of existence, but necessarily takes the concrete and definite form of a resolution determined by what is factically possible in the situational (temporal-spatial) context encountered at the time. Nevertheless, the present clearly has a subsidiary role in Heidegger's notion of temporality. The authentic moment of vision is in every case based on the authenticity of futural projecton; Augenblick is a consequence of anticipation, and not the other way around. Also, Heidegger pays more attention to the essential role

played by the *in*authentic present in theoretical discovery and scientific investigation. According to Heidegger, theory and practice are not separable; one is not the absence of the other. Theory is not the suspension of concernful manipulation of entities nor is practice merely sightless preoccupied concern; both are founded primordially in temporality. Dasein is for the most part engaged in circumspective deliberation with and use of ready-to-hand equipment. Theorizing and thematizing take place when these things are objectified as *vorhanden* entities to be investigated, analyzed, and categorized -- that is, when a sudden change in perspective is brought about such that the entities are not altered but are seen in a new way as objects of a distinctive mode of making-present. Such objective investigation is not inauthentic in the sense of the they-self, however; the awaiting of discoveredness has its *existenziell* basis in a particular type of resoluteness.

Primordial coming-towards (future), having been (past) and making present (present) are neither ontically connected together nor collapsed into a monotonous or uniform identity, which would suggest the derivative view of successive now-points. Rather, they are intertwining and inseparable horizons which allow Dasein to stand ecstatically "outside-of-itself" in and for itself and out amongst beings it concernfully uses and theoretically

interprets. Temporality is the <u>ekstatikon</u> pure and simple by which Dasein views itself as a temporal-historical unity and individualized continuity of finite transcendence, rather than as a collection of isolated yet serially-connected time units. Ecstatic unity clears or illuminates thrown-projection such that "in every ecstasis, temporality temporalizes itself as a whole . . . that is, the unity of care-structure."[11] Primordial past, present and future are not independent realms but are fully implicated in each other at all times in that each ecstasis has its own horizon and the unity of the ecstases presences in each horizon. Futural understanding, for example, is always present in the process of having been, and thrownness temporalizes itself as a future which is making present.

The ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality is the primordial condition for the "there" or openness of Dasein, the entity which understands Being, and thus constitutes the clearedness or lighting (<u>Gelichtetheit</u>) that makes Dasein bright and overt for itself and its projects. The illuminative power is not a <u>vorhanden</u> capacity implanted in or possessed by Dasein, but the temporal basis of its sight and understanding by which all possible and diversified dimensions of existence arise, including spatiality, discourse, transcendence and historicality. Thus, for

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[11]SZ 350 (BT 401).

Heidegger, in contrast to the onto-theological tradition he seeks to overcome, time is not a gap to be surpassed to attain the truth of Being nor is Being simply the first and/or highest vorhanden being. Heidegger neither posits Being as an eternally transcendent realm (as in Plato or Aristotle) nor does he attempt to reduce Being to the totality of present-at-hand beings (Nietzsche) or elevate beings to the status of Absolute Spirit (Hegel). That is, Heidegger does not justify or eliminate (in a derivative fashion) the presupposed gulf between Being and time, but he discloses the non-ousiological temporality of un-vorhanden Dasein as the transcendental horizon of Being. Transcendence, according to Heidegger, is neither the speculatively claimed a-temporal or supra-temporal objectified realm beyond self and world nor the epistemologically analyzed perception of objects by a vorhanden subject, but the repetitive coming-towards of the thrown having been of Being-in-the-world that either loses itself in making present entities or resolutely encounters them in an active moment of vision.

The temporality of Dasein is the foundation for spatiality, discourse and historicality. Never a vorhanden thing or item 'in' an externalized and objectified space that is defined in terms of its measurable boundaries, only as projectively and ecstatically temporal can Dasein discover, break into and occupy space, making room for itself

and the equipment it uses -- bringing it close, handling it or keeping it at a distance -- in a factical region. The discourse of Dasein does not merely refer to time in passing as one topic among many, but each utterance necessarily and fundamentally reveals its temporal basis. Every expression of language is in every case structured, regulated and determined by reference to one tense or a combination of tenses; even to say "is" in any form is essentially a temporal disclosure. Furthermore, languages themselves are temporally and historically determined. Languages can die, and particular uses and contexts within them are based on and gain their expressive power from the temporal structure -- whether authentically or inauthentically modified -- of Dasein, which underlies any concern with the logical principles of grammatical construction.

The continuity of Dasein -- the basis of the fact that it is stretched-along from beginning to end or between birth and death both individually and communally -- is ontologically interpreted by Heidegger in terms of the phenomenon of historicality, which is the true basis of all historically significant events as well as the scientific study of history, and is grounded in the finite transcendence of care. Historicality is not an extra dimension added on to temporality, but is essentially interrelated with and inseparable from primordial time. Historicality has two levels of meaning. First, it allows occurrences, people,

equipment, spatial sites, and epochs (or historical ages) to stand out in significance for current Dasein, not because they are obsolete curiosities of the past, but because they constitute the having been continually and projectively carried along as temporality. Historicality is the reason why Dasein may feel closer in understanding or attitude to a previous or even remote epochal period than to the present one. It also accounts for why an idea or expression may seem more meaningful and appropriate to a later historical era than to its own, as if it were awaiting the proper temporal conditions for its true arrival; truth is determined not by arbitrary standards of 'right' or 'wrong' but by temporal-historical disclosiveness based on Dasein's coming-towards itself, which selectively chooses and repeats its having been.

The second and deeper meaning of historicality is thus its essentially self-critical function by which Dasein projectively selects through creative questioning, dialogue and interpretation what is currently relevant and important from its having been. True history, according to Heidegger, is neither a random collection of human occurrences nor an external Plan which manifests itself in or 'happens to' the human realm; it is neither the sum of the momentary actualities of experiences which come along successively and disappear nor a framework which this succession gradually fills up. Heidegger seeks

to overcome traditional dichotomizations of history in terms of freedom vs. determinism, realism vs. idealism, original purity or impurity vs. teleogical attainment, personalism vs. impersonalism, the natural realm of non-human beings vs. the historical realm of humans -- all of which presuppose some derivatively objectified understanding of history. Rather, he maintains that historicality is based on Dasein's "reciprocative (self-critical, self-dialogical) rejoinder (selective negation, rejection or disavowal)" concerning the fateful repetition or handing-down to itself of its historical possibilities. Fate (Schicksals) in turn founded on the equiprimordiality of death, guilt, conscience and freedom, and guided in advance by futural projection -- is the paradoxical "powerless superior power" by which Dasein acknowledges the conditions of its finitude or powerlessness and -- only then -- it resolutely projects its factically realizable potentialities. Destiny (Geschick) refers to the co-historizing of fateful communicating and struggling with other Dasein.

In the context of emphasizing historicality as self-criticism, Heidegger reorients the three kinds of historiology -- the monumental, the antiquarian, and the critical -- distinguished by Nietzsche, who never "explicitly point[ed] out the necessity of this triad or the ground of its unity. The threefold character of historiology is

adumbrated in the historicality of Dasein. At the same time, this historicality enables us to understand to what extent these three possibilities must be united factically and concretely in any historiology which is authentic."[12] Monumental history, according to Heidegger, reveals futural possibilities, conditioned by and profoundly acceptant of the past, and no longer overlooked by a fixated and confused present. Once this potentiality is opened up, history done in the present is essentially a critique (and not merely detached scientific observation) of the past and how it is currently being handed down and taken over. Dasein's care about what it is depends on what it has been in light of what it can and will be. Antiquarian history is neither a restitution of the past out of curious nostalgia nor the tying of the present onto the obsolete, but Dasein's anticipatory self-choices. For example, in choosing a hero, Dasein is making an existenziell decision grounded in the three-fold historicality and therefore the tripartite existenzial structure of temporality.

At the conclusion of Sein und Zeit, Heidegger questions the success of using a phenomenologico-ontological disclosure of temporality as the necessary and essential access to the meaning of Being itself. Although he has shown temporality to be the meaning of Dasein, the

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[12] SZ 396 (BT 448).

relationship between primordial time and Being remains vague, elusive and problematic. Heidegger writes of his perplexity that "our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's Being remains only _one way_ which we may take. Our _aim_ is to work out the question of Being in general. . . . Is there a way which leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does _time_ itself manifest itself as the horizon of _Being_?"[13] Heidegger's concern is that an over-concentration on the analysis of Dasein in his first major work bears and perpetuates the difficulties of the modern metaphysics of _subiectität_, which he has already exposed in Descartes, Kant and Nietzsche as an inversion rather than the overcoming of substance ontology, resulting in a three-fold dilemma for Heidegger that leaves the nature of Being more questionable than ever. The ontological problem which Heidegger acknowledges in _Sein und Zeit_ is his inability within the framework of _existenzial_ analysis to disclose and interpret the time of entities-in-the-world which Dasein finds itself alongside and frequently uses as ready-to-hand equipment. That is, the ecstatic temporality of Dasein reveals that Being is not a _vorhanden_ being, but it is not necessarily helpful in showing how Being is invariably the Being or presencing _of_ beings which, like Dasein, need to be disclosed in terms of their

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[13]SZ 436, 437 (BT 487, 488).

non-substantive temporal foundations. Secondly, he is uneasy about a possible misreading of the analysis of anticipatory resoluteness as an existentialist imperative which advocates human willfulness or voluntarism and thereby overshadows the priority of the ontological dimension (the truth of Being as such) unfolded in terms of the hermeneutic circle. Thirdly, Heidegger believes that it is no longer possible to re-establish the basis of metaphysics or to disclose Being within the context and framework of its traditional questions and issues because metaphysical thinking is from its inception and by its essence preoccupied with substantive present actuality.

Heidegger does not intend to abandon his focus on the dynamism and inner unity of temporality or on the priority of the future as the "first name" of Being, but to reorient the questions of Being, time and their profound interrelation in a more primordial fashion. He attempts to free the matter of Being and time from any traces of the subjectivistic (and therefore objectifying) re-representational thinking by means of a "step back" to the realm of presencing (<u>physis</u> or <u>Anwesenheit</u>) which comes-to-pass prior to the traditional metaphysical fixation with absolute presentness (<u>ousia</u> or <u>vorhandene</u>). In his later writings, Heidegger tries to overcome the hermeneutic difficulties he exposes at the end of <u>Sein und Zeit</u> by approaching time from a trans-homocentric (focusing on Being

rather than Dasein), trans-metaphysical (without trying to resolve the old questions) and therefore frequently naturalistic-aesthetic (concerned with beings themselves rather than only in terms of their usefulness to man) perspective of disclosure, "to raise the question how there can be presence as such."[14] Heidegger shifts his emphasis on human affairs from the notion of anticipatory resoluteness, by which Dasein decisively and selectively chooses its factical possibilities, to acquiescent releasement (Gelassenheit), a poetic thanksgiving or homecoming which unobstructively lets Being unfold. In that context, he asks if "the name for the task of thinking [should] then read instead of Being and Time: Opening and Presence (Lichtung und Anwesenheit)?"[15] Heidegger suggests the notion of the belonging-together or mutual appropriating event (Ereignis) of Being and time, Being and man, time and man, and Being and beings as a means of divulging the primordial source or self-sameness (das Selbe) which determines these relations by giving and taking, granting and withdrawing presencing as such. "Time is not the product of man, man is not the product of time. There is no production here. There is only giving in the sense of extending

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[14]Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 70.

[15]Ibid., p. 73.

which opens up time-space."[16]

*Ereignis*,[17] Heidegger insists, is not meant to simply replace Being as an over-generalized metaphysical category. It is neither an all-encompassing concept under which Being and time could be subsumed nor a relation retroactively superimposed upon the two. Such views, he maintains, would be the result of trying "to derive the source from the river."[18] *Ereignis* is not a third entity attached to the other two, but a genuinely temporal designation of that which makes possible occurrence as such or Being as the presencing of time. Heidegger thus reorients the unity of primordial time in terms of what he now calls its "true fourth-dimension" -- the nearing of nearness (*Nahheit*) -- which is essentially the first dimension that gives, determines and enhances all the others -- the three tenses as well as space, language and

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[16]*Ibid*., p. 16.

[17]Of the term *Ereignis*, also translated "E-vent" (Richardson) and "self-spectacle" (Vail), Heidegger writes in *Identität und Differenz* (trans. *Identity and Difference* by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 36): "The words event of appropriation, thought of in terms of the matter indicated, should now speak as a key term in the service of thinking. As such a key term, it can no more be translated than the Greek *Logos* or the Chinese *Tao*. The term event of appropriation here no longer means what we would otherwise call a happening, an occurrence. It now is used as a *singulare tantum*. What it indicates happens only in the singular, no, not in any number, but uniquely."

[18]Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, p. 24.

history. Nearness preserves what has been or the past by denying its advent as present, and keeps open the approach coming from the future by withholding the present, all gathered in threefold simultaneity. From the intimacy of the still center of nearness all movement flows -- time temporalizes and space spatializes. In his reflections on language, Heidegger writes, "Time's removing and bringing to us, and space's throwing open, admitting and releasing -- they all belong in the Same, the play of stillness, something to which we cannot here give further thought."[19] Thus nearness, a notion which suggests the unity of time and space without implying conventional bifurcations between proximity and distance, is for Heidegger II the most meaningful temporal disclosure of Being as the basis of human and phenomenal existence.

Heidegger portrays the nearness of Ereignis in two interrelated dimensions -- the historical-epochal and the naturalistic -- which are largely continuous of and consistent with thematic developments in Sein und Zeit. First, in works such as Holzwege and Nietzsche (2 volumes), Heidegger reflects on the history of metaphysics as the history of the self-withdrawal of Being itself from its

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[19] Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, trans. On the Way to Language by Peter D. Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 106.

beginning with Anaximander and the pre-Socratics to its completion with Nietzsche. The granting of nearness is the basis of the eschatological unfolding of the belonging-together of Being and man which, because of finitude or inherent concealment, has led through a gradual but inevitable decline to a progressive oblivion or forgetfulness of Being. Time and space are reduced by metaphysical thinking and consequent global technological dominance to the mere parameters for human measurement, calculation and exploitation. "Metaphysics is in all its forms and historical stages a unique, but perhaps necessary, fate of the West and the presupposition of its planetary dominance. The will of that planetary dominance is now in turn affecting the center of the West."[20] The current age as the destitute aftermath of metaphysics is, from Heidegger's eschatological standpoint, the threshhold point which can either lead toward further oblivion or to genuine recovery of Being through man's poetic thanksgiving of the nearness of time-space.

The second dimension, developed in Heidegger II's reflections on art, language, thinking and thinghood (continuing Sein und Zeit's analysis of discourse, transcendence,

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[20] Martin Heidegger, "Überwindung der Metaphysik" (from Vorträge und Aufsätze) trans. "Overcoming Metaphysics" in The End of Philosophy by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), p. 90.

worldhood and spatiality) seems to be posited as a possible resolution to the oblivion of Being.[21] Heidegger naturalistically-aesthetically characterizes the authentic occurrence of true time as an ongoing mutually appropriative and illuminatingly self-reflective purposeless interplay (<u>das ereignende Spiegel-Spiel</u>) throughout time-space which gathers into simple oneness the unity of the four-fold (<u>Geviert</u>) of earth (the serving bearer), sky (the home of light and dark), gods (the messengers of Being), and mortals (those capable of dying and awaiting the divinities). Nearness, which preserves farness, is at work in each useful <u>Ding</u> (thing), such as a bridge or jug, or a profoundly poetic artwork, such as Van Gogh's peasant shoes, at once bringing into harmony and allowing the individuality of all members at play. As soon as one of the four is spoken, each of the others comes to mind. <u>Ereignis</u> occurs as two inseparably interrelated movements -- the one-fold which

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[21]In "The Anaximander Fragment" (p. 18), Heidegger stresses that the "eschatology of Being" is not to be understood in an onto-theological (or teleological) way in that it does not lead inexorably and inevitably to a supreme and attainable goal. Rather, the richness and greatness of the <u>eschaton</u> lies at the beginning, which is not left behind, but is coming-toward man: "If we think within the eschatology of Being, then we must someday anticipate the former dawn in the dawn to come; today we must learn to ponder this former dawn through what is imminent." The "former dawn" is the early Greek thinking on Being as dynamic temporal presencing in terms of the notions, according to Heidegger's interpretation, of <u>physis</u>, <u>logos</u> and <u>aletheia</u>.

unites and appropriates, and the fouring which expropriates the unique ec-static dynamism of each. "The fouring presences as the worlding of world. The mirror-play of world is the round dance of appropriating. Therefore, the round dance is the ring that joins while it plays as mirroring. Appropriating, it lightens the four into the radiance of their simple oneness."[22] The polarity of mutual configuration of the human, divine and the natural is simultaneously held apart by differentiating its full multiplicity and borne together in the splendid simplicity of oneness. Each of the four is set out into its own in that none of the four insists on its separate particularity. The interplay is neither exhausted self-destructively nor expanded indefinitely, but it continually enhances and renews, builds and preserves, enables and sustains all at once and one in light of all.

The doctrine of the round dance of Ereignis is perhaps the closest Heidegger comes to an ontology (surpassing traditional onto-theology) which attempts to include

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[22]Heidegger, "The Thing," p. 180. In Der Satz vom Grund ((Pfullingen: Neske, 1957), p. 69), Heidegger explores the meaning of Being ontologically "without ground" (ab-grund) and existentially "without why" ("ohne Warum") by citing the mystical poem of Angelius Silesius: "The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms/ It does not care about itself, does not ask if it's being seen." Heidegger also writes (p. 188): "The 'because' is submerged in the play. . . . The question remains whether we and how we, heeding the passage of this play, play along with and acquiesce to the play."

the pervasive totality and non-substantive unity of temporal events of the world. The existential dimension, however, is thereby lessened in significance in that human resolve (now understood negatively as subjective willfulness) is denied priority in the intricate movement of the dance. At the same time, an emphasis on the futural-orientation of Sein und Zeit is heightened because Heidegger counsels that man can "do nothing but wait,"[23] not for a specific happening, but to be released from all traces of will into the temporo-historical coming-to-pass of the open realm of Ereignis. Man can neither initiate nor accomplish the harmonious interplay of the four-fold. He can only endure the current destitution and destructiveness of technology that is due to the self-concealment of Being-as-Ereignis. And, in Heidegger's posthumously-cited words,[24] man only has the capacity to "prepare to be ready" or to cultivate the "expecting of expectation" should Being epochally reappear to a new way of thinking of time and Being that is non-objectifying, non-conceptualizing, beyond will and the negation of will as well as the dichotomy

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[23]Martin Heidegger, Gelassenheit, trans. Discourse on Thinking by John Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 62.

[24]Martin Heidegger, "Nur Noch ein Gott Kann uns Retten," trans. "Only a God Can Save Us Now" from Der Spiegel interview by David Schendler in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, vol. 6, no. 1 (Winter, 1977), p. 19.

of activity and passivity.

## Dōgen's Understanding of Primordial Time

Dōgen stresses the total convergence of ontological truth and understanding and existential injunction and practice as full manifestations of the pervasive unity of being-time. The presencing of uji prevails regardless of whether or not its true nature is comprehended, and yet primordial time ultimately depends upon and is fulfilled only by means of each being's fully sustained and perpetually renewed selfless exertive power. Since all beings are, ontologically, nothing other than the exertion of uji at each, every and any moment, Dōgen insists on the individual's utmost existential effort of shinjin-datsuraku at all times. He writes in "Gyōji" that the blossoming flower and falling leaf, the brightened and the broken mirror -- images which symbolize the dual possibilities of enlightenment and unenlightenment -- are equally the manifestations of sustained exertion. Since "everything is exertion," he maintains, "To attempt to avoid exertion is an impossible and unrighteous evasion of exertion [because] the avoidance of exertion depends upon exertion itself."[25] Therefore, it is imperative that exertion be authenticated through

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[25]SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 165).

existential realization of non-self that makes possible ontological understanding of the insubstantiality and dynamism of being-time. Philosophical insight and clarification is necessarily and ultimately grounded in personal experience, acceptance and affirmation of impermanence as the direct pointer to muga beyond relative attitudes of optimism and pessimism.

The total unity of all possible dimensions of reality and experience realized at every moment of being-time is expressed in "Uji": "The configuration of my-self makes up the entire [Dharma]-realm as time's occurrence at each, every and any moment. The mutual non-obstruction of things and things is the same as the mutal non-obstruction amongst all times. Therefore, the arousing of aspiration [in different] minds at the self-same time is the arousing [at different] times of the self-same mind. It is just the same with practice and attainment of the [Buddhist] Way."[26] Dōgen thereby conveys the ontological inseparability and mutual non-obstruction arising spontaneously and simultaneously of all beings and all times, my-self and time, my-self and all beings in the entire Dharma-realm, each being and all beings, and one time and every time. He also divulges the existential unity of resolve and realization, practice and attainment, individual and

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[26] SBGZ "Uji" 288-289 (Terada vol. I, p. 267).

universal awakening manifested right-now and throughout past, present and future. The configuration, display and activity of the insubstantial self is fully coterminous, contiguous and harmonious with that of all other insubstantial beings at each and every moment. Similarly, time and minds are at once the self-same in that the awakening of spiritual intentions in one mind at one time arouses all minds at all times, and different because each mind is a unique occurrence and perspective of uji at any time. Thus, the unity of being-time does not merely allow for, but necessarily encompasses complete diversity and multiplicity in all realms, directions, standpoints and manifestations. Difference is by no means reduced to a monolithic equality by Dōgen. Rather, the totality and unity of all beings manifested as all times makes possible and is realized through the full array of experiential factors.

The ultimately non-differentiatable existential and ontological dimensions of being-time can and must, however, be provisionally analyzed by Dōgen in order to distinguish his doctrines from the heretical and reductionist views of idealistic monism (sennigedō) and naturalistic pantheism (jinen-gedō). Ontologically, the dharma-stage is analyzed as a non-obstructive impermanent totality of life-death/beyond life-death heuristically divided into the two aspects of immediate presencing right-now (nikon, cut off from before and after) and continuous passage

(kyōryaku, possessed of before and after) throughout all times. First, the dharma-stage is manifest as a discrete, non-sequential particularity that is self-generating, self-contained and self-renewing. Nikon is not the self-imposed limitation of a supposedly absolute Buddha-nature, but an eternity and totality complete in and of itself as an holistic and dynamic situational context. The directness and completeness of the present moment is independent of anticipation or expectation because it is not coming from or going anywhere and nothing is left out of it. Nor can the absolutely immediate present be evaluated as appearing too little and too late or as premature and over-extended. The present moment is never lost or slipping away. Each and every instant must be esteemed and valued as and for the multi-dimensional impermanent/insubstantial unity it constitutes. "The entire content and meaning of heaven and earth and its relationship to the mind reduces itself to one eternal moment. If we fail to understand this we will never grasp the significance of a sneeze or any seemingly minor occurrence [which represents the instantaneous co-existence of life and death right-now]."[27] When the practitioner of the Way attains one single dharma by casting off body and mind, Dōgen maintains, he permeates

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[27]SBGZ "Shinjingakudō" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. I, p. 13 (Terada vol. I, p. 77).

fully and freely that one dharma for that one eternal moment unbound by hesitation or deliberation.

Freedom from entangling attachments to the conventional conception of time as mere coming and going, Dōgen asserts, is to see "the time which has not-yet come" (mi-tō), fully disclosed right-now and free from arbitrary distinctions between arrival and movement, getting there and not getting there. Being-time appears precisely at this very moment without partiality or limitation, impediment or boundary. Each being non-obstructively penetrates in and through each moment, and in thereby realizing itself, it discloses the totality of beings at all times. "[The average man tends to think] that obstruction can be used by other dharmas, but there has never been any obstruction that obstructs other dharmas. I meet people, people meet people, I meet myself, meeting meets meeting."[28] At such a totalistic moment, all elements are simultaneously initiated and fulfilled. Dōgen concretely expresses the Kegonian notion of the harmonious interpenetration of particularity and universality, universality and universality, and particularity and particularity by emphasizing the purely dynamic activity of the unobstructed unfolding of the non-substantive temporal process -- "meeting meets meeting" -- in and of itself.

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[28] SBGZ "Uji" 304 (Terada vol. I, p. 262).

Thus, the nikon of uji is for Dōgen the best possible means for expressing the innate and unceasing dynamism and insubstantiality of the Buddhist truth of non-self in its inseparability with impermanence, avoiding traditional bifurcations between time and space, conditioned and unconditioned, eternity and transiency, absolute and manifestation. Dōgen's notion avoids an attachment to eternalism either beyond man, as in the doctrine of an absolute and unchanging Buddha-nature, or within man, as in the doctrine of kenshō, both of which presuppose (from Dōgen's standpoint) a fixation with substance. Dōgen is not satisfied with the Mahāyāna preoccupation with the cosmology and teleology of busshō, nor does he accept the traditional Zen emphasis on human activity which still does not challenge and fully overcome the derivative notion of time. Rather, he accentuates the truly temporal foundations of both Buddha-nature and man, of the ontological and the experiential, through a creative rediscovery of the holistic and impersonal presencing of the dynamically immediate moment of being-time.

The central elements of his philosophy of being-time are suggested by Dōgen's interpretation of the opening poem in the "Uji" fascicle:

> Sometimes (uji) standing so high up on the mountain top;
> Sometimes walking deep down on the bottom of the sea;

Sometimes a three-headed eight-armed [demon or Acala];
Sometimes a sixteen- or eight-foot [Buddha]. . . .[29]

From the conventional standpoint of uji as "sometimes," time appears fragmented into deep-rooted and seemingly irreconciliable oppositions between now and then, appropriate or inappropriate, authentic or inauthentic. From the primordial standpoint, however, the unity of being-time is seen as thoroughly universal (encompassing human and natural, sameness and difference, enlightened and unenlightened without obstruction or dichotomization), insubstantial (as the trans-personal basis of all activity without reference to ego or subject, substance or object, but only to ebb and flow of movement itself), and yet eminently existential (through the implicit imperative to realize Buddhahood in terms of the holistic presencing of naturalistic activity). For Dōgen, all talk of "nature" (shō), whether an all-pervasive Buddha-nature or an internal own-nature, that works its way into linear time or is realized teleologically through the suspension of time is unedifying and removes one from realizing non-self at this very insubstantial totalistic moment. Uji (as muga) is fully detached from the daily time of 24 hours derivatively conceived as sequential, and yet is found nowhere else but right within daily time when penetrated as the insubstantiality and impermanence

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[29]SBGZ "Uji" 286 (Terada vol. I, p. 267).

of all factors of experience here-and-now at all occasions. "The sixteen-foot golden body itself is time, and just because it is time there is the luminous glow of the radiance (kōmyō) of time, and you must study the matter right within this twenty-four hours."[30]

Dōgen stresses that the totality of the present moment is not to be considered a metaphor for eternity, but the full discovery, realization and affirmation of being-time just as it is. In "Tsuki" Dōgen maintains, for example, that tonight's moon demands our complete attention as an immediate and complete manifestation without beginning or end, oldness or novelty. Furthermore, each quarter of the moon is complete within itself just as each and every form or existence is, as it is, the "true form of Buddha." Dōgen insists that his reference to moonlight is not merely a figure of speech which symbolizes the luminosity of being-time. "'As it is' does not mean similarity but indicates the true form of existence."[31] Each aspect of the moon and therefore each and every occasion of being-time is in itself a complete manifestation without reference to anything outside it.

Dōgen further avoids any possible confusion of

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[30]SBGZ "Uji" 287 (Terada vol. I, p. 267).

[31]SBGZ "Tsuki" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. I, p. 83 (Terada vol. I, p. 278).

nikon with a new and disguised derivative eternalism by stressing the temporal depth and experiential breadth of the right-now in terms of the inseparable notion of experiential continuity or totalistic passage (kyōryaku). Passage at one time engages all aspects and dimensions of the selfsameness and simultaneity of past, present and future here-and-now as well as allowing for their full diversity, variety and differentiation.

The second element of the dharma-stage -- kyōryaku -- refers to the continuously creative and regenerating dimension of being-time. Nikon and kyōryaku are two inseparable, interpenetrating and ultimately selfsame, although provisionally distinguishable standpoints for understanding uji. Neither has priority; the difference between them is a matter of viewing either the topology (nikon) or the cross-section (kyōryaku) of a total temporal phenomenon. In Dōgen's metaphor of climbing the mountain, for example, nikon designates the particular and immediate activity that occurs as nothing other than the present occasion of ascent. Kyōryaku suggests the entire context and background of events of man and universe by which "life lives through me and I am me because of life." Kyōryaku encompasses all personal, social and natural history, conditioning and recollection as well as all futural projection, outlook and striving that both make possible and are contained within the concrete circumstances invariably and

fully manifested right here-and-now. Each moment is complete as it is because it includes the full range of multiple perspectives and situations extending simultaneously and reverberating non-obstructively throughout the three tenses. Past, present and future themselves are merely provisional terms for conveying the totality of dimensions which appear at each and every moment.

Dōgen iterates five extensive motions of passage to refute the conventional view of serial progression, and to convey the complexity and insubstantiality, intricacy and fluidity, flexibility and multi-directionality of the dynamism of being-time. "Passage from today to tomorrow, passage from today to yesterday, and passage from yesterday to today" refutes the concept of chronology or linear sequence as appropriate for primordial time. "Passage from today to today" destroys a fabricated separation on any level of the essentially unified three phases of time since "today," which encompasses past, present and future, is said to move simultaneously backwards and forwards, advancing and retreating within itself. Finally, "passage from tomorrow to tomorrow" surpasses any view which gives sole priority to the derivative present tense because each of the unified dimensions is complete only through its ultimate identity with every other one.

Genuine passage, in contrast to the inauthentic conception of time's passing forever away, contains the

inexhaustible contents and innumerable manifestations of being-time continually emerging anew without substratum or duration. "Passage is like spring in that all the various manifestations of spring themselves are passage. . . . Passage is not [just] spring; however, since it is the passage of spring, passage now completes the Way at the very time spring appears."[32] As one aspect of spring emerges, spring unfolds everywhere at all times. With each situation, appearance, fragrance, atmosphere and hue of this very spring, all previously experienced and forthcoming possibilities of spring are spontaneously realized right here-and-now.

The notion of kyōryaku establishes the basis for Dōgen's radical reorientation and reinterpretation of traditional Mahāyāna ontological doctrines, such as busshō, and of the Zen understanding of the existential path to realization, in terms of the inseparability and insubstantiality of here-and-now manifestations of being-time. Kyōryaku is intimately connected to Dōgen's view of Buddha-nature in two interrelated ways: first, the simultaneity of past, present and future is the reason why Dōgen takes license to drastically revise and even alter previous Buddhist expressions of Dharma in accord with his own current experience of genjōkōan; second, Dōgen must show how Buddha-

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[32]SBGZ "Uji" 299 (Terada vol. I, p. 260).

nature can be re-understood and re-expressed in terms of its full integration with kyōryaku and nikon as ultimately selfsame with this very moment of the holistic presencing of being-time. For Dōgen, uji does not necessarily replace busshō as the central doctrine to convey the existential/ontological realization of the Buddhist truth of non-self. He does not merely discard busshō; rather, he attempts to fully revitalize and restore its genuinely temporal significance through his creative interpretation of busshō-as-kyōryaku. There is no being-time that is not Buddha-nature; on the other hand, Buddha-nature is not manifested unless and until -- or, more positively, only upon -- one's realization of uji as the insubstantiality of all phenomena.

In the first section of "Busshō," for example, Dōgen seeks to clarify the temporal meaning of the well-known and widely-accepted passage from the Nirvāna Sutra, "All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha-nature. Tathāgata abides forever without change." He creatively reads -- or, rather, intentionally misreads on the basis of his understanding of the kyōryaku of Dharma -- the phrase shitsu-u-busshō as "whole-being-Buddha-nature," in that to "have" (u) busshō can mean in a deeper sense to "be" busshō. The being of busshō is not a fixed ontological substratum underlying all phenomena. It is neither an entity possessed by all beings nor a greater power which possesses or encompasses beings, but an expression of

suchness immediately and completely manifest as each and every being-time both "within and without sentient beings." Whole-being-Buddha-nature is not emergent being that began at a certain time because everyday mind is it right-now; it is not original or timeless being because it fills the past right up through the present. It does not subsist before practice and it is not attained after practice.

Thus, being-Buddha-nature must not be conceived as something hidden that is awaiting realization or as a potential from the past which will come to the fore in the future that is approaching. The traditional interpretation of the second sentence of the cited passage implies that busshō is a constant essence which when nourished by the Dharma rain gives forth branches, leaves, flowers, and fruits with new seed-potentials, and it thereby presupposes a direct yet unacknowledged and self-deceptive reliance on derivative time. It assumes that the past, present and future are three separable and independent realms through which existence passes, leading inevitably toward some destination. Dōgen reappropriates the final phrase of the passage, "without change" (mu u henyaku), in the following way: Tathāgata is "non-existent (mu), existent (u) and is change (henyaku)." The ontological and existential significance of such a reformulation, regardless of whether or not it is strictly grammatically "correct," is that [Buddha-nature] is not a question of something in the tree

or something outside of the tree. It is always so, at any time of the past or present . . . root, stem, branch, and leaf are still, without differentiation, produced and they live the same life and die the same death and are Buddha-nature as the same whole-being."[33] In contrast to the derivative conception of a Buddha-nature that is attainable at some later time, all manifestations and elements at each and every time (kyōryaku) are the spontaneous here-and-now presencing (nikon) of this very being-time of busshō.

In "Busshō," Dōgen highlights and deepens the temporal significance of Buddha-nature by showing that it is inseparable and coterminous with impermanence (mujō), karmic consciousness (gosshiki), life-and-death (shōji), activity (gyō), the manifesting body of the five aggregates (shingen), the occasion already arrived (jisetsu kishi), a single instant (ji).[34] Elsewhere in the Shōbōgenzō,

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[33]SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 1, p. 102 (Terada vol. I, p. 47).

[34]In addition to the various temporal dimensions of Buddha-nature, Dōgen also examines in "Busshō" two other most significant dimensions -- no-Buddha-nature (mu-busshō) and emptiness-Buddha-nature (kū-busshō) -- to overcome any subtle clinging to substantiality. According to Dōgen, mu-busshō does not indicate the absence, negation or denial of Buddha-nature (as in the traditional interpretations), but full liberation from an objectified concept of busshō. Furthermore, mu-busshō directly points to and is ultimately (groundlessly) grounded in kū-busshō, which is not an abstract emptiness, nor merely a synthesis with form, but each and every non-substantial concrete particularity or

Dōgen reinterprets Zen notions which symbolize enlightenment to free them from a static representation or expression which implies a bifurcation between immutable and ephemeral time. He emphasizes that "one bright pearl" (ikkya-myōju) contains all the changes of life of the inexhaustible past existing through time and emerging ever anew in the present. "Radiant light" (kōmyō) glows amongst all the harmoniously interpenetrating functions of temporal phenomena. Also, "original Buddha-mind" (kobusshin) is in no way separable from the spontaneous here-and-now presencing of uji. "Every thing -- blooming flowers, wild grasses, mountains, oceans, land, rivers -- are the body and mind of original Buddha-mind. . . . In the present there is the original mind and the Buddha-mind."[35] From the standpoint of the kyōryaku of Dharma, not the slightest separation exists between primordiality and spontaneity.

As Dōgen's disclosure of the incessantly vigorous activity of the dharma-stage of being-time through his analysis and overcoming of conventional fixations is the

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manifestation. "One does not say no (mu), because it is no. One says no because it is Buddha-nature-emptiness. Thus, each piece of no is a touchstone to articulate emptiness; emptiness is the power articulating no. Here emptiness is not the emptiness of 'form is emptiness.' . . . The emptiness of 'emptiness is emptiness' is a piece of rock in emptiness." (In SBGZ "Busshō" (W/A) part 1, pp. 111-112 (Terada vol. I, p. 52)).

[35] SBGZ "Kobusshin" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. I, p. 33 (Terada vol. I, p. 117).

basis for his reinterpretation of ontological doctrines, it also allows for his reorientation and restatement of the genuine temporal meaning of the stages of Zen awakening. Dōgen specifically refutes Rinzai Zen's over-reliance on _kōan_ practice, which presumes that enlightenment can be suddenly acquired through the quick solution of a puzzle. He claims that the _kōan_ may be answered and yet the insight remains bankrupt unless authentic _kyōryaku_ of realization is experienced at all occasions of being-time.[36] Dōgen's analysis of the inseparable spontaneity of resolve (beginning or past in conventional terms), simultaneity and totality of practice (middle or present), and continually renewed development of realization (end or future) based on _genjōkōan_ (here-and-now realization encompassing _nikon_ and _kyōryaku_) constitutes the ultimate and complete resolution of his initial Great Doubt Block concerning the relationship between original and acquired enlightenment. Dōgen was deeply troubled by the question why, if Buddha-nature is original and all-pervasive, there is any need for practice. His conclusion is that resolve, practice and realization are, like the three tenses of time, absolutely interpenetrating and inseparably fulfilled by virtue of the unified multi-dimensional _kyōryaku_ of _Dharma_ which reflects the _genjōkōan_ of non-self here-and-now. To cast off body and mind and

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[36]SBGZ "Shisho" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. II, p. 183 (Terada vol. I, p. 439) for Dōgen's refutation of Rinzai practices.

to spontaneously forget the self is to fully manifest all levels and dimensions of experience right-now. Dōgen does not seek to reduce resolve-practice-realization to a monolithic uniformity, but to highlight the selfsameness underlying the creative tension between them, each phase interpenetrating and enhancing, fulfilling and renewing the others.

An understanding of the true nature of time thus breaks down any linear or sequential conception of Buddhist realization. Resolve and practice do not lead to or necessarily result in realization, but the three inseparable dimensions are fully realized at one and the same being-time. When one dimension appears in one mind at one time, it permeates all levels of each mind at every time without distinction, obstruction or partiality. "Because of this, when even just one person at one time, sits in zazen, he becomes, imperceptively, one with each and all of the myriad things, and permeates completely all time, so that within the limitless universe, throughout past, future, and present, he is performing the eternal ceaseless work of guiding beings to enlightenment. It is, for each and every thing, one and same undifferentiated practice, and undifferentiated realization."[37]

The three "stages" of awakening are mutually

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[37]SBGZ "Bendōwa (W/A) 136 (Terada vol. I, p. 15).

contained and ultimately equalizable, though experientially distinguishable. "The great Way of the Buddhas and patriarchs is necessarily unsurpassable sustained exertion. Perpetuating the Way unceasingly, resolve, practice, bodhi and nirvāṇa are all the while without any interval; such is the perpetuation of the Way through sustained exertion."[38] Resolve or awakening to the Buddha-seeking mind is spontaneous in that it arises neither beginninglessly nor recently, neither innately nor through universal conditioning, neither before nor after effort, but as an instantaneous stirring of authentic spiritual intentions and determination of a particular heart-mind which extends throughout all beings at all times. "Countless awakenings arise from the initial resolve to seek enlightenment. The resolve of innumerable persons started with one person's initial awakening. . . . The initial awakening and zazen are not the same, not different, nor this or that; they cannot be separated."[39] Resolve is continually renewed through practice and sustained in realization, and it is resolve which unceasingly motivates practice and inspires realization. "[The resolve for enlightenment and attainment of the Way] must work

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[38]SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 166).

[39]SBGZ "Hotsu-mujōshin" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. II, p. 124 (Terada vol. II, p. 212).

reciprocally, from beginning to end."[40]

Just as initial resolve constantly fuels practice, sustained practice of shinjin-datsuraku enhances and affirms the dedication and conviction of resolve. Similarly, neither practice nor resolve can cease at realization. Enlightenment is not an attainable goal but a renewable insight and experience accentuated by diligent practice. In "Bendōwa" Dōgen answers the query as to why those who have already realized the Dharma must still practice, by insisting that "practice and realization are not two [separable] stages." The merits of unabated practice extend simultaneously to all beings throughout all times. "Because one's present practice is practice in realization, one's initial negotiation of the Way in itself is the whole or original realization. Thus, even while one is directed to practice, he is told not to anticipate realization apart from practice, because practice points directly to original realization. As it is already realization in practice, realization is endless; as it is practice in realization, practice is beginningless."[41]

The "beginninglessness" and "endlessness" or the spontaneity and renewal of originally and continuously unified practice-in-realization is the immediate

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[40]Ibid.

[41]SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) 144 (Terada vol. I, p. 20).

manifestation and passage of this very moment of being-time. Because realization takes place nowhere else than here-and-now, which encompasses the totality of interpenetrating tenses, dimensions and elements, it necessarily involves the perpetual renewal of "continuous development beyond Buddha" (butsukōjōji) which "is to see more and more Buddhas after becoming a Buddha." Realization continues no longer than the resolve which kindles it and the practice which sustains it. "When buddhas are genuinely buddhas there is no need for them to be conscious that they are buddhas. Yet they are realized buddhas, and they continue to realize buddha. . . . All traces of enlightenment [then] disappear, and this traceless enlightenment is continued on endlessly."[42] Unceasingly renewed by the resolute engagement of sustained effort, however, realization continually enhances the aspirations and inspires the practices which perpetuate it.

The presencing of being-time itself is thus possible because of the selfless here-and-now activity which realizes itself as primordial time. No aspect or realm of temporal existence is independent of the individual's exertive effort to cast off body and mind. The being-time of every single thing in 'this' world and in 'that' world -- the right and left domains of the heavenly universe and the multitudes

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[42] SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 135 (Terada vol. I, p. 36).

on land and water -- are all in all the spontaneous manifestation and the passage of one's own particular utmost yet purposeless exertion. "You should realize that without the passage of my utmost exertion at this very moment, there would be neither the manifestation of one single dharma or one single phenomenon."[43] Dōgen is not making a solipsistic claim, however, because he declares in "Gyōji" that it is the sustained exertion of all beings at all times "which is neither self-imposed nor imposed by others, but without condition or defilement" that makes possible, sustains and upholds the entire universe. Exertion is the ceaseless, all-encompassing and all-pervasive reverberating power which is the basis for the perpetuation of the Way (gyōji-dōkan). There is a perfectly complete and harmoniously interpenetrating equilibrium brought forth without end by the activity generated by myself and all other phenomena in the universe. "The merit of this sustained exertion upholds my-self and upholds others. The truth is that manifold beings circulating in heaven and on earth throughout the ten directions [of the universe] all in all partake of the merit of my sustained exertion. Others may not know of it, and even I may not realize it, but it is the case. Because of this, my spontaneous realization of sustained exertion and mastery of the Great Way is made

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[43]SBGZ "Uji" 299 (Terada vol. I, pp. 259-260).

possible by the sustained exertion of all Buddhas and all patriarchs. All the Buddhas' spontaneous realizations of sustained exertion and mastery of the Great Way are made possible by my sustained exertion."[44]

According to Dōgen's interpretation of the Buddhist Dharma, gyōji[45] is more fundamental than dependent origination. "It should be examined and understood thoroughly that dependent origination is gyōji, but gyōji is not dependent origination."[46] Existential activity (selfless and purposeless yet utmost and sustained) itself is the ontological basis of the temporal existences of all universes. Ultimately, time appears only through the total activity in the totalistic (impermanent/insubstantial) present. All beings as all times emerge spontaneously and continuously by means of their exertive power. Without such selfless activity, there is neither time nor world. The full convergence of the existential activity of self and others as the ontological ground for the perpetuation of the Way

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[44]SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 165).

[45]Gyōji is a Zen term for zazen practice which Dōgen explores for its deeper philosophical significance -- gyō means activity, movement, exertive effort; ji means to hold, maintain or sustain unrelentingly. Thus, gyōji signifies the dynamism and universality of temporal reality, grounded in the existential imperative for selfless activity; or, the totalistic moment ceaselessly renewed.

[46]SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 166).

occurs at this very present moment. The totalistic moment embraces and realizes, and is sustained and upheld by fully involved exertive effort. "The exertion that brings the exertion of others into realization is precisely our exertion right here-and-now. The right-now of exertion is not innately or inherently within us; the right-now of exertion does not come and go, arriving and departing. The Way which is called 'now' does not precede exertion; 'now' is itself the immediate and complete realization of exertion (gyōji-genjō)."[47] All three tenses, life and death, all beings and all Buddhas, self and world, particular effort and entire existence, practice and attainment, living and understanding, Dōgen's insight and experience and the universal meaning of his expressions, the True Man of no-self and the full temporal context of his surroundings all in all living through one another are the spontaneous here-and-now realization of the kōan (genjō-kōan) reverberating throughout the simultaneous and totalistic manifestations of the present occasion of being-time.

## Critical Examination

Heidegger and Dōgen both illustrate the profound and intimate connection between an overcoming of the

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[47]SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 165).

deficient average view that time can be lost since it is believed to be endlessly slipping away, and the formulation of genuine ontological understanding of the unified dimensions of primordial time. Because it is in everyday decisions that the ontologically problematic bifurcations and misconceptions of derivative time emerge and persist through fixations with substantiality and actuality, inauthenticity must be challenged and reoriented by means of a courageous acceptance and creative affirmation of radical contingency. As existence is authentically reclaimed, ontology can be appropriately reinterpreted and refashioned. The overcoming of derivative time and substance ontology is largely determined and reflected by the extent of the unity established by each thinker in the analysis of the three tenses, self and other, time and beings as well as in terms of the convergence of the existential and ontological dimensions themselves. The aim of the disclosure of primordial time is not, however, to reduce existence to a monolithic or monistic uniformity, but to uncover the flexible and multidimensional yet integral framework which makes possible and is fulfilled by the diversified factors of existence.

Heidegger's philosophy seems to be haunted by a variety of ontological gaps or separations that fall short of a fully unified and non-substantive disclosure of primordial time. These subtle bifurcations appear in several aspects and dimensions of his analysis throughout the phases

of his thinking, such that he himself is not sure if he is able to eliminate the rifts within the context of hermeneutic circularity. The existentialist approach of Sein und Zeit is grounded in the analysis of Dasein without penetrating the temporal nature of beings, and it thereby leaves unresolved the leading question of Being itself. The naturalistic orientation in some of Heidegger's later writings, however, highlights the temporality of Being as such with a reduction in the significance of the existential dimension of time. In order for Heidegger to compensate for a drawback in one approach, another hermeneutic difficulty emerges or is created.

On the one hand, Heidegger's accomplishment is to disclose the unity of ecstatic temporality and therefore the deep, underlying interrelatedness between Being and time in terms of an analysis of the totality of Dasein as Being-in-the-world thrown-projection, prior to the traditional bifurcations of subject/object, theory/non-theory, understanding/state-of-mind. Heidegger's hermeneutic circle interprets ontology itself as an enterprise inseparable from the existenziell concern or ontical priority of Dasein, which is in every case uniquely "mine." Yet the hermeneutic framework of fundamental ontology also presupposes distinctions between existenzial analysis, interpretation or disclosure and Dasein's existenziell concrete choices, which are themselves divided into inauthentic and authentic

possibilities, the latter further distinguished in terms of the aspects of projective anticipation and factical resolve. On the basis of these separations, Heidegger concludes that the unity of ecstatic temporality is subtly divided by the priority of future and past over the present.

Heidegger II seeks to disclose the mutually appropriative event of belonging-together which primordially links the temporal dimensions in the selfsameness of nearness. But the approach undertaken in the later writings also accentuates the futural orientation of temporality by counselling man to await through poetic thanksgiving to receive the redemptive call to an anticipated and long-sought homecoming with the neighborhood of Being. In his fundamental ontology, Heidegger attempts an analysis of Dasein's way to be that is executed for the sake of ontological disclosure, and he intends to ultimately leave existential concerns behind as a stepping stone -- no longer philosophically significant -- in the pathway of thought. As Heidegger II further reduces the importance of the existential dimension for the unveiling of Being, Heidegger expresses a sense of increasing perplexity or inconclusiveness concerning the overriding ontological matter: "It looks as if thinking were continually being led, or driven like a fool, as though in a magic circle around the Sameness without ever being able to approach this Sameness. But

perhaps the circle is a hidden spiral."[48]

The central thrust of Dōgen's approach is to remove any separations between past, present and future and between ontology and existence as problematical deficiencies which distort a genuine understanding and experience of the totalistic and insubstantial passage of being-time. From Dōgen's standpoint, Heidegger's conception of ecstatic temporality aggravates rather than overcomes the existential and ontological dilemmas inherent in the conventional view of time. In contrast to the futurally-based philosophy of Heidegger, Dōgen stresses the harmonious simultaneity of the three tenses. As opposed to Heidegger's notion of *Ereignis* as a mirror-play generated by virtue of the "nearness" of the configuration of participating elements, Dōgen's notion of *gyōji-dōkan* accentuates and stimulates the existential imperative for each individual to act without restraint right here-and-now. The Way which encompasses all temporal possibilities, according to Dōgen, is a harmonious network of interpenetrating relationships and non-substantive situations and perspectives, and it is perpetuated only by means of utmost or exhaustive exertion at this very moment and throughout the simultaneous realization of past, present and future. The foremost existential

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[48]Martin Heidegger, *Zur Seinsfrage*, trans. *The Question of Being* by William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde (New Haven: College and University Press, New Haven, 1958), p. 81.

injunctive for Dōgen is activity itself -- not in order to accomplish a specific end or for any particular motive -- but dynamic movement fully integrated with the totality of existence in, of and through its own exertive power, non-obstructively enhancing, reflecting and reverberating through all other beings at all times each and every moment.

Heidegger seems to suggest that the proper time for the presencing of Being is for the most part withheld from man due to the inherently limiting condition of finitude which pervades existence. The notion of the withholding of the "right time" is depicted existentially in _Sein und Zeit_ in terms of Dasein's anticipation of the imminent possibility of its end, and ontologically in Heidegger II through the notion of the epochal self-concealment of Being. Heidegger does point in _Sein und Zeit_ to the authentic moment of vision realized by a resolution which takes action in a concrete Situation. "Resoluteness does not first take cognizance of a Situation and put that Situation before itself," he writes. "It has put itself into that Situation already. As resolute, Dasein is already _taking action_ . . . 'activity' will also embrace the passivity of resistance."[49] But such an emphasis on the actualization of the possibility for authenticity in the situational context of the present moment is not further explored by

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[49]SZ 300 (BT 347).

Heidegger.

Dōgen stresses that there is absolutely no time which is not manifestly the "right time" for sustained exertion here-and-now. Since time has in every case already completely arrived without pause, lack or interruption, each and every moment must be affirmed and enacted through strenuous yet purposeless effort. No time is concealed, or to be anticipated, lost or only partially disclosed, obscured or forgotten. "Sometimes," Dōgen writes in "Gyōji," "these merits of [sustained exertion] do not appear and are neither seen nor heard nor perceived. Even without appearing, they are not concealed and must be realized, because they are not diffused or defiled whether they appear or disappear, are manifest or withheld."[50] The proper time is not withheld so long as one does not refrain from dedicated and sustained exertion. Furthermore, no being is excluded from active immersion in the totality of self-less exertion that makes possible full diversity, multiplicity and individuality in all the ten directions (<u>jippō</u>) of the universe: "The entire universe is myself as-it-is, myself as myself, yourself as myself, myself as your-self. Myself-is-yourself, yourself-is-myself and the entire universe form one unity."[51]

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[50]SBGZ "Gyōji" (Terada vol. I, p. 165).

[51]SBGZ "Jippō" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. I, p. 105 (Terada vol. I, p. 143).

The central existential difference between Heidegger and Dōgen is that Dōgen insists that man of non-self realization must not await, expect or anticipate the arrival of the presencing of time because he penetrates insubstantiality here-and-now. For example, Dōgen reorients the Zen notion of juki, generally understood as "prediction of the attainment of Buddhahood" to fully eliminate any notion of futural arrival. Juki, he maintains, is "invariably in our present life." "We may use past, future, and present to describe the destruction, potentiality, or fluidity of things but we must be awakened to the past, future, and present which have not yet arrived,"[52] and are manifest as the totalistic dwelling place of being-time. Anticipation, for Dōgen, is neither more nor less authentic than expectation. Both anticipation and expectation represent an unenlightened hesitation or self-centered deliberation concerning the right-now of being-time which reflects a longing for the fabricated and unattainable "ruby palace," and must be spontaneously and completely cast off. Dōgen also stresses that the time of history is not a determining factor for existential awakening. Whether or not the historical epoch is suitable, the proper occasion is in every case here-and-now so long as there

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[52]SBGZ "Juki" trans. Nishiyama/Stevens, vol. I, p. 79 (Terada vol. I, p. 273).

is utmost sustained exertive power. The time for realization is not a futural advency; nor must any moment of time be allowed to pass by fruitlessly. There should be no holding back from spontaneously manifesting the Buddha-nature in all activities of the True Man of no-self at this very moment.

The difference in ontology between the two thinkers is apparent in Dōgen's emphasis that time itself does not occur without thorough existential involvement and active immersion each moment. Time must not be conceived or represented in any subtle sense as a landscape or setting divorced from action, or as a process severed from experiential affairs in each situational context. No element of spectatorship is permissible. Dōgen maintains that man must not wait for time because uji itself does not wait. The moment is neither automatic nor acquirable but spontaneously manifest anew with each occasion of the totalistic harmony of doing and being, living and understanding. "Need I add," he writes in "Bendōwa," "those who think mundane affairs hinder the Buddha Dharma know only that there is no Buddha Dharma in daily life; they do not yet know there are no 'mundane affairs' in the Buddha Dharma."[53] All activities -- even the seemingly mundane -- are extraordinarily unique occasions to realize the Way of being-time.

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[53] SBGZ "Bendōwa" (W/A) 149 (Terada vol. I, p. 25).

Thus, Dōgen's doctrines of being-time and total dynamism (zenki) can be said to at once encompass and surpass the Heideggerian notions of ecstatic temporality and the event of belonging-together, of resoluteness and releasement. Dōgen fully integrates the existential and ontological dimensions of being-time radically oriented in terms of the preeminence of present activity. Heidegger's shifting from one hermeneutic approach to the other without a satisfactory conclusion highlights his need for a new foundation to guide the aims and scope of his thinking.

On the basis of Dōgen's view of the non-differentiation of ontology and existence, the truth of Buddha-nature and the appearance of all beings, he seems to be more successful than Heidegger in overcoming substance fixations in terms of the here-and-now manifestation (genjō) encompassing the simultaneity of past, present and future. Although it may appear that Heidegger emphasizes the future (anticipation of advency) and past (historicality) and that Dōgen emphasizes the present, Dōgen's dual notions of nikon and kyōryaku indicate that Dōgen by no means overlooks past and future but fully integrates them in the dynamic and insubstantial unity of the moment, so that there is no priority of one dimension over and above the others. The primordial standpoint, for Dōgen, is the flexibility and multi-directionality of their ultimate identity, which discovers and captures the meaning of each. Dōgen writes

that "there is passage (kyōryaku) from tomorrow to tomorrow." Thus, the future may have priority at any given occasion, but this is not absolute and should be seen as a shifting perspective within the holistic, self-generating and self-renewing moment of being-time. Heidegger's view of futural temporality seems to be more in line with the common-sense view, and this highlights the point that Heidegger may be caught between depicting phenomenologically and overcoming ontologically the conventional conception of time, between uncovering an awareness of the Western tradition's presuppositions and limitations and surpassing them. Heidegger's modification of the linear, sequential view he seeks to refute is not fully successful in overcoming substance ontology.

The other points mentioned in the introductory section of the chapter -- non-reductionism and non-homocentrism -- can be illustrated in terms of the following passage from "Uji":

> The mountain is time; the sea is time as well. If they were not time, there would be no mountain or sea. You must not think that there is no time right-now of the mountain and sea. If time should deteriorate, the mountain and sea will deteriorate as well; and if time does not deteriorate, neither will the mountain or sea. For this reason, the bright star appears, the Tathāgata appears, the [Dharma-]eye appears, the uplifted flower appears.[54]

First, whereas Heidegger tends to either reduce space and

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[54]SBGZ "Uji" 301-302 (Terada vol. I, p. 261).

beings to the temporality of Dasein in Sein und Zeit or to reduce Dasein to the naturalistic presencing of Ereignis in later writings, Dōgen emphasizes the full and unimpeded inseparability between being-time and all spatial manifestations, without accentuating one realm over and above any other. The mountain and sea as well as anyone who stands on or walks in them are nothing other than being-time. They depend on time and are not manifested separable from time; time depends on them and is not manifested separable from them. Second, Dōgen stresses that the sameness-in-difference of all manifestations of space and being-time constitutes the impersonal and insubstantial moment of existential awakening, symbolized by the bright star and uplifted flower. Thus, Dōgen is neither reductionist nor homocentric, but existentialist within the holistic, insubstantial context of being-time.

The distinctions between Heidegger's and Dōgen's views of primordial time as well as the differences between their views and the derivative conceptions they refute is reviewed in the following hierarchical chart. The first three positions are deficient, according to Heidegger and Dōgen, because they presuppose substantiality and overlook contingency:

1. inauthentic time -- the views of the average man who feels subjugated by "time flies" and clings without reflection to the very source of his problem; his

fearfulness of time and death is the hidden basis for substance ontology.

2. clock-time -- a neutral or value-free category in itself, because although derivative, it is not necessarily deficient; useful and even essential for everyday activity, clock-time becomes obstructive if (as is usually the case) it is mistaken for absolute and it obscures primordial time.

3. eternalism -- the varieties of theological, mystical and metaphysical claims of an infinity either removed from contingency through the suspension of time or imminent in the world of endless now-time, ranging from the most naive monotheistic conceptions of a transcendent deity to the most sophisticated (but equally derivative) conceptions of eternity manifested 'in' time (such as Nietzsche's eternal recurrence and the Senika heresy).

The next views represent attempted disclosures of primordial time because they undermine substance-fixations through the disclosure of radical contingency:

4. Heidegger's ecstatic temporality -- based on finitude, it reverses the traditional preoccupation with actuality, but is limited because it separates present from past and future, Dasein from beings, and theory from practice.

5. Dōgen's being-time -- based on impermanence, it seems to be more universal (encompassing all beings at

all times without partiality, limitation or exception), naturalistic (embracing human and phenomenal), holistic (total manifestation at each and every moment), and existential (imperative for selfless exertion without separation of existenziell and existenzial levels).

Thus, the differences which emerge from our examination of Heidegger and Dōgen concerning the unity and insubstantiality of the three tenses and their relation to activity reflect fundamental and critical points of philosophical contention. Heidegger can be criticized, for example, for a reluctance to accentuate total existential involvement in the ontological disclosure of the presencing of time, at least on the grounds that it limits the success of his inquiry. To a large extent, the differences which appear in their respective notions of primordial time can be traced to the method of Heidegger's analysis of derivative time and of finitude. Because, as previously shown, Heidegger associates making-present-at-hand with falling, and because he connects finitude with the inherent non-power of existence or the prior incapacity of man to attain truth, he is led to two points of ambivalence. First, he is unwilling to propose existential awakening as a "genjō-oriented" (here-and-now manifestation of all tenses at the present moment) realization rather than as a futural possibility. Secondly, he is unable to formulate an ontology which genuinely encompasses the temporal unity and activity

of human existence and other beings. On the one hand, Heidegger seems to indirectly suggest a negative evaluation of human existence as falling for the most part into inauthenticity because of its necessary concern with beings. Yet, by resisting a definite injunctive for overcoming everydayness, he does not approach the totalistic and harmonious unity of being-time that is disclosed by Dōgen.

Heidegger's hermeneutic difficulties, however, appear to be more basic than a drawback in the procedure of investigation because the goals, range and accomplishments of his philosophical enterprise remain questionable, even for Heidegger himself. The central problem in Heidegger's approach pertains to the dimension of time which he has tried from the outset to exclude from his thinking -- that is, the soteriological dimension, which necessarily involves personal experience, reflection, commitment and insight in the development and formulation of ontological understanding. If the very starting point of thinking is itself problematic, the conclusions will invariably be limited as well.

To clarify the reasons why differences between Heidegger and Dōgen concerning the soteriological dimension of time are of utmost importance for their understanding of the existential and ontological dimensions, I will briefly reframe how and why each thinker sets for himself the nature and significance of the question of time. Both

Heidegger and Dōgen force the issue of time into the open, considering it afresh after a slumber that has taken time for granted as given and self-evident, and not subject to inquiry. They are eager to render time worthy of asking about in a positive, constructive way. It is important to realize, however, that although the question of time is necessary and essential as an integral part of the primary and overriding concerns which guide their philosophical tasks, the question of time is not in itself to be equated with their main concerns. Heidegger and Dōgen are each propelled by one basic issue that is pursued with single-minded persistence and intensity. But a theory of time is not necessarily a solution to the central issue, even as the issue itself cannot be separated from the question of time.

Heidegger's primary concern is the _Seinsfrage_, and why ontology is increasingly puzzling and problematic despite -- or, rather, because of -- the metaphysical tradition's smug indifference to the paramount question of all thinking. After attempting various non-substantive approaches to Being through a disclosure of temporality, however, Heidegger remains uncertain about the relationships between Being and time, time and man, man and beings; the long-sought primordial unity underlying these elements is still elusive. The notion in his later writings that they "belong-together" is not necessarily more fruitful as a

disclosure of the dynamic integralness of time than the _existenzial_ analysis of ecstatic temporality. In each of Heidegger's approaches, there are dimensions and perspectives which are left unsettled and are continually troubling to him.

Dōgen's concern is why the gap between original and acquired Buddhahood had been fabricated and perpetuated in Buddhist theories and practices because the ontological understanding of Buddha-nature was considered self-evident, although it did not satisfactorily account for Dōgen's personal experience of impermanence. He concludes that the temporal nature of _busshō_ is not an issue which can be isolated or abstracted from personal insight into and realization of the truth of being-time. Attainment of Buddhahood is obstructed by an inauthentic and inadequate understanding of time, which can in turn only be clarified and corrected through spontaneous and renewable dedication and discipline in pursuit of the Way of non-self.

The significance of the question of time for Heidegger's thought is the role time plays as the "first name" of Being. Any personal involvement or interest in this matter is bracketed until the disclosure of _Sein_ is accomplished. Heidegger seems to claim that only by solving the _Seinsfrage_ first of all will an appropriate basis have been established for personal realization of authenticity. Despite Heidegger's attempted avoidance of the issue of

personal involvement in the question of Being and time, however, soteriological implications do not disappear but continually emerge as unacknowledged tendencies or unclarified tangential elements which obstruct and perhaps prohibit a resolution of the Seinsfrage. The question remains whether any separation between ontology and personal experience is, indeed, possible or even reasonable in terms of Heidegger's hermeneutic method and philosophical aims. Such a separation seems to violate the unity of Seinsverständnis and mineness, of man's way to be and the potentiality for illumination, which is the very ground and framework of his thought.

From Heidegger's own interpretive standpoint, soteriology cannot and should not be added on after or in addition to ontology, nor subtracted from it beforehand. Otherwise, personal experience would stand in an ontical or vorhanden relation to Being, which thereby becomes objectified -- and that is precisely the position of substantiality Heidegger struggles to overcome. For example, Heidegger does note in Humanismusbrief that there must be a unity of ontology and human experience which neither negates nor transcends either dimension, but also does not merely attach one to the other. "The thinking that inquires into the truth of Being and so defines man's essential abode from Being and toward Being is neither ethics nor ontology. Thus the question about the relation of each to the other no

longer has any basis in this sphere."[55] Yet, he does not use that insight as an occasion to articulate the primordially temporal basis of an existentialist ethics in its inseparability from ontology, but rather to further avoid or delay that very matter until Being has been disclosed.

Heidegger bases ontology on the existenziell way to be of Dasein, which is always already intimately involved as its ownmost concern in the question which is ultimately at stake. But, by presupposing that man cannot help but be inauthentic by virtue of existenzial finitude and falling, Heidegger inherently limits the possibility for a fully non-substantive disclosure of temporality. Furthermore, the sense of urgency that he seeks to instill in his inquiry is dissipated without a personal commitment and a sense of wholehearted conviction in and pursuit of resolving the matter. Instead, the quasi-mystical approach of Heidegger II's "purposeless play" tends to reenforce rather than radically reorient theology; and the ambivalent existentialism of Sein und Zeit is perhaps less challenging to traditional Western metaphysics than Kierkegaard's uncompromising imperative for the subjective realization of truth through the inwardness and passion of self-reflection and self-discovery which demands a transformation of the entire person. Heidegger does not adequately disclose either the

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[55] Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 236.

existential or ontological dimension precisely because the soteriological concern has been excluded from his thinking. As Heidegger has criticized Kant, Nietzsche and other thinkers, by his holding back from a full disclosure of the primordial temporal unities he seeks to uncover, Heidegger reveals the poverty and entanglements as well as his own bondage to the very tradition of substance ontology he attempts to overcome. He is not free of the basic separations of theory and practice, philosophy and existential experience, which betray the presuppositions of onto-theology, even though he sees that he must penetrate beyond them to achieve a breakthrough from the notion of substantiality.

Dōgen presupposes that man is always already involved in exertion at all times and at this very moment. The attempt to avoid exertion is a sham both philosophically and personally -- it is an "impossible and unrighteous evasion" which is ontologically misleading and existentially self-deceptive in that it reveals a clinging to self, and therefore it is soteriologically obstructive and unedifying. Personal involvement in and realization of the true nature of being-time can never be bracketed or withheld in any subtle way. It is impossible to stand by as a spectator of time because the innate and unceasing dynamism, impermanence and insubstantiality of temporal reality does not permit, but rather continuously betrays such an evasion.

Dōgen stresses that man cannot hold still personally until the ontological issue is solved in that reality itself is nothing other than our active immersion temporally interpenetrating all beings each and every and any occasion of *uji*. To attempt to stand back from full personal involvement in the matter of casting off body and mind by realizing the true nature of time is itself a self-destructive and debilitating inauthentic response to the passage of being-time.

For example, because each and every dwelling-place of being-time -- at once possessed of and yet cut off from before and after -- encompasses and is liberated from all possibilities of moral causation (*karma*), Dōgen does not withdraw from or hesitate in affirming a thoroughgoing ethical commitment on the part of the True Man. Rather, in contrast to Heidegger, he insists that the moment-to-moment presencing of being-time offers innumerable and inexhaustible occasions by which the enlightened person must continually and diligently attempt to "refrain from all evil" (*shoaku-makusa*) as the natural and spontaneous outflow of his utmost selfless exertion. "Where evil is already not produced," he writes, "the exertive power of practice is at once spontaneously realized. This spontaneous realization is measured through its manifestations in the whole earth, the entire world, every moment, and all *dharmas*. This measure is nothing other than the measure

of refraining [from all evil]."[56] The fulfillment of the moral imperative is inseparably related to the realization and expression of being-time as the manifestation of muga. The totalistic moment of spontaneous compassion and renewed ethical discipline is itself the overcoming of self-fixation in the dynamic dwelling-place of uji.

The religious question for Dōgen is not undertaken for the sake of ontological disclosure; nor does ontological clarification necessarily lead to personal realization. Dōgen neither reduces the dimensions of time into a sheer (derivative) identity nor elevates the priority of one dimension over and above the others. Nor does Dōgen expect, in a way which would violate the true nature of being-time, for one dimension to appear first or last, before or after any other one. "The very moment one begins to seek the Dharma [away from himself], he becomes far removed from its environs. When the Dharma has been rightly transmitted to one, he is at once the Person of his original part."[57] Theory must spring from and be in perfect accord with authentic practice, just as realization is enhanced and renewed by personal effort. Theory is not a mere consequence of practice, but neither can it be isolated from practice. Theory and practice are only fulfilled by means

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[56] SBGZ "Shoakumakusa" (Terada vol. I, p. 357).

[57] SBGZ "Genjōkōan" (W/A) 135 (Terada vol. I, p. 36).

of complete realization of their inseparability. Dōgen points directly to the three-fold and ultimately unified interpenetration of the existential authenticity of renewed selfless practice, the soteriological deliverance of nirvāṇic awakening, and the ontological penetration of the truth of uji by the True Man of shinjin-datsuraku whose creative activities and expressions of self-forgetfulness are at once grounded in, realized through and sustaining the harmonious simultaneity and insubstantiality of the totalistic passage (kyōryaku) of being-time.

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# APPENDIX

## A Translation of Dōgen's "Uji" (Being-Time)

## A Translation of Dōgen's "Uji" (Being-Time)

### Introductory Comments

"Uji" is one of the central chapters of Dōgen's monumental philosophical work, the Shōbōgenzō, and it is crucial to an understanding of the philosophy of time which is the centerpiece of his thought, practice and unique interpretation and appropriation of the Buddhist Dharma. In this fascicle, Dōgen introduces several key notions, such as uji (being-time), jiji (time's occurrence at each, every and any moment), and kyōryaku (passage, encompassing the simultaneity of past, present, future), which do not appear in other chapters of the work. He also discusses terms such as nikon or shikin (right-now) and jū-hōi (dharma's dwelling-place) which are treated rather more extensively elsewhere. This does not, however, suggest a discontinuity between "Uji" and the rest of the Shōbōgenzō. To the contrary, the notions dealt with here are fully compatible with other doctrines concerning time, particularly mujō (impermanence), mujō-busshō (impermanence-Buddha-nature), zenki (total dynamic activity), kikan (dynamic engagement), genjōkōan (immediate and complete realization

of Zen kōan), gyōji (sustained exertion), and gyōbutsu (active Buddha). All these ideas must be understood in their interrelatedness in order to comprehend Dōgen's philosophy of Zen as a whole. Therefore, although uji is not mentioned in other chapters, it can well be considered one of the foremost of the doctrines he formulates to creatively "express the Way" (dōtoku). And although this chapter does not refer specifically to mujō, Dōgen's understanding and experience of impermanence is inseparable from his explication of the meaning (dōri) of uji.

The aim of this fascicle is to expose and overcome fundamental existential deceptions and ontological misconceptions concerning time that arise in the views of the average man (bombu), and lead to deficient interpretations of the process of enlightenment and the attainment of Buddhahood. Because the average man mistakes the unity and total dynamism of being-time presencing each and every occasion for a mere sequential time-unit "flying by," enlightenment is seen as a matter of linear development toward some futural goal. For Dōgen, each and every totalistic moment of being-time encompassing past, present and future, life and death, all Buddhas and all beings, is the essential experience of self, triple world and Buddha-nature which must be penetrated and realized here-and-now as the basic aim of Buddhist theory and practice. Any view which proposes enlightenment as a supratemporal realm beyond the incessant

vicissitudes of momentary existence, is to be considered the position of heresy (gedō).

The importance of "Uji" is attested by the appearance of no less than five published translations, as cited below. Yet, there seems to be a need for a translation which is direct and literal as well as alive to the philosophical complexity and profundity and the expressional richness and ambiguity of the work. Several of the available published translations (Nishiyama/Stevens, Masunaga, Kennett, and Kapleau) are limited in that they are not scholarly and do not claim to be; they seek mainly to make Dōgen accessible to the general English reader rather than to the specialist. But in opting for the priority of "readability" in their renderings, these four translations tend to do a disservice to both Dōgen and the reader by implying that Dōgen is too obtuse to be understood in the original context. It seems, however, that Dōgen is best represented in English if there is an attempt to capture the ideological and linguistic nuances and subtleties, or at least to let them stand rather than to cover them up for the sake of easy reading, while also recognizing the impossibility of doing full justice to Dōgen's uniquely profound expressions.

One difficulty with these four translations, particularly the Nishiyama/Stevens version, is the tendency to follow the content and style of Japanese gendaigoyaku

(translations in modern Japanese) which accompany the original text in some Japanese editions of the Shōbōgenzō, such as Nakamura and Masutani (cited below). (See Thomas Kasulis, "The Zen philosopher: A review article on Dōgen scholarship in English," Philosophy East and West, vol. 28, no. 3 (July, 1978), pp. 353-373). But the gendaigoyaku are more like a combination of translation-commentary-interpretation than an attempted faithful translation because they are generally not meant to appear independently of the original text. The Japanese reader who chooses to follow the gendaigoyaku can always conveniently check the original on the same page, whereas the English reader of the translation based on this procedure has no access to the original and must suffer unacknowledged deletions and paraphrases.

Norman Waddell's recent translation in The Eastern Buddhist (which appeared after the completion of this translation) does adhere, like all the other ones in that series of Dōgen translations, to the highest scholarly standards. But Waddell tends to read a philosophical interpretation into the translation. For example, he renders uji in the opening stanza as "for the time being" rather than the literal "sometimes" followed by a footnote to explain Dōgen's linguistic "twist" or pun. He also translates kyōryaku as "passage seriatim" which may imply a serial or sequential concept of continuity that is explicitly refuted by the text.

I am greatly indebted to two unpublished translations of "Uji," one by Charles W. Fu (Temple University) and the other by Thomas Kasulis (University of Hawaii), which I reviewed in working out this translation. Their efforts do painstakingly attempt to recapture the meaning of each word of the original text with great philosophical and linguistic sophistication. Dōgen's writing allows for -- or even demands -- various possible renderings in English, and I take full responsibility for the following one I have attempted.

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Charles W. Fu, Department of Religion, Temple University.

Thomas Kasulis, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii.

Translation of "Uji" (Being-Time)

An ancient Buddha's words[1]:

> Sometimes (*uji*)[2] standing so high up on the mountain top;
> Sometimes walking deep down on the bottom of the sea;
> Sometimes a three-headed eight-armed [demon or *Acala*];
> Sometimes a sixteen- or eight-foot [Buddha];
> Sometimes a Zen master's staff or *hossu*;[3]
> Sometimes a round pillar or stone lantern;
> Sometimes this man or that fellow;
> Sometimes the great earth or the empty sky.

The so-called "sometimes" (*uji*) means: time (*ji*) itself already is none other than being(s) (*u*); being(s) (*u*)

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[1]"An ancient Buddha . . ." refers to Zen Master Yüeh-shan Wêi-yen (751-834).

[2]*Uji*, the central notion discussed in this chapter, has two meanings, according to Dōgen. In everyday or conventional discourse, it means "sometimes" or "at a certain time" in the sense that, at a certain time-point, something takes place. This implies that time is a realm separable from existence 'in which' events transpire that are conceived as mutually exclusive oppositions -- "sometimes" it is either a demon *or* a Buddha, enlightened or unenlightened, fitting and appropriate or unmanageable and out of season. In the opening sentence of the paragraph below, Dōgen points to the second or primordial meaning of *uji* disclosed through a profound philosophical pun or creative linguistic "twist," by showing that all beings (*u*) are originally time (*ji*) and time is already beings. Beings are invariably and without exception temporal occurrences. Being and time are absolutely inseparable, constituting two-fold aspects of the selfsame reality, which is not conceived as a monistic identity, but represents the fundamental experience that generates the full manifold of differentiation. Spring, for example, does not merely take place at a certain time, but all the various expressions of spring -- the colors, fragrances, ambience and vistas -- are the immediate manifestations of the being-time of spring.

[3]The staff or *hossu* is used by Zen masters to train, discipline, and stimulate their disciples during meditation.

are all none other than time (ji). The sixteen-foot golden body itself is time, and just because it is time there is the luminous glow of the radiance (kōmyō)[4] of time, and you must study the matter right within this twenty-four hours.[5] The three-headed eight-armed [demon] itself is time and just because it is time it must be the same as the time right within this twenty-four hours. Although the time span for each day is generally not actually measured out, it is said to be twenty-four hours. Because of the clear tracks left by the going and coming [of time], people do not doubt the duration of daily time. but even though they do not doubt it, this does not mean that they know what it really is. Whenever people for the most part doubt

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[4]Kōmyō, generally used in Buddhism to describe the distinctive features of an illuminative Buddha, and sometimes used synonymously with the Pure Land of Amitābha, is for Dōgen fully integrated and harmonious with the ever-varying manifestations of being-time. In SBGZ "Kōmyō" he writes that kōmyō is not beyond or the ground of existence, but it radiates through each and every element and dimension of shohō-jissō (true form of all dharmas).

[5]Uji in its primordial meaning is inseparable from daily time and is found nowhere else than right within this very twenty-four hours. In SBGZ "Busshō" Dōgen writes: "Because not depending on a single thing is within the twenty-four hours, it is the Buddha-nature clearly seeing. As for these twenty-four hours, when will not be the time of their arrival?" (trans. Abe Masao and Norman Waddell, The Eastern Buddhist, part 3, vol. 9, no. 2, Oct. 1976, p. 78). Yet, to merely measure the day into twenty-four identical recurring sequences and to equate this with uji -- the standpoint of the average man -- is to perpetuate a self-deception which misses the true nature of time.

any thing or any event unknown to them, their doubting is so inconsistent that the doubts at the previous moment do not necessarily correspond to the doubts at the present moment. Nevertheless, doubting itself, for the time being, is indeed time.[6]

The configuration of my-self makes up the entire [Dharma-]realm, and you must examine each being and each thing in the entire [Dharma-]realm as time's occurrence at each, every and any moment (jiji). The mutual non-obstruction of things and things is the same as the mutual non-obstruction amongst all times.[7] Therefore, the arousing

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[6]Linear, sequential time seems to be self-evident, beyond doubt, and free from the need for inquiry that it is generally not questioned. The lack of doubt indicates not a genuine understanding, but that the conventional view of time is increasingly problematic and removed from insight into the primordial significance of uji. Underlying the false sense of certainty, however, lurks the suspicion that the true nature of time is unknown or misrepresented. The very act of doubting, though frequently subliminal, is a manifestation of uji. The inconsistencies of doubting reveal that doubt itself, and even an apparent lack of doubt (or false certainty) is invariably shaped and fashioned by and inseparable from time.

[7]This passage shows both the profound influence of Kegon (Hua-yen) philosophy on Dōgen's thinking and his unique existentially-oriented appropriation of it. As a Sōtō (Ts'ao-Tung) master, Dōgen relies heavily on Kegonian ontology of totality and non-obstruction, but he uses it to express his own experience and understanding of Buddhist Dharma. According to the Kegon school, suchness is the mutually reciprocal and harmoniously interpenetrating non-obstruction of all phenomena (jiji-muge) manifested in the simultaneity of 10 periods of time. Dōgen stresses below, however, that the totality of phenomena unfolds without hindrance, not on its own as a mere abstract process, but by virtue of the exertive projection of the

of aspiration [in different] minds at the selfsame time is the arousing [at different] times of the selfsame mind.[8] It is just the same with practice and attainment of the [Buddhist] Way. [Projecting] the configuration of my-self is to behold this. The truth of my-self's being time is just like this.

You must realize that it is by this very reason[9] that there are all the phenomena and all the many grasses in the whole world as well as each particular blade of grass and each particular phenomenon in its own place in the whole world. To survey the matter in this way is the initiation of practice. When you reach such a standpoint, each particular blade of grass and each particular

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configuration of my-self which mirrors and contains the entire Dharma-realm.

[8]A fascinating sentence which illustrates Dōgen's profoundly rich literary style: kono yoheni dōji ho(tsu)shin ari, dōshin hotsuji ari. By reversing the order of the two characters, ji (time) and shin (mind) in the two clauses, Dōgen offers a concrete expressional illustration of the meaning of interpenetration. Times and minds are both the selfsame in that the awakening of spiritual intentions or authentic resolve in one mind at one time awakens all minds at all times, and different in that each and every mind is a unique occurrence of uji at any moment.

[9]". . . this very reason . ." (inmo no dōri). Inmo can imply suchness (Skt., tathatā), but it is generally used in this chapter more modestly in the sene of "just as," "such as," or "this very" -- in the same way that tathā can be so used in Sanskrit. Yet, the deeper implication may be kept in mind; it is explored more fully in SBGZ "Inmo," in which Dōgen says that to know inmo one must become a "man of inmo" (inmo no hito)."

phenomenon is seen as it is. There may or may not be an understanding of phenomena or of grass. [But] it is by virtue of this very time that being-time [appears at] all times and being-a-grass and being-a-phenomenon alike are time. All beings of the entire [Dharma-]realm are time's occurrence at each, every and any moment. You should seriously consider whether or not any being in the entire [Dharma-]realm lies outside this moment of time.[10]

When, however, the average man (bombu)[11] unlearned in the Buddhist teaching hears the word "uji," it becomes an occasion for all sorts of conjectures that "sometimes" (arutoki) [it is] a three-headed eight-armed [demon] and "sometimes" [it is] a sixteen- or eight-foot [Buddha].[12] This can be likened by metaphor to crossing a river and climbing a mountain. Although the mountain and river are indeed here right-now, I seem to think that I have left them

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[10]Dōgen stresses that the primordial significance of uji is in accord with experience, in which no being or any time can be isolated, separated or abstracted from this very occasion of being-time.

[11]The term bombu refers to the unreflective, existentially self-deceptive and ontologically misconceived standpoint of average worldlings who obstinately and continuously perpetuate and reenforce their misunderstandings by clinging to partial and one-sided perspectives.

[12]In this case, Dōgen uses the kana form "arutoki" for "sometimes," perhaps to stress that the term here represents the conventional view of a fixed time-point, rather than the primordial significance of uji which seems to be unknown to the bombu.

far behind and I act as if I occupy a palace made of rubies, thereby believing that there is a separation between myself and the mountain and river [as great] as that between heaven and earth.[13]

But the truth is not only this. When I climbed the mountain and crossed the river I existed, so in myself there must be time. I already am, and time cannot be said to slip away.[14] If time is not the form (<u>sō</u>, Skt. <u>lakṣaṇa</u>)

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[13]The example of climbing the mountain is a central passage which illustrates the conventional preoccupation with linear, sequential time. Even while man is fixated on the supposed constancy of now-points, he feels that the points are connected in an irreversible series leading toward an obtainable goal in the future. Obsessed with the fabricated and romanticized future symbolized by the palace made of rubies, which may or may not exist or ever be reached, the past is considered to be left far behind, and the current activity of traversing the path in the present here-and-now is overlooked or discounted. The palace represents man's deficient attempts to escape from the responsibilities for authentic exertion in terms of an idealized and anticipated futural attainment. Dōgen is implicitly critical here (and explicitly in SBGZ "Busshō") of Buddhist doctrines and practices which misrepresent Buddha-nature or enlightenment as an objectified end-point which arrives in the future. The average man's views create existential-ontological gaps or gulfs, which violate the primordial selfsameness of being-time, between self and time, self and world, present and future, and t1 and t2 that seem of enormous and insurmountable proportions.

[14]The misconceptions concerning time are not considered false in the sense that they constitute a logical error or inconsistency that can either be proven or disproven. Rather, they are partial, misguided views arising from one's existential deficiencies and reflecting a lack of ontological understanding. Dōgen's point is that since there is no way of talking about or experiencing oneself apart from time, even the unenlightened one's existence is inherently temporal.

of going and coming, then the time of ascending the mountain is the right-now (nikon or shikin) of being-time. Suppose that time does maintain the form of going and coming, then in myself there is the right-now of being-time; this itself is being-time. Does or does not the very moment of ascending the mountain and crossing the river chew up and spit out the time of the palace made of rubies?[15]

The three-headed eight-armed [demon] is yesterday's time; the sixteen- or eight-foot [Buddha] is today's time. Nevertheless, the truth of yesterday-and-today lies precisely in the moment of setting forth up the mountain to overlook so many different mountain peaks. The three-headed eight-armed [demon] passes around in my being-time (waga uji), not as it may appear over there, but right here-and-now. The sixteen- or eight-foot [Buddha] passes around in my being-time, not as it may appear down yonder, but right here-and-now.[16]

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[15]Dōgen here considers two basic forms of time -- not going and coming, and going and coming. In both cases uji manifests itself right-now, which is altogether experientially more significant and ontologically more primordial than the supposed time of the ruby palace. Nikon, the "eternal now," is able to both encompass ("chew up") and to surpass ("spit out") the conventional misconception of time.

[16]Yesterday and today are not separable time-units, the one gone away and the other having arrived. Rather, both dimensions interpenetrate each other right here-and-now, just as the many different mountain peaks are each unique manifestations but are linked-together in the mountain range.

Likewise, the pine tree is time and so also the bamboo. You must not understand and account for time in terms of its flying ever away; you must not learn "time flies" as the one and only function of time. If time had only this one function of flying by, there would have to be a gap [between t1 and t2].[17] If someone does not heed the way of being-time, it's because he sees it as something merely slipping away. In short, all beings in the entire [Dharma-]realm are linked-together as time's occurrence at each, every and any moment. Because of being-time I am [being-]time.

In being-time there is the distinctive function of [totalistic] passage (kyōryaku);[18] there is passage from

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[17]The conventional, ontologically misleading and existentially inauthentic view that "time flies" is reprehensible if taken as the exclusive understanding of time. It implies a gap, in addition to the ones created by the deficient longing for the ruby palace between self, world and time, within time itself -- between t1 and t2, which are thought to be connected in a series forever passing man by and able to sweep him away should he relinquish his grasp on the supposed constancy of the derivative now-point. Yet, "time flies" is in a profound sense, unknown to the bombu, close to the truth in that the incessant movement of uji is never detained.

[18]Kyōryaku (literally "undergo" or "passing through") is one of the central notions in Dōgen's philosophy of time. Here, Dōgen deals with the continuity of time in a way fundamentally distinct from the conventional view, which holds that fixed time-units are passing, flying or slipping away and flowing in irreversible succession toward some destination. Kyōryaku, on the other hand, refers to the process of a journey actively engaging the passenger and passage-way as well as the full context of their experiential reality. It is multi-dimensional, flexible,

today to tomorrow, passage from today to yesterday, passage from yesterday to today, passage from today to today, and passage from tomorrow to tomorrow. This transpires because passage itself is the distinctive function of time.

Since the times of past and present neither pile up on top of one another nor line up side by side, Ch'ing-yüan is time, Huang-po is time, Ma-tsu and Shih-t'ou are time.[19] Because self and other already are time, practice and realization take place at all times. In the same way, entering into the mud and water is time.[20] The views now held by the average man as well as the conditioned origination (innen, Skt. hetu-pratyaya) of the views by which he tries to account for his existence are by no means the Dharma of the average man; the Dharma for now sets the stage

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dynamic, moving in and through multiple directions simultaneously, projecting man's ontological understanding and enlightened experience of time into past, present and future which are ultimately equalizable yet experientially differentiatable dimensions of being-time. All tenses of time interpenetrate, reverberate through and influence one another.

[19]Because time is not linear, successive time-points do not accumulate. Thus, the lives of previous Zen masters are not counted or added up backwards in terms of chronological sequence, but are to be understood as interpenetrating occasions of the here-and-now transmission of the true passage (kyōryaku) of Dharma encompassing the simultaneity of past, present and future.

[20]". . . entering into the mud and water . . ." is symbolic of the bodhisattva's fulfilling his compassionate vow to abet the soteriological aspirations of all beings totally rooted within the context of being-time.

for the origination of his [karmic] conditions.[21] It is because this very time and this very being are learned as something other than the Dharma that the sixteen-foot golden body is not recognized as myself. But even the evasion of [the truth] that I am the sixteen-foot golden body is a fragment of being-time.[22] The person who has not realized this had better take a look at the matter again and again.[23]

The arrangement of the "horse" [noon] and the "sheep" [2 o'clock] in the world is due to the ascending and descending fluctuations of things such as they are dwelling in their appropriate dharma-positions.[24] The

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[21]This is a complex sentence which seems to suggest that the Dharma is not in the least bound or reduced by the bombu's misconceptions about it; rather, the vastness and inexhaustibility of the Dharma presencing as being-time prevails, and it makes possible the provisional and/or partial standpoints of men, who are unable to fully comprehend Dharma. In the second part of the sentence, dependent origination is used as a verb: innen shite.

[22]Even the evasion of the truth of being-time, like doubting or not knowing enough to doubt the conventional view (ftn. 6), is shaped by and inseparable from uji.

[23]". . . had better take a look at the matter again and again." Literally, kan-kan, "look, look," with the force of a Zen master's injunction to awaken his disciple.

[24]Dharma-position (jū-hōi), another key notion (see SBGZ "Genjōkōan"), suggests the total situational complex of each and every occasion of being-time, encompassing the continuity of kyōryaku and the immediacy of nikon as well as the simultaneity of past, present and future and of life and death. Jū-hōi is characterized by incessantly vigorous activity, always moving around -- thus, it is neither stable and fixed nor chaotic and abrasive.

"mouse" [midnight] is time, the "tiger" [4 o'clock] is time; sentient beings and Buddhas are time as well. At this very moment, the entire [Dharma-]realm is realized in terms of a three-headed eight-armed [demon] or in terms of a sixteen-foot golden body. To fully enlighten the entire [Dharma-]realm is ultimate and complete realization (kyūjin). To fully enlighten the sixteen-foot golden body by means of the sixteen-foot golden body is to spontaneously manifest (genjō) resolve (hosshin), practice (shugyō), bodhi (bodai), and nirvāṇa (nehan); this itself is being, this itself is time. Ultimate and complete realization of all times as all beings is to have no left-over dharma because the left-over dharma is itself a dharma left-over. A [full] being-time half known is a half being-time fully known.[25] Any false step taken is still being[-time]. Moreover, even before and after the misjudgement is shown, still there is found the dwelling-place of being-time. The

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[25]The particular contains the totality and the totality is manifest in-and-through each and every particular. Each fully penetrating experience at every moment of being-time embraces the simultaneity of the 4 stages of awakening -- resolve, practice, bodhi, and nirvāna -- which must not be conceived as sequential segments. Furthermore, nothing is excluded from the totality (which is not a mere collection or random grouping of items) because if a particular is left out of one group, it is still a unique occurrence of uji which embodies and reflects the totality. Thus, half of anything if fully realized is of equal significance as the whole partially realized, because half and whole are terms relative to the totality which is always disclosed in each phenomenon.

incessant vigorous activity of a dharma's dwelling-place itself is being-time. Don't jump to the conclusion that it is non-being, but don't be constrained to assume that it is being. Discerning only the aspect of time that passes away, there is no understanding of the time which has not-yet come.[26] To realize this is time; but time itself is not conditioned by [whether it is realized or not]. Discerning going and coming, it is impossible for a "stubborn fool"[27] to clearly perceive the dwelling-place of being-time, let alone reach the moment of breaking through the barrier [to realization]. Even discerning the dwelling-place [of being-time], who can express how to maintain such [a dwelling place]? Even if there is a person who has been able to express this for a long time, still he is groping in the darkness for his original face. Left up to the being-time of the average man, bodhi and nirvāṇa are only being-time in the form of going and coming.[28]

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[26]". . . the time which has not-yet come" is not flying by or passing away, nor is it simply stationary; it is the right here-and-now of jū-hōi acting vigorously through itself.

[27]"Stubborn fool" is literally leather sack or wine-skin, and it is used in Zen as a deprecatory term for some-one who is too obstinate to ever seek or realize the Way. The term is stronger than bombu because it expresses a negative value judgement.

[28]Dōgen traces here a step-by-step progression to show the limitations of human language and expressions in attempting to convey the full meaning of uji. The "stub-born fool" certainly cannot express the truth of

Freedom from all entanglements is the spontaneous here-and-now manifestation of being-time (uji genjō).[29] The heavenly kings and their heavenly court appearing in the right realm and the left realm are at this moment the being-time of my utmost exertion (jinriki).[30] The being-time of the multitudes outside [that universe] on land and in the water is the spontaneous manifestation of my utmost exertion. The being-time of every single thing in

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being-time. Those who have a clear perception, and even those whose insight is maintained for a long time, are still groping in their human ways to divulge the trans-ultimate standpoint. The danger always lurks that inadequate understanding and expression will reduce bodhi and nirvāna to the mere aspect of going and coming, which is the only form of time the average man sees.

[29]This sentence is literally, "The net and the cage are useless in trying to snare the spontaneous here-and-now manifestations of being-time."

[30]All possible realms, both the heavenly and the worldly, both in this universe and in any other one, both in "this" life and the "next" life are dependent upon the genjō (spontaneous here-and-now manifestations) and kyōryaku (totalistic passage) of one's own utmost exertion, exhaustive power, or sustained effort (jinriki), which implies not only zazen and other Buddhist practices, but every aspect of human activity which is itself an occurrence of being-time. Here, Dōgen stresses again the existential dimension in interpreting the Kegonian doctrine of totality. Being-time, indeed incessantly dynamic, is not an abstract realm, but only completed through each being's dedicated yet ultimately purposeless endeavors. Dependence upon jinriki, however, does not suggest a subjectivistic causal principle. One's own efforts are equally dependent upon the exertions of all other beings. In SBGZ "Gyōji," Dōgen writes that the unrelenting activity of sustained exertion (gyō-ji) right-now is the basis of all selves and all Buddhas, all moments and all phenomena, and it is more fundamental than dependent origination.

"this" world and in "that" world are all in all the spontaneous manifestation and the passage of my utmost exertion. You should realize that without the passage of my utmost exertion at this very moment, there would be neither the manifestation of one single dharma or one single phenomenon, nor the passage of one single dharma or one single phenomenon.

Don't conceive of this passage as something like the wind and rain moving from east to west. There is nothing in the whole world that is not moving around, nothing that is not advancing or retreating, [nothing that is not in] passage. Passage is like spring in that all the various manifestations of spring themselves are passage. You must realize that there is passage nowhere else than in spring. For example, the passage of spring is necessarily that which passages in-and-through spring. Passage is not [just] spring; however, since it is the passage of spring, passage now completes the Way at the very time spring appears.[31] You must carefully examine the matter backwards and forwards.

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[31]The passage of spring is by no means separable from spring itself; it does not happen 'in' spring, or vice-versa, but is realized through the ever-varying display and diversified expressions, contexts, situations, and occurrences of spring. The flowers, hues, fragrances, sunlight, warmth, ambience, etc. are all passage. Yet, spring and passage are not merely identical since passage perpetually occurs at any and at every moment of being-time. As each phenomenon of spring appears, passage and spring continually complete and fulfill each other.

When those who do not concentrate single-mindedly on the Buddhist Way speak of passage, they tend to think it is something outside of which the objective world stands; and the Dharma that makes passage is misunderstood as moving eastward a hundred thousand worlds and a hundred thousand epochs away.[32]

One time Master Shih-t'ou instructed his disciple Master Yüeh-shan Hung-tao to visit Master Chiang-hsi Ta-chi. Yüeh-shan asked Ta-chi, "I have searched through all the essential doctrines of the three vehicles and the twelve schools, but what is the meaning of the Bodhidharma's coming from the West? [Hearing] this, Ta-chi replied:

> Sometimes teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes;
> Sometimes not teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes;
> Sometimes teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes is right;
> Sometimes teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes is not right.

Upon hearing these words, Yüeh-shan had great enlightenment (satori) and said to Ta-chi: "When I was Shih-t'ou's, I was as hard-headed as a mosquito trying to bite an iron

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[32]The bombu's conception of kyōryaku is linear, unidirectional, remote and removed from human existence, beyond man's reach, yet sweeping him away as it rushes by with the incessance and indifference of a rainstorm. Furthermore, the average man confuses the transmission of the Dharma -- symbolized by the Bodhidharma's coming from the West (from India to China) -- with the mere physical passing of doctrine from one country to another one.

cow."

What Ta-chi expresses here is essentially different from all others' expressions. The eyebrows and eyes must be the mountain and sea because the mountain and sea are the eyebrows and eyes. This "teaching him to raise" must be to see the mountain, this "teaching him to blink" is to overlook the sea. "It is right" is to become "his" common practice; "he" is persuaded by the "teaching." "It is not right" is not "not teaching him"; "not teaching him" is not "it is not right." These are one and all being-time.[33]

The mountain is time; the sea is time as well. If they were not time, there would be no mountain or sea. You must not think that there is no time right-now of the mountain and sea.[34] If time should deteriorate, the

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[33]Teaching and not-teaching, right and wrong are all temporal; none has absolute status or significance over and above the others. Here Dōgen recalls the Diamond Sutra dictum, "Nirvāna is not nirvāna, therefore nirvāna." The appropriateness of teaching or not-teaching in Zen instruction is determined by the concrete temporal context; each is realized in terms of its negation, just as uji is neither exclusively the mountaintop nor the depths of the sea (in the first poem of the chapter), but both occurrences interpenetrating one another simultaneously. The particular vantage point to be realized is continually shifting.

[34]Dōgen shows the undifferentiatable unity or identity of space and being-time. The mountain and sea as well as anyone who stands on or walks in them are nothing other than uji. They depend on time and are not manifested separable from time; time depends on them and is not manifested separable from them.

mountain and sea will deteriorate as well; and if time does not deteriorate, neither will the mountain or sea. For this reason, the bright star appears, the Tathāgata appears, the [Dharma-]eye appears, the uplifted flower appears. These are all time.[35] If there were no time, they would not be such as they are.

Zen Master Kuei-hsing of the Yeh district was a Dharma-successor of Lin-chi and transmitter of Master Shou-shan's teaching. One time, holding forth before a congregation, he said:

> Sometimes the intended meaning (i) gets there (tō), but the expression (ku) does not get there;
> Sometimes the expression gets there, but the intended meaning does not get there;
> Sometimes both the intended meaning and the expression get there concurrently;

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[35]The bright star is symbolic of Śākyamuni's enlightenment and triumph over the temptations and taunting of Mara at the age of 35 under the Bo tree; Tathāgata or "thus come" (nyorai) is the name for one who has clearly realized the thusness or suchness of conditioned phenomena, or the truth of reality such as it is without one-sided views or conceptual fabrications imposed upon and distorting it; the Dharma-eye is symbolic of a Buddha's unique power of insight and comprehension; the uplifted flower is symbolic of the origins of Zen when Śākyamuni silently presented a flower to Mahākāśyappa, the only monk who understood the meaning of his silence, thus initiating the spontaneous transmission from selfsame mind-to-selfsame mind which Bodhidharma, Dōgen's master Ju-ching, Dōgen, and all other Zen masters continually perpetuate as the kyōryaku of Dharma. The four appearances occur simultaneously as manifestations of uji; otherwise, there would be no appropriation, emulation and duplication of Śākyamuni's experience throughout all ages.

> Sometimes neither the intended meaning nor the expression get there.[36]

"Intended meaning" and "expression" are both being-time; "getting there" and "not getting there" are both time as well. While the time of getting there is unfinished, the time of not getting there is already here.[37] Intended meaning is a donkey, expression is a horse, or the horse

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[36]This poem is attributed to a Lin-chi (Rinzai) disciple and recalls the content and structure of Lin-chi's own famous saying: "Sometimes I snatch away the man but not the environment; sometimes I snatch away the environment but not the man; sometimes I snatch away both man and environment; sometimes I snatch away neither man nor environment" (from The Zen Teaching of Rinzai, trans. Irmgard Schloegl, Berkeley, Shambala, 1976, p. 19). Dōgen makes the point below that since getting there and not-getting there are both eminently temporal, there is no superiority of the former over the latter.

I means both intention and meaning as well as attention, care, and thought, implying that which is prior to what is said and what any saying actually conveys; it also signifies disposition, will(ing), etc. I has been used in Chinese Buddhist texts as a translation of manas (thought). In the Terada-Yaoka edition, kokoro is written in kana-form next to i, which is the kun-yomi for shin (mind, heart-mind, will), frequently used as a Chinese translation for citta (mind). Ku could mean generally language or expression, or specifically sentence, words and phrase, implying that which articulates and gives concrete expression to what is intended as the meaning to be conveyed. I and ku may be identical, or there may be great variance between them. Tō means reach or arrive in the sense of getting the point across or hitting the mark; it also implies arrival at the "other shore" of nirvāṇa

[37]Dōgen shifts the priority from the linear accomplishment of completion to the acting or the process itself. Not getting there is not a lesser or merely preliminary stage leading up to the arrival, but it is nothing other than uji already realized here-and-now.

is taken as expression and the donkey as intended meaning.[38] "Getting there" itself is not forthcoming, "not getting there" is not not-yet [forthcoming]; such is being-time. Getting there is obstructed by getting there, and not by not getting there. Not getting there is obstructed by not getting there, and not by getting there. Intended meaning penetrates through intended meaning and realizes intended meaning. Expression penetrates through expression and realizes expression. Obstruction penetrates through obstruction and realizes obstruction. All this is time. [The average man tends to think that] obstruction can be used by other dharmas, but there has never been any obstruction that obstructs other dharmas.[39] I meet people, people meet people, I meet myself, meeting meets meeting.[40] If

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[38]Neither intended meaning nor expression, neither the horse nor the donkey should be considered first or second as if in a sequence.

[39]Each of the four factors of experience cited in the poem "obstructs," that is, existentially penetrates and realizes itself. Obstruction here, recalling the Kegonian view, is paradoxically to be understood not as hindrance or impediment, but as the non-obstruction of a totalistic self-generating, self-fulfilling, self-renewing moment. Obstruction itself, as explained in the last two sentences, is a temporal event involving the mutual dependence, containment and reflection of harmoniously interpenetrating dharmas; it makes use of other dharmas, as do all interdependent phenomena, but it never hinders them in the conventional sense.

[40]A uniquely concrete illustration of the above notion. Myself and people, the particular and the totality, the individual and the universal, the phenomenon and the principle all "meet" (hō) or are mutually engaged in existential

these [matters] were not time, no such [meeting] would ever happen. Furthermore, intended meaning is the very moment of the immediate and complete realization of the kōan (genjōkōan).[41] Expression is the very moment of advancing upward and breaking through the barrier. Getting there is the very moment of casting off body[-and-mind]. Not getting there is the very moment of staying-here and leaving-here.[42] You should discern like this, you should see into being-time [as being-time] (uji subeshi).[43]

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encounter of intersubjective lived-experience. That is, all factors and perspectives penetrate, realize, "obstruct" each other. ". . . meeting meets meeting" (literally, "going out, shutsu, meets going out") conveys the ontologically non-obstructive interpenetration of all simultaneous manifestations of being-time.

[41]Genjōkōan is one of the central notions in Dōgen's philosophy of Zen, and is the subject of the first chapter of SBGZ. Dōgen uses it in contrast to the Rinzai view of kōan as a puzzle intuitively and suddenly solved, as if that in itself were satori. For Dōgen, the kōan is more than a riddle, but the Dharma fully and spontaneously disclosed, presented, revealed, or manifested right-now and perpetually renewed in each and every concrete activity and expression of the True Man (shinjin). In other words, satori is not necessarily "getting there" to a futurally anticipated goal, but is the "not getting there" or the time which has "not-yet come."

[42]The first two sentences in this sequence imply an ascension from genjōkōan realized in everyday life to the upward slashing of barriers in the supramundane world. But the point of the third sentence is that attainment is not as significant as the temporal process, whether manifest as getting there or not getting there.

[43]This sentence is almost impossible to translate because it uses uji as a verb, thus accentuating and intensifying its dynamic and existential nature.

Previous Zen masters have expressed it in all these ways; is there anything further to be expressed? Yes, I should add:

> Intended meaning and expression that get half way there are being-time;
> Intended meaning and expression that do not get half way there are also being-time.

You must investigate in this way.

> Teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes is a half way being-time;
> Teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes is a mistaken being-time;
> Not teaching him to raise his eyebrows and blink his eyes is an even more misleading being-time.[44]

In such a way, careful examination backwards and forwards, getting all the way there and not getting there are both this very moment of being-time.[45]

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[44]Instruction is limited in that whatever teaching is conveyed and understood invariably falls short of the whole truth of uji; but to refrain from teaching and not attempt to get any point across is a hopeless evasion of being-time.

[45]Even if one does not achieve genuine realization of being-time, the truth of uji still prevails; otherwise, enlightened realization would be conceived in terms of attainment in linear time.

# GLOSSARY OF JAPANESE TERMS

Amida (Buddha of Pure Land)

阿弥陀

*baige* (plum blossoms)

梅華

*bendō* (practice of the Way)

辨道

*bendōwa* (discourse on the practice of the Way)

辨道話

*bodai* (*bodhi*, wisdom)

菩提

*bombu* (average man)

凡夫

*busshō* (Buddha-nature)

仏性

*butsu-baku* (bonds of the Buddha)

仏縛

*butsukōjōji* (continuous development beyond Buddha)

仏向上事

*daimoku* (sacred title)

題目

Dōgen

道元

*dōri* (truth, reason, meaning)

道理

*dōtoku* (expressing the Way)

道得

*engi* (dependent co-arising)

縁起

fukan (applicable to all)

普勧

Fukanzazengi (universal admonition for zazen)

普勧坐禅儀

ga (ātman, self)

我

gabyō (painted rice-cake)

画餅

gakudō-yōjinshū (advice on learning the Way)

学道要心集

gedō (heresy)

外道

gendaigoyaku (modern Japanese translation)

現代語訳

genjō (manifestation, realization)

現成

genjōkōan (immediate and complete realization of Zen enlightenment)

現成公按

gosshiki (karmic consciousness)

業識

gyōbutsu (active Buddha)

行仏

gyōbutsu-igi (majestic activities of active Buddha)

行仏威儀

gyōji (sustained exertion)

行持

gyōji-dōkan (perpetuation of the Way through sustained exertion)

行持道環

hakanashi (fleeting, uncertain)

はかなし

hakujushi (cypress tree)

栢樹子

Heian (Japanese era, 794-1192)

平安

hō (dharma, experiential factor; Dharma, Law)

法

hō (meet, encounter)

逢

Hōkyō-ki (Record of Hōkyō Period)

寶慶記

hōjin (Body of Bliss)

報身

Hōnen (founder of Jōdo Sect)

法然

hōsshin (Body of Law)

法身

hosshin (resolve)

発心

hosshō (true nature of dharmas)

法性

hossu (Zen staff)

払子

hotsu-bodaishin (arising of the enlightenment-mind)

発菩提心

hotsu-mujōshin (arising of the supreme mind)

発無上心

i (intended meaning)

意

ikkya-myōju (one bright pearl)

一顆明珠

immo (such[ness])

恁麼

innen (conditioned origination)

因縁

ji (instant)

次

*ji* (time)
時
*jiji* (time's occurrence at any moment)
時々
*jiji-muge* (mutual non-obstruction of events and events)
事事無礙
*jinen-gedō* (naturalistic heresy)
自然外道
*jinen-hōni* (naturalism)
自然法爾
*jinriki* (utmost exertive power)
尽力
*jippō* (ten directions)
十方
*jiriki* (self-power)
自力
*jisetsu* (time, occasion)
時節
*jisetsu nyakushi* (if the time arrives)
時節若至
*jisetsu kishi* (time has already arrived)
時節既至
*jissō* (true form)
実相
*jōbutsu* (attainment of Buddha[hood])
成仏
Ju-ching (Dōgen's Chinese Zen master)
如浄
*jū-hōi* (*dharma*'s dwelling place)
住法位
*juki* (prediction of future Buddhahood)
授記
Kamakura (Japanese era, 1192-1338)
鎌倉

kankin (silent reading of sūtras)

看経

kan-kan (look!)

看々

kannō-dōkō (reciprocal spiritual communion)

感応道交

kattō (spiritual vines)

葛藤

Kegon (Japanese Mahāyāna sect; Hua-yen in China)

華厳

kenshō (seeing into one's [own original] nature)

見性

kikan (dynamic engagement)

機関

kōan (catechistic technique for Zen realization)

公案

kobusshin (original Buddha-mind)

古仏心

kōmyō (radiant light)

光明

ku (expression)

句

ku (suffering)

苦

kū-busshō (emptiness-Buddha-nature)

空仏性

kūge (flowers of emptiness)

空華

kūshu-genkyō (returning empty-handed to the native land)

空手還郷

kyōryaku (totalistic passage)

経歴

kyūjin (ultimate and complete realization)

究尽

mappō (age of degenerate law)
末法
mi-ten (prior-to-turning)
未転
mi-tō (not-yet come)
未到
mondō (Zen dialogue)
問答
mono no aware (poignant sadness of things)
もののあわれ
mu-busshō (no-Buddha-nature)
無仏性
muchū (dream)
夢中
muga (no-self, insubstantiality of phenomena)
無我
mujō (impermanence)
無常
mujō-busshō (impermanence-Buddha-nature)
無常仏性
mumonkan (gateless gate)
無門関
mu u henyaku (non-existence, existence, is change)
無有変易
nehan (nirvāṇa)
涅槃
nembutsu (recitation of the Buddha's name)
念仏
Nichiren (founder of Nichiren Sect)
日蓮
nikon (right here-and-now)
而今
nyorai (Tathāgata, Thus-come)
如来

nyūnan-shin (soft and flexible mind)
柔軟
ōjin (Body of Transformation)
応身
Rinzai (founder of Rinzai Zen Sect; Lin-chi in China)
臨済
saidan (cut off)
際断
sansuikyō (mountain and river sūtra)
山水経
satori (Zen enlightenment)
悟り
sennigedō (Senika heresy)
先尼外道
sesshin sesshō (explaining mind, explaining nature)
説心説性
shikan-taza (zazen-only)
只管打坐
shin (heart-mind)
心
shingen (manifesting body)
身現
shingi (authenticity)
真偽
shinjin (True Man)
真人
shinjin-gakudō (learning the Way through body and mind)
身心学道
shinjin-datsuraku (cast off body and mind)
身心脱落
Shinran (founder of Jōdo-shin Sect)
親鸞
shisho (transmission records)
嗣書

shitsu u busshō (all beings are Buddha-nature)
悉有仏性
shō (realization)
証
shoaku-makusu (refrain from evil)
諸悪莫作
shōbō (true law)
正法
shohō-jissō (true form of all dharmas)
諸法実相
Shōbōgenzō (Treasury of True Dharma-Eye)
正法眼蔵
Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki (Gleanings from Dōgen's Talks)
正法眼蔵随聞記
shōji (life-and-death)
生死
shugyō (practice)
修行
Shushō-gi (Meaning of Practice and Realization)
修証義
shutsu (going out)
出
sō (lakṣaṇa, form)
相
sokushinzebutsu (this mind itself is Buddha)
即心是仏
Sōtō (Zen sect founded in Japan by Dōgen; Ts'ao-Tung in China)
曹洞
Tendai (Japanese Mahāyāna sect; T'ien-t'ai in China)
天台
Tenzokyōkun (Instructions to the Chief Cook)
典座教訓
Terada To-oru
寺田透

to̅ (get there)

到

to̅datsu (penetration)

透脱

tsuki (moon)

月，都機

u (being)

有

u-bussho̅ (being-Buddha-nature)

有仏性

udonge (udambara flower)

優曇華

uji (being-time)

有時

ui-shinjin (True Man of rank)

有位真人

waka (31-syllable Japanese poem)

和歌

yuibutsu-yobutsu (only between Buddha and Buddha)

唯仏與仏

zazen (seated meditation)

坐禪

Zen

禪

zenki (total dynamism)

全機